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A B S T RAe T 
In attempting to evaluate British policy towards 
Korea during the years 1882- 1910 , the first requirement 
is to consider the nature of Korean society itself and 
the changes that were taking place within it . Korea , 
however , had a special historical relationship with China 
and there impinged on this both Japanese and Russian 
aspirations . As a r esult, British policy towards Korea 
has to be examined in the light of Britain ' s interests 
in the highly complex Far Eastern situation which,in turn, 
cannot be divorced from her global interests . The Study 
thus becomes one of an analysis of inter- state relation-
ships . 
The course of investigation flows from the British-
Korean Treaty of 1882 to the British response to the 
Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 . The main areas 
of investigation are the Port Hamilton Incident (1885-
1887) , the Sino- Japanese War (1894- 1895) , the Anglo -
Japanese Alliance (1902) , the Russo - Japanese War (1904 -
1905) and the renewal of the Anglo - Japanese Alliance 
(1905) · 
It is within the above framework that an attempt 
is made to consider the extent to which British policy 
towards Korea was determined by her attitude towards 
Korea alone and to what extent by far broader considerations . 
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PART ONE . THE OPENING OF KOREA 
CHAPTER 1. 
THE KOREAN INTERNAL SITUATION 
(1) The Political , Social and Economic Situation in Korea 
In the late nineteenth century Korea was under 
the rule of the Yi dynasty (1392 - 1910) , which was declining . 
The long continuous chronic factional strife among the ruling 
class since the sixteenth century and the financial chaos due 
to governmental corruption were some of the major inner 
factors for her eventual collapse . The Yi dynasty was a 
typical centralized f eudal society . The ent ire political , 
ideological and social basis df the Yi dynasty r ested on 
Neo - Confucianism , which also provided justification for the 
r epressiv e government of the ruling class . Although 
Confucianism had been introduced into Korea from China 
a long time ago, it had been developed very much in her own 
way in Korea . Neo - Confucianism was essentially anti -
Buddhist. During the previous Koryo dynasty ( 936 - 1392) 
the Buddhist priests had controlled much of the national 
economy and had wielded considerable power at Court . 
Further , they were the de facto rulers in the rural areas . 
However , after the establishment of the Yi dynasty 
Confucianism became the new creed . Buddhism and its monks 
were forced to withdraw before the triumphant Confucianism 
and the majority of the property of the Buddhist temples 
f . 1 was con lscated . 
1 . A Short History of Korea , East West Centre Press , 
Univ . of Hawaii , Honolulu , 1964 , pp . 58 - 61 , 77 - 81 ; 
Woo - Ke un Han , The History of Ko r e a , Eu1- Yoo Publishing 
Co. , Seoul , 1970 , pp . 203- 360 . 
The essence of Confucianism could be summed up 
in the eight steps to becoming a true gentleman : 
Investigate nature , Extend the boundary of knowledge , 
Make your purpose sincere , Regulate the mind , Cultivate 
personal virtue , Ru le the family , Govern the state , and 
Pacify the world . 2 Confucius postulated five virtues and 
five fundamental relationships as ethical principles : 
Benevolent love , Righteousness , Proper conduct , Wi sdom, 
and Faithfulness . The five principles in human relation-
2 . 
ships are the relationships between father and son , sovereign 
and subject , husband and wife , old and young , and friend and 
friend . 3 To keep proper relationships between these pairs , 
Confucius laid down fi ve articles of morality : Intimacy , 
Righteousness , Distinction , Obedience , and Faithfulness . 
When everybody observes these principles , a harmonious and 
peaceful social order will prevail . 
Confucius also believed in the doctr i ne of 
inequality , saying : 
' As soon as there were heaven and earth , there 
was the distinction of above and below (superior 
and inferior) , when the first wise king arose , 
2 . J . K. Fairbank , The United States and China , " The 
Great Learnings " in the Chinese Classics , Harvard 
University Press , 1948 , p . 74 
3 . Ib id ., p . 75 
3. 
the country he occupied had the division of 
classes . The ancient kings established the 
rules of proper conduct and divided the 
people into nobles and commoners , so that 
everybody would be under someone ' s control ' 4 
According to the Confucian view , inequality and distinction 
between superior and inferior were the natural order or 
innate in nature for the good of society . Government was 
not an institution based on law , but on morals . Therefore , 
to govern means to rectify the subjects according to the rule 
of proper conduct . The goal of good government was to 
introduce moral realism in which the peace and happiness of the 
people would prevail . This was the utopian society of the 
Confucian state system . 5 
The doctrine of inequality was an authoritarian element 
in Confucian thought . Confucius considered abolition of 
inequality as a return to a state of barbarism and chaos , In 
which men ' s desires have no limit . The five virtues and 
five fundamental ethical principles in human relationships 
were the explicit expression of an authoritarian feudalism . 
4. Melvin Frederick Nelson , Korea and the Old Order in 
Eastern Asia , Louisiana State University Press , 1946 , 
p . 17 ; James Legge , The Chinese Classics , Clarendon 
Press , Oxford , 1895 , Vol.l, p.103. 
5 . Bong- Youn Choy , Korea , A History , Charles E . Tuttle 
Co ., Rutland,Vermont , and Tokyo , 1971 , pp . 63 - 67 . 
Responsibility and authority should be in the hands of 
the superior virtuous men . The concepts of individual 
rights , freedom , and equality were alien to Confucian 
thought . This Confucian doctrine of inequality justified 
the social structure of the Yi dynasty , under which the 
population was divided into two classes : the rulers and the 
ruled . The Confucian concept of the ruler was a most 
forceful and convenient political ideology for a system 
of absolute monarchy . The concept of government by 
virtuous men gave the Confucian gentry an opportunity for 
setting up a Confucian bureaucratic regime . The affairs 
of government were monopolized by the Confucian hierarchy, 
since government positions depended on civil service 
examinations , which were based on a knowledge of Confucian 
classics : a knowledge reserved for those whose resources 
allowed them time for years of study . 
The Confucian scholars were the landed aristocracy . 
They considered manual labour inferior and made a sharp 
distinction between it and mental labour . They cultivated 
extreme conservatism and emphasized formalism , such as the 
correct ceremony of marriage , funeral service , and ancestor 
worship . In the course of the Yi dynasty ' s five hundred 
4 . 
years' rule , Confucianism , as a state creed, blocked progress , 
preserved the established social order , and perpetuated the 
literati ' s position of power . Both power and wealth were 
thus concentrated in the hands of a small privileged clique 
whose existence depended on the survival of an authoritarian 
. 6 
reglme . 
6 . Ji- Woon Kang , Kundae Chosun Jungchisa (Recent Korean 
Political History) , Seoul , 1950 , pp . 20- 24 . 
5 . 
Confucian idea also determined the relationship 
between Korea and China for many centuries . 
Inequality among nations, as among individuals , was 
thought to be the natural order of the world on the grounds 
that equality in relations between nations would produce 
disorder or war . China was regarded as superior because 
she was regarded as the land of the sages and virtues . 
Chinese rulers viewed all non- Chinese as uncivilized people 
who needed the guidance of the virtuous Chinese and they 
treated the neighbouring small states as tributary kingdoms . 
China dominated the neighbouring kingdoms through the 
penetration of Confucianism and Chinese culture rather than 
by using military power . 7 
The relationship between China and Korea was that of 
elder and younger brother within a family based on Confucian 
theories . One aspect of the relationship which puzzled 
Westerners , when they were pursuing negotiations for the 
opening of Korea , was that of investiture and the sending 
of missions by Korea to China with gifts and protestations 
of allegiance. The established custom of sending of 
missions to Peking to inform the Emperor of China of new 
heirs to the Korean throne or of deaths in the Korean royal 
family was strictly ceremonial without any idea of sub -
ordination other than that of respect and deference on the 
S part of a younger member of a family to its recognized head. 
7. M. F . Nelson , Korea and the Old Order in Eastern Asia, 
pp . 86 - 106 . 
8 . William Woodville Rockhill , China ' s Intercourse with 
Korea from the XVth Century to 1895 , London , Luzac & 
Co ., 1905 , pp. 3- 9 . 
6 . 
The annual missions sent by Korea to China did the bulk of 
the trading , although periodical trading was done at Wiju on the 
Yalu River . In other words , the so- called tribute missions 
actually became trading expeditions undertaken by the envoys , 
their suite and servants . What China expected of Korea was 
the payment of nominal tribute in order to maintain her over-
lordship as the 'Heavenly Empire' , and Korea enjoyed China ' s 
protection as well as trading privileges . 9 
The government of the Yi dynasty was in theory an 
absolute monarchy . Both the land and the people belonged 
to the king , and laws and precedents meant only a little . 
It was typically government by men rather than by law . 
The central government in Seoul consisted of a Council 
of State , the highest policy - making organ , and six admini-
strative departments : Civil Affairs , Revenue , Ceremonies , 
War , Punishments , Works . The country was divided into 
eight administrative provinces which were subdivided into 
smaller units of local governments . Local officials were 
vested with judicial and administrative powers subject to 
various controls by the central government . All civil and 
military appointments down to the lowest level of admini -
strative organization were made with the King ' s sanction 
from among those who passed competitive civil service 
examinations based on the Confucian Classics or military 
arts . 
9 • 
Key officials at the provincial and the county 
Payson J . Treat , China and Korea , 1885- 1894 , 
New York , Columbia University , 1934 , p . 509 
7 . 
levels were appointed by the central government for 
fixed and relatively short terms , and close surveillance 
was maintained over all local officials , which on occasion 
was carried out by secret agents who were appointed by and 
were directly responsible to the King . 
Control of the military establishment by civil 
officials was strictly observed . Military officials had 
to yield precedence to their counterparts of equal rank in 
the civil branch and the Department of War was usually 
headed by a scholar official . The military units in the 
capital consisted of the royal guards . In the provinces , 
the governor was ex officio the commander of the military 
forces , although he was often assisted by professional 
military officers. The ruling aristocracy of the society , 
called the Yangban , embraced both the civilian officials , 
drawn from the Literati , and the military officials , not all 
of whom would have reached the highest standard of the 
. . 10 Llteratl . 
In order words , there were two maln social divisions . 
On the one hand , there were the members of the royal family 
and the Confucian aristocracy (the Yangban) , and , on the 
other hand , there was the vast underprivileged mass of 
peasants , handicraft labourers , and slaves. Under 
10. Woo- Keun Han , The History of Korea , pp . 229 - 237 ; 
C. I . Eugene Kim , Han- kyo Kim , Korea and the Politics 
of Imperialism , 1876- 1910 , University of California 
Press , 1967 , p . 4. 
8 . 
Confucian ethical principles , each person ' s social status 
was fixed by his occupation . The scholar (the Sa) was on 
the top followed by the f a r me r (the Nong) , the artisan 
(the Kong) and the merchant (the Sang) . 
The title of the Yangban was bestowed by the King and 
could be inherited . Civilian and military retainers who 
had helped in establishing the Yi dynasty had entered the 
Yangban class . Later,the title was also given to those 
who passed the state civil service examination . The 
Yangban class had exclusive access to government positions , 
owned lands cultivated by tenants , and enjoyed the prestige 
and the privileges of the highest social class. The 
Yangban class divided into the Seoul Yangban and the rural 
Yangban , the latter consisting of those who had settled in 
various parts of the country usually after having incurred 
royal disfavour . The members of the Yangban class were 
landlords . The Yi dynasty rewarded those who had 
rendered service to the royal family or to the government 
by gifts of land , and the right to the land was hereditary 
and tax- exempt , which meant an absolute privilege in an 
agrarian society . The Yangban class amounted to only 
about three per cent of the total population by the end 
of the Yi dynasty . ll 
11 . Nihon Naikaku Tokei Kyoku , Dai Nihon Teikoku Tokei _ 
Nenkan (Japanese Statistical Yearbook) , Tokyo , 
1910 , p . 947 . 
9 . 
Rigidly separated from this ruling class,was the rest 
of the population , which was divided into three major 
classes : the Joongin (middle- men) , the Sangmin (commoners) 
and slaves . The Joongin class was numerically small and 
of minor political importance . It included the members 
of skilled professions such as medicine , painting , 
mathematics , astronomy . The Sangmin class was numerically 
the largest and included farmers , artisans , merchants , 
fishermen and various other occupational groups . The 
farmers constituted about 85 per cent of the entire popula-
tion . As most of the farmers were largely self- sufficient , 
the products of the other occupational groups were primarily 
destined for the consumption of the small economically 
unproductive elements in the country . There was no 
manufacturing c ~ass , and only one per cent of population 
was engaged in primitive handicraft work . The lowest sub -
class of the Sangmin included musical and acrobatic 
entertainers , sorceresses , butchers , tanner~ Buddhist monks . 
In addition, there remained a very small class of slaves , which 
. . . f . 12 
was an hlstorlcal survlval 0 no real lmportance . 
The traditional Korea was a highly stratified society 
with little mobility , in which the numerically small Yangban 
class ruled over the commoners , the majority of whom were 
farmers . The farm lands , the single most important source 
12 . Chosen Chusatsu Kempei Shireibu , Chosen Sahkai Ko 
(Analysis of Korean Society) , Keijo , 1912 , pp . 
37- 42 . 
10 . 
of wealth , were also the main source of government revenue , 
and farmers paid a land tax which accounted for nearly 70 
per cent of the total government revenues . In addition , 
farmers were required to supply labour for public works . 13 
Farming had been considered the foundation of the 
nation for centuries and one of the main duties of local 
magistrates had been . the promotion of agriculture . In 
reality , however , the government ' s performance fell far 
short of this ideal . The land system made the peasants 
into virtual serfs of the Yangban . The imposition of 
ever- increasing duties and taxes exacerbated the life of 
the peasants. Exploitation by local magistrates , clerks , 
the Yangban landlords , the Confucian academics , the 
princely houses and government agencies eventually brought 
the peasantry to near bankruptcy . 
What is called feudalism in Korea did not share the 
patterns of European feudalism . In Korea there was an 
early development of political centralization which , it 
may be argued , contributed to the basic static nature of the 
Korean economy . However , it can be suggested that it was 
Confucian teachings that largely contributed to economic 
stagnation . The Yangban were completely divorced from 
production , trade was tightly controlled to prevent excessive 
profit - making and merchants were relegated to the lowest 
level of the social structure . There was virtually no 
foreign trade , except for a small amount of private trading 
with China and limited trade through the tribute missions . 
13 . Chosen Sotokufu , Chosen no Kosaku Kanshu (Korean 
Tenant Farming Practices) , Keijo , 1929 , pp . 22- 23 , 
28 . 
11 . 
In addition , trade with Japan was kept at an equally minimal 
level . Thus , in addition to being a largely static society , 
Korea was also largely a closed society . 
Weak trade adversely affected the general development of 
industry by depressing the production of commodities for the 
market . The predominance of primitive methods in domestic 
production , primarily weaving and food processing for home 
consumption , also impeded industrialization. Industry was 
subjected to close government surveillance . Any innovation 
in technology was suppressed , specialization in manufacture 
was hardly known and the mining of raw materials was kept to 
a minimum . 
The ruling Yangban class continued to indulge ln vicious 
factional struggles which had pitted groups of high government 
officials and Confucian scholars against one another . 
Although these factions endeavoured to attack each other 
in the name of Confucian orthodoxy , the struggle was 
essentially nothing but a struggle for power . From the 
mid- sixteenth century , the ruling class began to divide 
into two rival factions , and later each of them divided 
into sub - factions creating an intricate web of alliances 
and counter- alliances . On the surface , factionalism arose 
over petty ritual and private matters , rarely over national 
affairs . At each occasion of royal succession or selection 
of the royal consort , there was a flare - up of new intrigues 
and sanguinary attacks . The emergence of a new faction in 
power invariably led to a wholesale purge and sometimes 
12 . 
physical elimination of opposition factions . Other 
important problems of the government and the nation 
appeared to have been subordinated to the requirement 
of this struggle within the ruling class . Engulfed 
in chronic partisan strife , the government was unable 
to govern , the centripetal system of bureaucracy lost 
its efficiency and impartiality , and there developed a 
widespread growth of extortion from peasantry and other 
corrupt practices , operated by officials whose own security 
f . 14 o tenure was uncertaln . 
The factional strife weakened the dynasty , hampered 
the functioning of the entire government , and spread its 
harmful effects far beyond the capital into every sector 
of local government and society . Although factionalism 
began to wane late in the eighteenth century , the 
government found itself in new difficulties as nepotism 
began to permeate all levels of government and to paralyse 
the administration. This problem arose largely because 
of the growing influence of royal in- laws . Nepotism 
crept not only into the appointment of officials , but 
also into the entire civil service structure . 
In 1864 , after the death of King Choljong , Lee Ha- Ung , 
father of the newly - enthroned twelve year old King Kojong 
(1864 - 1907) , became the regent . The title of Taewongun , 
Prince of the Great Court , was conferred on him . 
14 . Hadada Takashi , Chosenshi (Korean History) , Tokyo , 
1951 , pp . 125- 135 ; Woo - Keun Han , The History of 
Korea , pp . 298- 304 . 
13 . 
The Taewongun ' s regency left a lasting imprint on 
Korea , and he was the most prominent ruler of the Yi dynasty 
to attempt to introduce wide- ranging r e forms into Korea and 
at the same time preserve the ancient order of Korean society . 
The Taewongun soon set himself up as a dictator and ruled for 
ten years . The new ruler first set about breaking the power 
of clans and factions at Court and re - establishing royal 
authority and power . He expelled the Noron faction , which 
had been in power for more than a century , and introduced 
equal opportunity to all political factions . He was deter-
mined to stamp out factional warfare between the aristocrats 
and concentrated power in his own hands in order to clean up 
all factional influences in the government . He then 
announced his policy of equal opportunity , hoping in this way 
to eliminate the danger of one faction acquiring political 
monopoly . 
Old government institutions which had fallen into 
abeyance under clan rule were restored , in particular, the 
executive cabinet , The State Council. The legal codes 
were newly revised , as were the household law of the rcy al 
family and the rules of court ritual . In order to break 
the power of the factions and prevent their re - emergence 
at a later time , nearly all of the most powerful Sowon (the 
government - financed Confucian learning institutions) , which 
had become not only factional bases but also a means to evade 
military duty or taxes , were closed down . Corrupt local 
officials were strictly disciplined and their illicit 
profits confiscated . The land tax systems were also 
reformed . The lands which had been granted to the Confucian 
institutions by the government were transferred to the local 
private institutions , and for the first time tax was imposed 
upon the Yangban as well as commoners . 
These measures strengthened the monarchy , served 
the royal dignity and benefited the country . In certain 
directions , however , the Taewongun appears to have been 
fiscally blind . The new land and tax system did not 
release the commoners from the heavy burden of taxes . 
On the cont r ary , the Taewongun imposed more taxes on the 
peasants and also demanded compulsory labour from the 
peasants to reconstruct the Kyongbok Palace , which had 
been destroyed during the Japanese invasion in 1592 . 
Many of the Taewongun ' s reform measures were not received 
enthusiastically by the officials and were challenged 
outright by an active opposition movement . This opposi-
tion seems to have been directed not so much against 
14 . 
refor ms as such but against some of the Taewongun ' s initiatives 
that were felt to be incompatible with the traditional value 
system . 
However ~ the Taewongun himself also inherited the 
defects of Confucian thoughts : the rigidity of mind , 
resistance to change ~ refusal to face realities which 
conflicted with his beliefs . It was the tragic irony 
of his life that he came to power at a time when the 
ideals in which he sincerely believed and attemp ted to 
apply had become outmoded , because they no longer 
corresponded to the real world . Only a dynamic society 
with rapidly expanding commerce and industry could success -
fully oppose the mounting pressure from the West , as the 
example of post- Meiji Japan had clearly shown . The 
Taewongun could not see this . His only answer to 
Western pressure was to attempt to isolate Korea com-
pletely from the outside world , refusing all foreign 
contact and violently repressing all foreign ideas at 
home . His persiste~ policy of seclusion and his 
persecution of Christianity only helped , as was shown 
later , to increase intervention by the Western Powers . lS 
15 . For full details of the Taewongun ' s politics , see 
Ching- Young Choe , The Rule of the Taewongun , 
1864- 1873 , Restoration in Yi Korea , Harvard 
University Press , 1972 . 
15 · 
(2) Korea ' s External Relations and the Early Approaches 
by the Foreign Powers 
The peninsula of Korea , constituting the heart of 
the strategic triangle of North- Eastern Asia , has played 
the role of the determining factor in the course of the 
Far E~stern history . Particularly in the modern period , 
16 . 
Korea has been ' the master key ' to many Far Eastern problems 
because of her geographical location. The history of 
Korea ' s external r elations has been primarily the record 
of her relationships with the neighbouring Powers , China 
and Japan . Korea ' s contact with outsiders was first made 
with the Chinese as early as 1122 B. C., and f or s ever al 
thousand years , Chinese culture and influence con-
tinuously penetrated into the peninsula . l 
As mentioned in the last chapter , Confucian culture 
can both explain and justify all r elationships in terms 
of relations within a family . Relations between a king 
and people or between a teacher and a student can , be 
explained as an extension of the relation between father 
and son in a family . International relations are the 
extension of inter- personal relations within a family . 2 
1. William Eliott Griffis , Corea : the Hermit Nation , 
New York , Charles Scribner ' s Sons , 1911 , pp . 12- 13 , 
First Edition , 1882 , London . 
2 . W. W. Rockhill , China ' s Intercourse with Korea , p . 3 . 
The cardinal principle of foreign policy of the Yi 
dynasty was the ' Sadae - Kyorin' (Serving the Big and 
Friendly with the Neighbours) . ' Sadae ' referred to 
the relationship with China , and ' Kyorin ' to that with 
Japan . The inequality between a superior and an 
inferior was as natural in international relations as 
it was in inter- personal relations . Korea owed loyalty 
to China as an elderly brother nation and treated Japan 
in a friendly manner as her equal . This principle was 
17 . 
represented mainly by the periodic and ceremonial exchange 
of official envoys and limited trade relations by means of 
the exchange of official gifts among the three countries . 
These limited barter exchanges were maintained under 
official supervision and conducted by licensed merchants 
at two border towns between Korea and China , and in the 
course of the periodic visits paid by the Japanese merchants 
from the island of Tsushima to the Korean port Pusan when 
they carne to obtain food and other necessities for the islanders . 
Except for these transactions , the Korean borders and coasts 
were completely sealed . 3 
The somewhat peculiar form of subservience of Korea 
to China , based on the oriental philosophy of Confucianism , 
was most confusing to Westerners . They were accustomed 
to interpret the international relations in the light of 
3 . M.F . Nelson , Korea and the Old Orders in East Asia , 
Ch. 6 ; George M. McCune , ' Exchange of Envoys between 
Korea and Japan durin the Toku awa period ', Far 
Eastern Quarterly , V (May , 19 ), pp . 30 - 325-.--
international law and concepts such as Sovereignty, 
Freedom , and Equality . For them the nature of Korea ' s 
relationship to China was a real puzzle . When they 
were told , at one and the same time , that ' Korea , though 
a vassal and tributary state of China , was entirely in-
dependent as far as her government , religion , and inter-
course with foreign states were concerned ', it was too 
f . 4 con uSlng to understand . These confusions occurred In 
many cases later , especially in the Treaty relations 
which developed between Korea and the Foreign Powers . 
For example , in 1871 , in reply to the request of the 
United States Minister in Peking , Frederick F . Low , about 
' the General Sherman ' incident , 5 the Tsungli Yamen , the 
Chinese Foreign Office , wrote that : 
' Although Korea is regarded as a country subordinated 
to China , yet she is wholly independent in everything 
that relates to her government , her religion , her 
4. W.W . Rockhill , op . cit ., p . 1 . 
5 . ' The General Sherman' Incident follows on pp . 33- 34 . 
18 . 
prohibitions , and her laws ; in none of these 
things has China hitherto interfered ,. 6 
These problems will be developed in detail in subsequent 
chapters. It was difficult for Westerners to understand 
that even the investiture by the Emperor of China of the 
King of Korea , which was for many centuries the most 
19. 
important act of suzerainty exercised by China over Korea , 
was a strictly ceremonial relation involving no idea of 
subordination , other than that of the respect and deference 
on the part of a younger member of a family to its recognized 
head . This was also the case with the investiture of the 
Kings of Siam and Annam : these were essentially ceremonial 
relations . 7 
Until the late nineteenth century Korea was able to 
keep her policy of total exclusion toward the rest of the 
world with exception of bare minimum dealings with her 
immediate neighbours , China and Japan . Among the reasons 
why Korea was able to remain as ' the Hermit Nation ' even after 
the openings of China and Japan were the following : 
(a) As most of the Western Imperial Powers came by sea , 
they tended to concentrate on India , South Eastern Asian 
countries , China and Japan . Korea ' s geographi cal pos i tion 
was remote from their main sea routes . 
6 . The Tsungli Yamen to Low , 28 March 1871 , enclosed 
In Low to Fish , No . 29, 3 April 1871 , U. S . Dept . 
of State , Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States , 1871- 2 , p . 112 ., hereafter 
referred to as U. S . Foreign Relations . 
7. W. W. Rockhill , op . cit ., pp . 3- 6 . 
(b) Great Britain , France , the United States and 
Russia were respectively all too busy in India and 
China , Annam , Japan,and Siberia and Vladivosto ck . 
Further , they regarded Korea as less interesting 
e conomically. 
(c) As for Korea itself , a combination of historical 
circumstances , the situation of Yi dynasty and the 
e ffect of the impact of the Western Powers on China all 
led the Taewongun to pursue a strict isolation POlicy . 8 
However , from the end of the eighteenth century 
onwards , the Far Eastern countries had already begun to 
fe e l increasing pressures from the Western Powers . This 
was touched off by the Opium War , which resulted in the 
five open ports of China in 1842 by the Nanking Treaty . 
It was followed by the opening of Japan only twelve years 
20 . 
later. It was , therefore , natural that Korea alone could 
not be left out of the incre asing Western influence . 
Despite Ko r ea ' s desire to be left alone , reports of ' strange 
looking ' ships , both merchant and naval , reached Seoul with 
increasing frequency . 9 
8 . Byung- Do Lee , Kuksa Daikwan (The History of Ko rea) , 
Seoul , 1958 , pp . 502- 3 ; Kuk- Joo Shin , Hankuk 
Keundai JungchiWae gyosa , (Studies in Modern Political 
and Diplomatic History of Korea) , Seoul , 1965 , pp . 
25 - 2 7 . 
9 . Nung- Hwa Lee , Chosun Kidokgyo Waegyosa (History of 
Christianity and Foreign Relations of Korea) , Seoul , 
1925 , pp . 70 , 130- 134 ; M. F. Nelson , op . cit ., p . 110 . 
Most of the first Western ships , which attempted 
to open trade with Korea , were British ships . The 
first among them was ' The Argonaut ', under the command of 
Captain James Colnett , which , in August 1791 , passed the 
Quelpart Island off the south coast of Korea and tried 
a n approach to the Korean officials several times but 
without success . In September 1797 , Captain William 
21 . 
Robert Broughton on ' The Providence ' surveyed the northeast 
coast of the Sea of Japan and named the bay embracing the port 
o f Wonsan and Port Lazareff as Broughton Bay . After investi-
gation of Port Hamilton and Quelpart Island , he returned 
back to Macao in November 1797 . In 1816, ' HMS Lyra ' and 
' HMS Alcesto', which had just conveyed ' The Lord Amherst ' s ' 
mission to Peking; , came to the southwest coast of Korea . 
Captain Basil Hall , commander of ' The Lyra ', recorded his 
e leven days survey of the coast and gave the groups of 
islands off the shore the name of Sir James Hall Islands , 
in memory of his father , who was at that time President of 
the Edinburgh Geographical Society . lO But neither 
Broughton nor Hall made any e ffort to penetrate into the 
country or to establish contact with Korean people . In 
183 2 , the British East India Company made an effort to 
open trade with Korea by sending ' The Lord Amherst' on a 
10 . Joseph H. Longford , The Story of Korea , New York~ 
C. Scribner ' s Sons , 1 911 , pp . 225 - 6; W. L . Clowes , 
The Royal Navy : A History , London , 1897 - 1903 , Vol . 
IV , pp . 562- 3 . 
22 . 
voyage of commercial exploration in July . She came to 
the west coast near Kojae Island and stayed there nearly 
one month , but this expedition , too , accomplished little . 
An interesting point was that the Prussian missionary , Charles 
Gll tzlaff , came as a passenger and landed on several islands 
and offered Korean officials and people many scientific 
11 
and religious books and potatoes , but these were refus e d . 
When it is remembered that these events occurred nearly 
twenty years before the opening of Japan by the American 
Admiral , Perry , it is interesting to speculate how 
differently the history of both Korea and the Far East 
might have developed if these approaches had been successful . 
But they were not . Later , in 1845 , ' The Samarang ', under th e 
command of Captain Edward Belcher , conducted another important 
survey on the coasts of Quelpart mland and the harbour of 
Port Hamilton as well as on the coast of Bo rneo and Nagasaki . 
' The Samarang ' s ' voyage made Quelpart l sland and Port 
Hamilton bett er known both geographically and in relation 
12 to British naval strategy . 
11 . W. E . Griffis , Corea , the Hermit Nation , pp . 359 - 360 . 
12 . W. L . Clowes , op . cit ., Vol . VI , p . 522 ; Sir Edward 
Belcher , Narrative of the Voyage of HMS Samarang 
during the years 1843- 46 , London , Reeve & Co ., 
1848 , Vol . I , pp . 324- 358 . 
23 . 
One of the most interesting chapters in the history 
of Catholicism in Korea is its beginning . From the 
early sixteenth century , Korea possessed a rudimentary 
knowledge of the Western world and Christian religion . 
Because of her geographical position , Korea received this 
at second hand through China . But , nevertheless , she 
did acquire some knowledge of European thoughts and insti-
tutions . The beginning of Catholicism in Korea is of 
particular interest . Unlike many other countries , where 
the Christian religion was first brought ln by foreign 
missionaries , in Korea it began with a kind of ' self- study ' 
of Christian literature by native scholars . After a long 
period of this ' self- study ', in 1783 the first Korean 
convert to the Western religion , Sung- Hoon Lee , was baptized 
in Peking and returned home next year . The new faith 
rapidly spread among the Namin (the men of the South) , the 
faction to which the first Korean Christians belonged and 
which was estranged from the ruling power at that time as a 
result of its defeat in earlier power struggles . 13 
Initially Christianity was popular more as a curious 
knowledge rather than as a religion among Korean peoples . 
Some elements of Christian doctrine , however , fundamentally 
conflicted with certain basic ethical and ritual principles 
of Confucianism . The most heretical element of the 
religion was its abandonment of the established rite of 
13 . Urakawa Wasaburo , Chosen Junkyoshi (A History of 
Korean Martyrdom) , Osaka , 1944 , pp. 36- 44 . 
sacrifice to the deceased . Many Confucians objected 
that Catholicism did not take cognizance of the King and 
parents , but recognized only God . But these criticisms 
did not lead the authorities to ban Christianity . The 
r eal and most important factor in the official suppression 
of Catholicism which follow ed Sung- Hoon Lee ' s baptism was 
political factional strife . When the first wave of anti-
Christian suppression hit the nascent Christian community 
in 1801 , the target was as much the Namin faction as the 
wicked religion of the West . 14 
From 1794 , fore ign missionaries had started to come 
into Ko/rea . The first was a Chinese priest Chou Wen- Mo , 
who came in 1794 but was executed in the 1801 persecution . 
24 . 
Between 1836 and 1837 three French priests, Pierre- Philibert 
Maubant , Jacques - Honore Chastan , Laurent - Marie- Joseph Imbert , 
were smuggled into Korea , but they too were executed in the 
second persecution of 1839 . Although this second perse-
cution of 1839 at least arrested the Christian movement in 
Korea temporarily , the many who survived soon began to 
continue their evange listic work with even greater vlgour 
and intensity . In 1845 , the first Korean priest , Dae - Kun Kim 
~ndre Kim) was ordained in China and returned to Ko r ea . 
14 . Nung- Hwa Lee , op . cit ., pp . 70 , 130- 134 ; M. F . Nelson , 
op . cit ., p . 110 ; Oda Shogo , An Outline of Factionalism 
in the Yi Dynasty and Notes on Catholic Persecution , 
Tokyo , Seikyu Gakuso , 1930 , Vol . I , pp. 1- 26 . 
25 . 
Shortly after his return Kim left for Shanghai , and later was 
smuggled in again with two French missionaries , Jean 
Joseph Ferreol , who succeeded Imbert as Inshop , and 
Marie- Antoine - Nicolas Daveluy . 15 Although Kim 
himself was executed in 1846 , the evangelic work under 
the leadership of the two new French missionaries and 
others , who came after them , prospered greatly . It 
is said that in 1861 there were 18 , 000 converts in Korea , 
and , by 1865 , there were more than 20 , 000 converts and 
16 twelve French missionaries in the country . 
An examination of a variety of sources indicates that 
the Taewongun seems to have had no definite intention to 
suppress the Christians , at least at the beginning . Even 
his wife was said to have inclined to Catholicism for some 
time , and the Taewongun himself had wide contact with the 
Namin , many of whom were hereditary Cathol ics. 17 So it 
was a great blunder and no adequate explanation has so far 
been offered as to the reason for his engaging in the 
Catholic massacre of 1866 . 18 But there are some tentative 
15 · 
16 . 
17 . 
18 . 
Ibid ., Vol . I , p . 17; Urakawa , op.cit ., pp . 21 , 100 , 
121 , 709 - 744 . 
W. E. Griffis , op . cit ., p . 372 . 
Kikuchi Kenjo , Kindai Chosensi (A History of Modern 
Korea) , Tokyo , 1940 , Vol . I , p . 98 . 
It is regrettable that the Taewongun left no Memoirs 
orother r el iable records . 
26 . 
explanations as follows . 
The Taewongun had been aware of renewed Russian movements 
along the no rth - eastern Korean border > a t r ouble spot since 
Russia had completed her initial expansion policy in Siberia 
and to the Far East > thus achieving a common border with 
Korea for the first time in history in 1 860 . 19 The 
appearance of a Russian gunboat off the coast of Port Lazareff 
demanding a right to trade in 1866 , among other several minor 
border incidents between Korea and Russia > seemed to have 
persuaded certain prominent Korean Catholics to urge the 
Taewongun to ally himself with the Wes te rn ~owers (France 
and Great Britain) against Russia > to use Catholic Priests 
as negotiators > and to revoke the prohibition against 
Christianity . The two priests themselves , Berneux and 
Daveluy > however > failed to show any enthusiasm > because 
they were little inclined to p olitics , and time lapsed 
before any results emerged . Whether the Taewongun thought 
he had been tricked by the converts when the Russian ship 
left without causing trouble , whether he thought the Priests 
were playing a devious game , or whether the whole affair was 
a ruse of the extreme anti - foreign faction , is not clear . 20 
19 . The Russian Far Eastern expansion will be 
examined on pp . 67 - 69 . 
20 . Nung- Hwa Lee , op . cit ., Vol. II , pp . 33- 39 ; Kikuchi 
Kenjo , op . cit ., Vol . I > pp . 92 - 100 ; H. B . Hulbert , 
History of Ko r ea , Calrence Norwood Weems ed ., London , 
Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1905 , Vol . II , p . 205 ; 
Edinburgh Review , Vol. 136 (Aug. -Oct. 1872), pp.299-335. 
27 . 
Increasing pressure was put on the Taewongun by the 
anti - Christian elements in the government to sanction the 
arrest and trial of missionaries and heretics . He finally 
had to take a strong stand against Catholicism . In the 
persecution of 1866 , nine French missionaries , including 
two Bishops , were apprehended and executed , and the number 
of native converts , who fell victim to this wave of perse-
cution In 1866 and following years , is estimated to have 
reached nearly 8 , 000 . 21 Three French priests Felix--
Clair Ridel , Stanislas Feron , Adolphe- Nicolas Calais -
who luckily escaped the arrest and execution , informed 
Admiral Pierre- Gustave Rose , the commander of the French 
Asiatic Squadron in Tientsin , and this led to a French 
punitive expedition . 
French act i vities in the Far East during the 1850 ' s 
and 1860 ' s had been largely associated with the militant 
surge of the Catholic missionary movement , with naval and 
other measures taken in support . The missionar y ' s 
assignments covered portions of eleven provinces of China 
proper and peripheral Tibet , Manchuria and Korea . The 
reception accorded to French missionaries varied widely and 
in Annam and Korea they suffered seve r e persecution and 
hardship . The reaction of the French gover nment was 
21 . Hulbert , op . cit ., Vol . II , p . 211 . ' From 1866 till 
1870 , the persecution was destined to rage wi th 
unabated fury and the French estimated the numbe r 
killed at 8 , 000 . The tales of that terrible time 
remind one of the persecutions under the Roman 
Emperors or the no less terrible senses of the 
Spanish Inquisition '. 
sympathetic , but they were unable to embark on such 
adventures in the early 1850 ' s because they lacked the 
necessary naval facilities for the task . In addition , 
they were deeply engaged in the Taiping r ebe llion and the 
Near Eastern crisis at that time . Earlier , the French 
government had not undertaken reprisals for the Korean 
persecution of the three French priests In 1839 . 22 
On receipt of the report from Admiral Rose , Henri 
de Bellonet , the French Charge d ' Affaires at Peking , 
decided on reprisals without waiting for instructions 
from Paris . He announced to Prince Kung , the Head of 
28. 
the Tsungli Yamen , that since China had r epeatedly renounc ed 
authority over Korea , France would take immediate action by 
invading that country . 23 Prince Kung , foreseeing that 
assertion of Chinese suzerainty over Korea would lead to 
demands on China for reparations , adopted a policy of 
evasion by stating that China had never interfered with 
the internal affairs of Korea . 24 Bellonet seized upon 
the opportunity and proceeded against Korea as an independent 
kingdom . 
22 . John F . Cady , The Roots of French Imperialism in 
Eastern Asia , New York , Ithaca , 1954 , pp . 98- 100 . 
23 . Bellonet to Prince Kung , enclosed in No . 122 , 
Burlingame to Seward , 12 December 1866 . u . S . 
Foreign Relat ions , 1867 , Pt . I , p . 420 . 
24 . Ibid ., p . 421 . 
After a preliminary survey of the Korean coast in 
September 1866, on 11 October , Admiral Rose left Chefoo 
with his Far Eastern fleet of seven ships and about 600 
men including the marines from the camp at Yokohama . 
29 . 
One of the passengers was Father Ridel, who had volunteered 
to serve as interpreter . On 16 October , Admiral Ros e 
launched a general attack on the city of Kanghwa, west of 
Seoul , the traditional haven of Korean Kings in times of 
foreign invasions and domestic disorders , with his entire 
force and captured it with little r e sistance from the 
Koreans . Having captured Kanghwa I Sland, Admiral Rose 
inte nded to block the lower course of the River Han and 
thus to stop the flow of tribute rice into Seoul . 
But the Korean Government was determined to resist 
and mobilize d 30 , 000 soldiers of which 5 , 000 were sent to 
the front line. The invasion was practically brought to 
an end by what was called the Battle of Mt . Chongjok . On 
8 November , a French force of 160 marines , under the command 
of Captain Olivier , attacked the fortress of Mt . Chongjok 
but was defeated by a Korean force of about 540 men , mainly 
the tiger huntrers . In this attack the French were estimated 
to have suffered nearly fifty casualties , while the Koreans 
claimed losses of only one man killed and three wounded . 
This defeat forced Admiral Rose to reassess the plans for 
the expedition. The blockade of the River Han had little 
effect and there seemed no hope of negotiations with the 
Korean government . The possibility of a general attack by 
the growing Korean army and the freezing of the Rive r Han fi nally 
forced him to withdraw from the Korean coast on 10 
November . 25 
30. 
With the withdrawal of the French fleet , the Taewongun ' s 
first war with a Western Power ended , and his seclusion 
policy was vindicated . Louis Napoleon repudiated 
, . d ' . 26 Bellonet s unauthorlz 2d un ertaklng and recalled hlm . 
The Taewongun and his government were now more convinced 
than ever that the corning of the French was the result of 
the treacherous work of the Christians and his policy 
towards the heretics became more oppressive during and 
after the French invasion . In fact , it may be said that 
his real persecution of Catholics started after the French 
retreat . The invasion also drove the Taewongun to intro-
duce a more extreme anti- Western policy and led him to 
misjudge the real strength of the Western Powers and their 
true motives in corning to Korean shores . After 1866 he 
persistently viewed all other Western nations as mere 
reflections of the hated French , and this , in some respects, 
led him to the following clash , this time with the Americans . 
Soon after his victory over the French in 1866 , the 
Taewongun ordered the erection of stone tablets throughout 
the country inscribed with an anti - foreign declaration : 
25 . Sun- Keun Lee , Hankuksa , (History of Korea) , Seoul , 
Eul - Yoo Publishing Co ., 1961 , pp . 246- 274 ; 
W. E. Griffis , 0t . cit ., pp . 377- 383 ; Edinburgh 
Review , Vol . 13 (July - Oct . 1872) , pp . 167- 169 . 
26 . Tyler Dennet , ' Seward ' s Far Eastern Policy ', 
American Historical Review , Vol . 28 (1922 - 23) , 
pp . 51- 54 . 
' The barbarians from beyond the seas have 
violated our borders and invaded our land . 
If we do not fight , accord must be made . 
Those who urge accord sell the i r country . 
Let this be a warning to ten thou sand 
generations .' 27 
At this juncture , a Prussian adventurer named Oppert 
31 . 
tried to open trade with Korea . For this purpose heh a d made 
two voyages to the west coast of Korea in 1866 , one in 
March and the other in August , but nothing resulted from these 
. . 28 
mlSSlons . In 1868, Oppert organiz ed a small private 
expedition , as he claimed at the suggestion of the French 
priest , Monsignor Stanislas Feron , who was one of three 
escapees from the 1866 persecution . Feron ' s idea was to 
get hold of the Taewongun ' s royal family relics in the 
belief that this would force the Taewongun to open 
negotiations for free trade and for the free propagation 
of the Christian religion . The relics were the remains of 
the Taewongun ' s father , Prince Namyon . 29 The expedition 
left Shanghai in two steamers ( ' The China ' and ' The Greta ' ) 
in April , 1868 . The members were of all nationalities : 
27 . G. H. Jones , ' The Taewongun ' , Korean Repository , Vol . 
V (1898) , p . 247 . 
28 . Ernes t Oppert , A Forbidden Land : Voya es to · the Co r ea , 
London , 1880 , pp . 17 - 2 9 ; Sun- Keun Lee , Op . Clt ., pp . 
286- 292 . 
29 . Ibid ., pp . 291- 301 ; Grif f is , op . cit ., p . 398 . 
32 . 
German (Oppert) , French (Feron) , American (Frederick 
Jenkins) , some European., Chinese, and Filipino sailors , 
and several Korean converts . They arrived at an 
island on the west coast of Korea in May , and marched 
toward Duksan , calling themselves Russian soldiers , and 
finally reached the tomb . But before they could unearth 
the hidden treasures , news reached the Taewongun who took 
immediate action . Faced by attacks of Korean troops , 
Oppert and his company had to retreat . On their return 
to Shanghai , Jenkins was charged with making an unlawful 
expedition and the American Cpnsul - General , George F . Seward , 
put him on trial but released him with the verdict not 
proven . 30 
The importance of the Oppert affair was its effect on 
the attitude of the Koreans . The Tae wongun and the Court 
had before thei r eyes a confirmat::bn of their s us picion that 
the chief purpose of foreign invaders was to rob the dead 
. d · . 31 f 0 t ' and vlolate human 19n1ty . The savagery 0 pper s 
party heightened the Taewongun ' s anti- Western sentiments 
and brought the seclusion policy to its climax . It was 
during this time that American diplomatic overtures to Korea 
began . Thus , in historical retrospect , it may be said 
that these advances were doomed to failure even before they 
had started . 
30 . George F. Seward to the Secretary Seward , No . 29 4, 
3 July 1868 , u . S . Foreign Relations , 1870- 71 , 
p . 337 . 
31 . Griffis , op . cit ., p . 400 . 
33 . 
Until the French expedition and even during the 
period of the opening of Japan by Commodore Perry , the 
United States had had no relationship at all with Korea . 
On 24 June 1866 , an American merchantship , ' The Surprise ', 
was wrecked on the west coast of Korea . Captain McAslin 
and his crew of seven men were treated with great care 
and kindness by the Korean authorities , particularly in 
contrast to the treatment they received later from the 
Chinese authorities . They were supplied with food and 
returned to China by way of Mukden . 32 The Americans 
were so impressed by what the Koreans had done for the 
crew of ' The Surprise ' that they were much puzzled by 
the apparent paradox of Korean conduct , when another 
American merchantship ' The General Sherman ' received a 
very different treatment three months later . 
In July , 186 6, the owner of the American schooner 
' The General Sherman ', W. B. Preston , arranged with Meadow 
& Co ., a British firm in Tientsin , to send his ship to 
Korea with a cargo of miscellaneous merchandise . The 
schooner left Tientsin on 29 July for Korea and reached the 
Taedong River in rorth - western Korea in August . It forced 
its way towards the city of Pyongyang , subjecting Korean 
32 . Asiatic Squadron Letters in The United States 
Department of Navy Archives , 1865- 1866 , Vols . 
93- 94 . 
34 . 
officials to many indignities . They seized Hyon- Ik Lee , 
the Deputy Commander of the Pyongyang military headquarters , 
and , as a result , many citizens of Pyongyang gathered on 
the bank of the River Taedong demanding his release . As 
the situation was becoming serious the captain of the 
schooner decided to leave the river , but this was impossible , 
because a sudden drop in the water level had made the river 
no longer navigable . In panic the sailors ran wild and 
shot and killed several Koreans. The situation became 
uncontrollable . Flaming small Korean junks surrounded 
the schooner and at last burned it on 2 September . All 
the crew members were either shot or burned to death in 
the Ship . 33 
News of the fate of ' The General Sherman ' was brought 
to China by the French missionary , Ridel , who had been a 
member of Admiral Rose ' s French expedition of 1866 . On 
receiving the news , the American Consul- General , S . Wells 
Williams , approached the Tsungli Yamen with a request to 
secure the return of any members of the ship ' s crew who might 
. 34 have survlved . At the same time , Meadows & Co ., the 
British company that had sent the schooner to Korea with 
her cargo of miscellaneous merchandise , asked the American 
Minister in Peking , Burlingame , and the British Admiral for 
33 . Burlingame to Seward , No . 124 , 15 December 1866 , 
u . S . Foreign Relations , 1866 , pp . 426 - 428 ; Griffis , 
op . cit ., p . 391 . 
34 . Williams to Seward , No . 44 , 24 October 1866 , 
u . S . Foreign Relations , 1867 , Pt . I , pp . 416 - 417 . 
help in the matter . 35 However , the Tsungli Yamen , 
judging that Korea might become involved in a new clash 
with Britain and the United States , wished to minimize its 
own involvement . Being caught between Korea ' s insistence 
on maintaining her seclusion policy and the demands of the 
Western countries for her mediating services between them 
and Korea , the Tsungli Yamen claimed that the traditional 
tributary relationship between China and Korea was only a 
ceremonial one , and that China had no responsibility for 
Korea ' s management of foreign relations and trade . 36 
Minister Burlingame saw no use in seeking China ' s 
help in the matter , and decided to take independent action 
to determine the fate of ' The General Sherman '. He 
suggested to Rear Admiral H. H. Bell , Acting Commander of 
the United States Asiatic Squadron , that he should send a 
warship to Korea to e nquire about the lo~vessel . Bell 
assigned Robert W. Shufeldt , commander of the warship ' The 
Wachusett ', to the mission . On 21 January 1867 , ' The 
35 . 
Wachusett ' left for Korea , but , on arrival , was unsuccessful 
in attempting to deliver a letter to the Korean authority . 
Shufeldt returned with information , obtained from the 
Korean natives , that a Western vessel had been set on fire 
35. Burlingame to Seward , No . 124 , 15 December 1866 , 
Enclosure B: Messrs, Meadow & Co . to Burlingame , 
Ibid ., p . 428 . 
36 . Burlingame to Seward , No . 124 , 15 December 1866 , 
Ibid ., pp . 426 - 427 . 
36 . 
on the Taedong River and all her crew had been killed . 37 
In view of this report , the American Consul- General , 
Williams , again decided to seek help from the Chinese 
authorities . But , again , the Tsungli Yamen replied 
equivocally that although Korea was subordinate to China , 
all matters such as official ordinances to keep order and 
interdict trade with foreign lands and the propagation of 
alien religions were actually carried out independently by 
Korea and on her own responsibility . The Tsungli Yamen 
f .. 38 re used to take any dlrect actlon . As a result , Williams 
decided to send another warship and requested the Commander 
of the United States Asiatic Squadron , Commodore J . R. 
Goldsborough , to do so . In early April 1868 , ' The 
Shenandoah ', under the command of Captain John C. Febinger , 
left Chefoo for Korea , but this mission also failed to 
obtain any further information . 39 
Meanwhile , a change of administration took place in 
the United States . General Ulysses S . Grant succeeded 
Andrew Johnson as the President and Hamilton Fish took over 
the Department of State from William H. Seward . The 
37 . Ibid ., p . 428 , Enclosure A; Charles O. Paullin , 
DIPlomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers , 
1778- 1883 , Baltimore , The Johns Hopkins University 
Press , 1912 , p . 284 . 
38 . Williams to Seward , No . 18 , 31 July 1868 . U. S . 
Foreign Relations , Pt . I , 1868 , pp . 545- 546 . 
39 . Ibid ., p . 544 . 
37 . 
question of ' The General Sherman ' had begun to develop 
into a far more significant diplomatic issue . Emphasis 
now lay on the possibility of concluding a formal treaty 
with Korea , the primary object being to secure guarantees 
for the protection of shipwrecked American seamen . 
Under instructions from the Secretary of State , Hamilton 
Fish, the new American Minister in Peking , Frederick F . Low , 
asked the Peking government to transmit a letter to the King 
of Korea stating the purpose of a proposed new expedition 
for February 1871 . Low determined to secure , if not a 
treaty , at least a convention on shipwrecks , and to investi-
gate the fate of ' The General Sherman ' as well . 40 In the 
situation , the Tsungli Yamen continued to insist that it had 
no r esponsibility for Korean actions . It repeated that 
although Korea was regarded as a country subordinated to 
China , she was , nevertheless , wholly independent . 
On 8 May 1871 , the squadron , consisting of fiv e 
warships (flagship ' The Colorado ', two corvettes ' The 
Alaska ' and ' The Benicia ', two gunboats ' The Palos ' and 
the ' The Monocacy ' ) and 1 , 230 marines and sailors , under 
the joint command of Minister Low and Rear Admiral John 
Rodgers , left Shanghai and soon arrived off Kanghwa ISland . 41 
40 . Fish to Robson , No . 220 , 4 April 1870 , Ibid ., 1870 , 
p . 333 ; Fish to Low , No . 222 , 20 April 1870 , Ibid ., 
1870 , pp . 334 - 5 ; Low to Fish , No . 225 , 16 July-rB70 , 
Ibid ., 1870 , pp . 362- 3 ; Low to Fish , No. 21 , 22 
November 1870 , Ibid ., 1871 , pp . 73- 74. 
41 . Low to Fish , No . 31 , 13 May 1871 , Ibid ., 1871 , p . 115 . 
The local officials raised no objections to the proposed 
explorations of ·their coast and waters , but would not 
forward the letter to the capital . Being unable to get 
in touch with high Korean officials of enough rank , Low 
decided to force his way past Kanghwa to the mouth of the 
Han River which led to the capital , Seoul . 42 
An advance force , under the command of Captain Homer 
38 . 
C. Blake , consisting of two gunboats and four steam launches , 
began the exploration of the Kanghwa and Han River region . 
The main objective was to survey the passage between the 
mainland and the island of Kanghwa , the shortcut to Seoul . 43 
When the party approached a sharp bend named Sondolmok , 
beyond which all vessels were strictly forbidden to go , 
they were bombarded by the Korean batteries situated near 
Sondo1mok and K~angsong . However , the Korean fortifications 
were soon silenced by counterfire . Low and Rodgers con-
sider ed this incident as an indication of the Ko r ean 
government ' s determination to reject any negotiations and 
decided to launch a major attack in order to completely 
destroy the fortifications . By doing so , they thought 
they might force the Korean government to come to terms . 44 
42 . Low to Fish , No . 32 , 31 May 1871 , Ibid ., 1871 , 
pp . 116- 117 . 
43 . Enclosure in Ibid ., pp . 119 - 120 . 
44 . Low to Fish , No . 33 , 2 June 1871 . 
pp . 121- 122 . 
Ibid ., 1871 , 
39 . 
The attacking force , consisting of two gunboats and 
several launches and 450 marines , under the general command 
of Captain Blake , easily captured two forts , Choji and 
Dokjin , and destroyed all their batteries and ammunition 
dumps completely. The Ko reans offered no real resistanc e 
but retreated to the fort of Kwangsong apparently in 
preparation for a final stand . The Americans launched 
a general attack on the fort of Kwangsong and met with 
fierce resistance . Later Low wrote to the Secretary of 
State about the fighting , on 20 June : 
' All accounts concur in the statement that 
the Koreans fought with desp e ration , rarely 
equalled and never excelled by any people . 
Nearly all the soldiers in the main fort 
. . 45 
were kllled at thelr posts .' 
The battle finally ended with heavy Korean losses , some 500 
killed , and the complete destruction of the five forts , 
including Kwangsong . The Americans suffered only three 
killed and ten wounded . 46 It was a victory for the 
Americans but not one of which anyone could have been very 
45 . Low to Fish , No . 35 , 20 June 1871 , Ibid ., pp . 126- 129 . 
46 . Ibid . 
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proud or which anyone could have wanted to r emember . 
Not even the heavy losses Korea had expe rienced and 
the full demonstration of the strength of gunboat 
diplomacy by the Americans led to a change in the anti -
barbarian outlook of the Taewongun and his government 
and their determination to maintain the seclusion policy . 
Low observed that the Korean go ve rnment was from the first 
determined to reject all peaceful overtures for negotiation 
or even discussion , and that the recent e vent , which would 
have produced a profound impression upon any other 
government , had had no eff ect , and that the Korean government 
as yet showed no sign of change in its attitude of defiance 
to all nations . There was little hope of bringing them to 
any proper terms . At last the American squadron withdrew 
from Korea on 3 July 1871 . 47 
The means adopted by Commodore Perry in Japan had 
proved inapplicable in Korea . The expedition had 
accomplished nothing . Moreover , it had created an 
additional obstacle in the way of obtaining a treaty 
by peaceful means . The task of bringing Korea within 
the framework of internat ional obligations had become more 
difficult . It remained for Japan to break the hard shell 
of Korean seclusion . 
47 . Ibid . 
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CHAPTER 2 . THE OPENING OF KOREA 
(1) Kore a ' s First Treaty with Japan , 1876 
Contac t bet~en Ko rea and Japan in the e arly Yi dynasty 
was based on a tribute relationship . It was mainly for 
~ommercial and cultural r easons that the Japanes e sent tribute 
to the Yi Court . Any Japanese Daimyo (Lord) who desire d a 
tribute r e lationship with the Yi Court had to obtain a 
copper se al b e aring his name from the Korean government . 
The Korean government adopted measures aimed at reducing 
and controlling the Japanes e activities . From 1438 the 
Lord of Tsushima played the role of diplomatic inter-
mediary between Korea and Japan and only th e Shogun (the 
Supreme Ge neral) , the Commissioner of Kyushu and a f ew 
s e lected Daimyo were allowed to send tribute missions . 
This role of the Lord of Tsushima as intermediary was 
maintained throughout the Tok u gawa period , and the Lord of 
Tsushima was also allowed to send envoys to Korea for the 
purpos e of reporting important eve nts such as the death or 
accession of a Shogun , or the return of shipwrecked Korean 
seamen . 
After the Opening of Japan , the relations between 
Korea , unde r the Taewongun ' s governme nt , and Meiji Japan 
were characterize d by conflict between tradition and 
innovation . In the eyes of the leaders of the new Japan , 
the recognition of Tsushima as the diplomatic intermediary 
was incompatible with the rapid changes at home . Korean 
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leaders , on the other hand , regarded that tradition as 
eternal and the only legitimate basis upon which relations 
with Japan could be maintained . The question at stake 
was not merely a matter of protocols and technicalities . 
It involved the far more important issue of the viability 
of the traditional system of international relations in 
North East Asia under drastically changed circumstances . 
After the Meiji Restoration , the Japanese Foreign Office 
ordered the Lord of Tsushima to send an envoy to Korea to 
inform her of the restoration in Japan . On 13 November 
1868 , the Japanese petty envoy , led by Kawamoto , left 
Tsushima for Pusan , carrying two important notes , one to 
the Department of Rites , and the other to the magistrate 
and commander of the Pusan fort . In February 1869 , the 
Japanese Special Ambassador , Higuchi , arrived in Pusan . 
However , the Korean district magistrate refused to receive 
the credentials , complaining that they were not written 
in sufficiently respectful terms . The Korean authority 
pointed out specifically that the elevation of the title 
and rank of the Lord of Tsushima was against precedent , 
terms such as imperial house or imperial edict could only 
be used by the Chinese Emperor , and they refused to accept 
the replacement of the seals which Tsushima had received 
from Korea by a new seal issued by the Japanese government . l 
Thus , the Meiji government ' s first attempt to open diplomatic 
relations with Korea through Tsushima failed . This experience 
began to raise serious doubts about Tsushima ' s usefulness as 
1 . The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs , Nihon Gaiko 
Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Documents) , Tokyo , Vol. 2 , 
Pt . 3 , No . 615 ; Vol.l, Pt.II, Nos.705-6; Tyler 
Dennet , Americans in Eastern Asia , New York , Barnes & 
Noble Inc ., 1941 , p . 435 . 
a diplomatic medium . The management of Korean affairs 
was formally transferred from Tsushima to the Japanese 
Foreign Office in September 1871~ 
However, the subsequent missions of 1871 and 1875 , 
which were sent directly by the Japanese Foreign Office , 
brought no results . The repeated Korean refusal to 
43 . 
recognise the Restoration government caused much anger among 
the Japanese leaders and the idea of the conquest of Korea 
became widespread in Japanese documents and newspapers 
during the 1870 ' s . As the new regime completed its initial 
consolidation of power , many young Japanese dreamers began 
to regard Korea as a stepping stone to the conquest of the 
Asian Continent . The idea of the conquest of Korea 
(Seikanron) , advocated particularly by Saigo Takamori and 
Itagaki Taisuke , spread r apidly among the Japanese leader-
ship . 3 They started to argue that fo r ce would be the only 
means of inducing Korea to open her doors , and that , in 
response to the provocative Korean policy of seclusion , 
Japan should simultaneously dispatch troops and a special 
envoy to negotiate directly with the Korean government . 
Indeed , in 1873 , the Korean question became one of the 
2. NCB. Vol. 2, Pt. I I, No.486; 
Vol. 4, Pt.I, Nos. 179, 185, 
190, 197, 205, 210. 
3. NCB. Vo1.2, Pt.I, No.51; 
Vol. 8, Nos. 27-28. 
greatest political issues in Japan , and it was this 
belligerent policy that precipitated the first Cabinet 
4 
crisis in Japan in that year . When the Iwakura mission 
returned from Europe in September , it argued that Japan 
was not yet strong enough for military adventures . The 
subsequent appointment of Iwakura as acting Prime Minister 
changed the balance of political forces in the Japanese 
government . The belligerent Saigo and his followers were 
driven out of the government and the Seikanron (the idea of 
the conquest of Korea) was dropped as the government ' s 
policy towards Korea for the time being. 5 
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In the meantime , there was an important change in Korean 
government . The Taewongun , the powerful Regent , was 
relieved of office in 1873. While the Taewongun ' s 
isolationist policy was generally popular , many of his 
other actions were not . Though he was the most prominent 
ruler of the Yi dynasty to attempt to introduce wide -
ranging reforms into Korea and at the same time preserve 
the ancient order of Korean society , his heretical economic 
4 . Re y H. Akagi , Japan ' s Foreign Relations , 1542- 1936 , 
Tokyo , Hokuseido Press , 1937 , p . 115 ; Chitoshi 
Yanaga , Japan since Perry , New York , McGraw Hill 
Co ., 1949 , p . 186 . 
5 . E . E . N. Causton , Militarism and Foreign Policy in 
Japan , London , George Allen & Unwin , 1936 , p . 111 ; 
Dennet , Americans in Eastern Asia , pp . 442 - 430 . 
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and cultural r e forms provoked the conservatives , and 
the combined ups urge of Catholicism and the threats of 
foreign invasion during his reign created an atmosphere 
of national crisis. The leading forces of the opposition 
movement was the growing Queen Min ' s faction supported by 
political malcontents . The growing independence of the 
young King also played an important part in the Taewongun ' s 
sudden downfall . The new Korean government of Queen Min ' s 
faction was ready to open the country , mainly as a reversal 
of the Taewongun ' s seclusion POlicy . 6 
Japan had been anxiously following developments in 
Korea , watching for an opportunity to open the country . 
The Japanese decided to apply the tactics they had learned 
from the Americans in 1854 . After the settlement over 
Formosa and the Liu- chiu in 1874 , on 19 September 1875 , 
the Japanese warship ' The Unyo ' and another two ships sailed 
up the mouth of the Han River on the pretext of surveying 
sea routes. The Captain , Inoue , and twenty men landed 
on Kanghwa island ostensibly to get drinking water . The 
Kangwha battery opened fire but the vessel immediately 
struck back and stormed the fort . After that the Japanese 
returned to Nagasaki after two days . This is known as the 
Unyo - go Incident or the Kanghwa Incident and provided the 
pretext for the next steps in Japanese pOlicy.7 
6 . Seoul National University , Kuksa Kaesul (The History 
of Korea) , Seoul , pp . 582 - 3 ; Byung- Do Lee , Kuksa 
Daikwan (The History of Korea) , Seoul , Bomunkak 
Publishing Co ., 1958 , pp. 440- 441 . 
7 . Hulbert , History of Korea , Vol . II , p . 220 ; Yamabe 
Kentaro , Nikkan Heigo Shoshi (A Brief History of the 
Merger of Japan and Korea) , Tokyo , 1966 , pp . 22- 27 . 
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The Japanese government decided to adopt a firm policy 
towards Korea , if necessary , to take measures against Korea 
of the type with which they had constantly reproached the 
Western Powers for using against themselves . In other 
words , they were determined to force a treaty upon Korea . 
In so doing they had to take certain preliminary steps 
before despatching a naval expedition to Korea . 
Recognizing that success might well depend on the attitude 
of China , Japan first sent a mission to China , headed by 
Mori Arinori , to secure a more definite Chinese disavowal 
of suzerainty over Korea . Li Hung- Chang , the Governor- General 
of Chihli Province and the de facto Foreign Minister of China , 
continued to maintain that Korea , although independent in 
all matters relating to her government and religion , was 
subordinate to China . But , given the risk o f a war between 
Korea and Japan , Li f elt compelled to advise Korea to consider 
the Japanese demands in a friendly manner . 8 
In January 1876 , the Japanese naval expedit ion , headed 
by General Kuroda , the Special Plenipotentiary , and Inoue , 
Vice- Plenipotentiary , with two warships , three transports 
and several thousand marines , set sail to Korea . Under 
the threat of war , negot iations proceeded without much 
8 . T . F . Tsiang , ' Sino- Japanese Diplomatic Relations , 
1870- 9 4 ' , Chinese Social and Pol i t ical Soience Review , 
Vol . 17 (1933- 34) , pp . 56- 57 ; Griffis , op.cit ., pp. 
420 - 422 ; Dennet , op . cit ., p . 441 . 
difficulty . After some controversies and arguments , 
on 26 February 1876, Korea ' s first Treaty of Amity , 
Friendship , Commerce , and Navigation was signed at Kanghwa 
between Hon Shin for Korea and Kuroda for Japan . 9 This , 
Korea ' s first treaty with foreign countries in the Western 
conception, was only possible as a result of the coalescence 
of two major factors : 
(a) The s udden downfall of the Taewongun , and the 
advocacy of the opening of the country , as a 
countermeasure to the Taewongun ' s anti- foreign 
policy , by Queen Min ' s faction in the new 
Korean government ; 
(b) China ' s pressure on Korea to establish friendly 
relations with Japan . As Perry came to Japan 
at the right time so did the Japanese to Korea . 
The Treaty of Kanghwa consisted of twelve articles , 
and the most important provisions were : 
1 . Korea , being an independent state , enjoys the same 
sovereign rights as does Japan; 
2 . exchange of envoys within fifteen months from the 
9. Text in Sun- Keun Lee , Hankuksa (The History of Korea) , 
pp . 398- 400 ; English version appears in Chin~ Marit ime 
Customs , Treaties , Regulations , etc . between Ko rea 
and Other Powers , 1876- 1889 , Shanghai , Statistical 
Department of the Inspectorate- General of the Customs , 
1891 , p . 1 ; and also in Hugh Heung~o Cynn , The 
Reuirth of Korea , New York , The Abingdon Press , 1920 , 
Appendix E . 
date of the signing of the treaty ; 
3. opening of Pusan and two other ports in the 
twentieth month from the date of the signature 
of the treaty ; 
4. mutual extra- territoriality ; 
5. a trade agreement to be made within six months of 
the signing of the treaty . 
On 24 August , a Supplementary Treaty was signed , which 
gave the Japanese the rights : 
1 . to proceed to the Korean coast ; 
2 . to dispatch letters or other communications to any 
place or places in Korea ; 
3 . to lease land in Korea ; 
4 . to travel within a radius of ten Ri (4 km . ) ; 
5 . to employ Korean subjects and to traffic in any 
article owned by Korean subjects paying in 
. 10 Japanese COln . 
The terms of the treaty were almost identical with 
those contained in Japan ' s and China ' s treaties with the 
Western Powers . Japan not only adopted the Western 
method of negot i ations but also the terms of the treaty . 
The Kanghwa Treaty promised Japan,most of all , exchange 
of diplomatic emissaries , opening of two ports besides 
Pusan , granting of extraterritorial rights for Japanese 
citizens in Korea , the right to conduct surveys in Korean 
10. Ibid ., Appendix F . 
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waters. In other words , Japan imposed unequal terms on 
Korea that were similar in nature to the provision of the 
unequal treaties which the Western Powers had extracted 
from Japan only a dozen or more years before . 
By referring to Korea , most significantly in the light 
of future development , as an independent state with same 
equal and sove reign rights with Japan, the Japanese 
government denied the existing Chinese suzerainty over 
Korea , whereas China had no intention of changing the 
traditional relation ln any way . The ultimate intention 
of the Japanese government was not to see Korea independent 
and sovereign . Again , the Japanese government , which had 
been complaining of the extraterritorial clause of the 
Western t r eaties with Japan , was careful to stipulate for 
jurisdiction over its people in Korea while denying a 
reciprocal right to Koreans in Japan . 
The Treaty of Kanghwa was entirely favourable for 
Japan while discriminatory for Korea . It was a totally 
one - sided , unfair and unequal treaty , the responsibility 
for which was partly due to the Korean government . The 
Korean government did not fully understand the nature of 
the Agreement it had signed , because it had n e ithe r 
understanding no r experience of the nature of the Western 
style treaty . Nevertheless , the Treaty of Kanghwa marked 
the beginning of Japan ' s full - scale interference in 
Korea . ll 
11. John W. Foster , American Diplomacy in the Orient , 
New York , Houghton , Mifflin & Co ., 1903, p . 321 ; 
Harold M. Vinacke , A History of the Far East in 
Modern Times , New York , F . S . Crofts & Co. , 1937 , p . 117 . 
2 . The First Treaty with a Western Power , America , 1882 
The Kanghwa Treaty seemed to the Western Powers to 
be a break in Korea ' s long isolation , and they began once 
more to take an interest in relations with the kingdom . 
The first initiative came from the United States . Under 
50 . 
the instructions of the Secretary of State , Evarts , and the 
Secretary of the Navy , Thompson , Commodore R. W. Shufeldt , 
who had commanded the fUSS Wachusetts ' during investigation 
of ' The General Sherman ' Incident in 1867 , came to the Far 
East again in April 1880 on board ' The Ticonderoga '. With 
the help of the American Minister in Japan , Bingham , who 
had been instructed to invite the Japanese government to 
give to Shufeldt suitable letters of introduction to the 
Korean authorities , Shufeldt attempted to get in touch with 
the Korean authorities through the Japanese officials . 
However , as Japan had no real desire to have the trade of 
Korea thrown open to the world , his attampts failed , and 
ln fact , he was kept waiting in Nagasaki . l 
Meanwhile , in China , Li Hung- Chang , the Viceroy of 
Chihli , who was directly responsible for Korean affairs , 
viewed with alarm the steady growth of Japanese influence 
in Korea . He began to suspect that Japan had aggressive 
designs on Korea . Li thought that the greatest danger to 
1. Dennet , op . cit ., p . 457 . 
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Korea , and thus , eventually to China , would come from 
Japan . He considered Korea vitally important to the 
safety of China as the first line of defence of the 
. 2 
emplre . As he thought that the best means of preventing 
an attempt by Japan to seize Korea would be to open Korea 
to foreign trade , Li Hung- Chang began to calculate the 
advantages of letting Korea enter into treaty relations 
with the Western Powers . 
Thus , as a countermeasure to Japan , China follow ed 
a policy of widening Korea ' s contacts with the Weste rn 
world in the hope of maintaining division among the Powers . 
Li Hung- Chang advised Korea , in a confidential letter to 
the Korean Prime Minister , Yoo- Yon Lee , in August 1879 , to 
do two things : to reorganize and build up her military 
strength , and to negotiate commercial treaties with the 
Western Powers . 3 This policy was directed not only 
against Japan but also Russia . Li urged Korea to seize 
every opportunity to establish treaty relations with the 
Western Powers so as to neutral i ze one poison by another 
and to set one energy against another . 4 Li est imated that 
the United States had no territorial design and wa s th e most 
2 . T . C. Lin , ' Li Hung- Chang : His Korean Policies , 1870-
1885 ', Chinese Social and Polit ical Science Review , 
Vol . 19 (1935 - 36) , p . 219 . 
3 . Li Hung- Chang to Yoo - Yon Lee , 29 August 1879 , 
NGB , Vol. 14, No.154, Annex. 
4. H. F . MacNair , Modern Chinese History : Selected 
Readings , Shanghai , 1923 , p . 511. 
reliable of the Western nations . Li therefore thought 
that the United States would be the best partner for 
Korea ' s first treaty . 5 
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In 1880 , Li Hung- Chang r eceived news that Shufeldt was 
attempting to deal with Korea through Japanese channels . 
China was then on the verge of war with Russia over the 
Kuldja disput e . The presence of Shufeldt in Japan could 
only be interpreted as meaning that the American government , 
approving the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876 in which the Chinese 
suzerainty over Korea was not acknowledged , was about to 
throw the weight of its influence on the side of Japan in 
the controversy over Korea . Thus China was menaced 
directly by Russia and also , so it appeared, by a combination 
of Japan and the United States , and as a result of either of 
these dangers China might lose its position in the Korean 
peninsula . Li lost no time in inviting Shufeldt to come 
to Tientsin , assuring him of the use of his influence to 
secure a treaty with Korea . Shufeldt , stung by what he 
believed to be Japanese duplicity , was willing to accept 
the invitation and arrived in Tientsin in June 1881 . 6 
Again , Li Hung- Chang sent a message to the Korean 
government in which he expounded the many advantages which 
could be expected from the conclusion of a Korean- American 
treaty and urged the Koreans to dispatch a high official to 
5 . NGB , Vol. 14, No. 154, Footnote. 
6. Dennet , op . cit. , p. 457 . 
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China to negotiate it . At the time , in Korea , as 
the ruling faction became more favourably inclined towards 
discarding the tradition of isolation , the opposition from 
conservative facti ons became increasingly vociferous . The 
manifestations of anti - foreign and anti- government oppositon 
intimidated the Korean government and causectit to delay in 
responding to Li Hung- Chang ' s advice regarding the American-
Korean treaty . Even so , in the winter of 1881 , the 
informal Korean mission headed by Yoon- sik Kim was able to 
go to China . 7 
In March 1882 , the formal negotiations began between 
Li and Shufeldt . The most important difference between 
the Chinese and the American drafts related to the question 
of Korea ' s status vis - a - vis China . Li attempted to insert 
in the treaty a clause which would recogni ze Korea as a 
dependent state of China . The Chinese draft , which was 
made by Li ' s two trusted subordinates , Ma Chien- Chung , and 
Tseng Tsao - Ju , and which was referred to as a Korean dr aft , 
contained , at the beginning of Article 1 , the statement 
that : ' Korea is a vassal state of China , but has always 
enjoyed autonomy in both its internal and exte r nal affairs '. 8 
7 . Sun- Keun Lee , Hankuksa (The History of Korea) , pp . 718 - 724 . 
8 . Li Hung- Chang , Li Wenchungkung Chuanchi (The Collective 
Writings of Li Hung- Chang) , Wu Ju-Lun ed., Nanking , 1908 , 
Memorials , Ch . 43 , p . 34 ; T . C. Lin , op . cit ., Chinese 
Social and Political Science Review , Vol . 19 (1935- 36) , 
p . 223 . 
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Conscious of the seriousness of the first article of the 
Kanghwa Treaty , China now sought to guard itself by a 
statement of its position . Shufeldt maintained that the 
question of Chinese suzerainty had no bearing upon the 
right of the United States to deal with Korea , a nation 
which was self- governing in domestic and foreign affairs . 
However , they finally worked out a compromise : the Treaty 
would not include the Article 1 , but , instead , the King 
of Korea would acknowledge the tributary status in a message 
to the President of the United States . 
provisional treaty on 19 April . 9 
They finished the 
During the negotiations between Li Hung- Chang and 
Shufeldt , Yoon- Sik Kim , the head of the informal Korean 
commission who had been staying in Tientsin since winter 
of 1881 , had been busy as an intermediary between Tientsin 
and Seoul . Although he was never present at any of the 
sessions , he was kept well informed and was frequently 
consulted by Li Hung- Chang . He frequently had to act on 
his own discretion in the absence of specific instructions 
from Seoul , due to a deliberate decision of the Korean 
9 . For details of the negotiations between China and the 
United States , see C. I . E . Kim and H. K. Kim , Korea and 
the Politics of Imperialism , 1876- 1910 , pp . 18- 28 ; 
Sun- Keun Lee , op . cit ., pp . 707 - 738 . 
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Court and the ruling Queen Min ' s faction to assume as 
little r esponsibility as possible for the momentous and 
. . . 10 
unpopular declslon to open Korea to a Western natlon . 
Soon after the provisional treaty had been drafted , Li 
Hung- Chang dispatched a text of the provisional treaty to 
Korea with a letter , describing in detail the proceedings 
and announcing an impending visit by Shufeldt . At the 
same time , Li sent a squadron of three Chinese warships , 
under the command of Admiral Ting Ju- Chang , to Korea . 
Ma Chien- Chung also went to Korea to handle political 
problems . Shufeldt arrived on board f USS Swatara ' and , 
shortly after , the Treaty of Amity and Commerce , known as 
the Chemulpo Treaty , was signed by Hon Sh i n for Korea and 
Shufeldt for America on 22 May 1882 , with Ma and Ting in 
11 
attendance . The Treaty contained 14 articles and was 
apparently modelled upon the American treaties with Japan 
and China . The main provisions were the establishment 
of diplomatic relations on the basis of equality and 
reciprocity , relief of the shipwrecked , the right of 
American nationals to reside and trade at the open ports , 
10. Yoon- Sik Kim , Unyangjip (Collected Writings of 
Yoon- Sik Kim) Byung- Uk Hwang ed ., 8 vols ., Seoul , 
1913 , Vol. 5 , p . 16 . 
11 . Text in Sun- Keun Lee , Hankuksa (The History of 
Korea) , pp. 738 - 742 ; English version in Henry 
Chung , Comp ., Treaties and Conventions between 
Korea and other Powers , New York , H. S . Nichols , 
1919 , pp . 1 97- 204 . 
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extraterritoriality , and a most - favoured - nation clause . 
There was no explic it statement on the status of Korea 
vis - a - vis China . The first article , instead , merely 
stated that there was to be perpetual peace and friendship 
between the United States and Korea and should either party 
become subject to unjust or oppressive treatment by a 
third nation , the other party to this treaty was to exert 
its good offices for an amicable arrangement . 
A letter from the King of Korea to the President of 
the United States was given to Shufeldt before his 
departure from Korea . Despite China ' s intent , the King ' s 
letter to the American President contradicted itself : it 
acknowledged Korea ' s dependency upon China as a long-
standing tributary , but it simultaneously declared its 
complete independence in both internal and foreign 
affairs . 12 The United States government took no official 
notice of the King ' s letter , and chose to regard the Treaty of 
Chernulpo as an evidence of Korea ' s sovereign independence . 
The American Secretary of State , Frelin~huysen , insisted 
that Korea was an independent and sovereign state , 
responsible for carrying out the provisions of the treaty 
signed by the two governments . 13 Li Hung- Chang ' s attempt 
12 . Three different English versions of the Korean King ' s 
letter of 15 May 1882 appear in M.F . Nelson , Korea 
and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia , pp . 145- 149 ; 
T. Dennet , Americans in Eastern Asia , p . 460 . 
13 . Frelingh uysen to Foote , 17 March 1883 , George M. 
McCune and John A. Harrison eds ., Ko r ean- American 
Relations : Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern 
Diplomacy of the United States , Univ . of Calif . Press , 
1951 , Vol . I , p . 25 . 
to retrieve what China had conceded to Japan in 1876 had 
not been successful . It is against th is background and 
within this framework that the first phase of British 
policy towards Ko r ea has to be examined . 
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BRITISH- KOREAN RELATIONS : 
THE FIRST ACTIVE PHASE. 
CHAPTER 3 
BRITAIN ' S IMPER IAL ROLE AND FAR EASTERN INTERESTS 
It woul d s eem reasonabl e to examine British policy 
towards Korea In the period under consideration within 
the framework of Britain ' s global imperial interests and 
within that context to attempt to estimate both the 
degre e of importance which she attached to Korea and the 
significance of her policy measures. 
Great Britain ' s territorial position on the South-
East Asian mainland was established early in the nineteenth 
century . At this stage , the initiative in British policy 
towards all countries in East Asia r e sted usually with 
British officials in the East . They were frequently the 
first to put forward plans , and the Foreign Office had 
always given its representatives wide discretion in 
carrying them out . The function of the Foreign Office 
was to approve or r e ject the suggestions of its 
r epres entatives , to ensure that they conformed to the 
general lines of government policy. 
Britain had emerged from the Napoleonic Wars with 
an undisputed naval supremacy , and by the middle decades 
5 t) . 
of the nineteenth century was slowly but steadily 
securing and fortifying the maritime 'route leading 
to the Far East , and had secured overseas commercial 
and naval bases which guaranteed her control of the 
sea rout es to India . After the acquisition of 
Burma , Britain alone between 1820 and 1840 possessed 
all the important qualifications for the task of gate -
opening in the Far East . Besides India , her base of 
power on a grand scale , ambitious British planners of 
the empire , like T. Stamford Raffles, laid the 
foundations for British control of the sea lines 
from India to South East Asia . Raffles negotiated 
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for the transfer of Singapore , the most important 
advanced base , to the British East India Company in 1819 , 
and five years later he added Malacca to the British 
chain of naval and commercial outposts on the route 
from India to the China sea . l 
Great Britain ' s principal interest in China during 
the nineteenth century was trade , and the main aim of her 
policy was to bring about a general extension of that 
trade , whilst maintaining for herself the predominant 
commercial position which she had established in the Far 
East . Loss of the American colonies had accentuated the 
1 . G. F . Hudson , The Far East in World Politics , 
Oxford , 1937 , pp . 4- 12 ; L. K. Young , British 
Policy in China , 1895- 1902 , Oxford , Clarendon 
Press , 1970 , pp . 2- 15 . 
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growing emphasis on commercial rather than colonial 
development . For the active British merchants , the 
increase in Chinese trade indicated a possibility of 
commercial expansion in an area where the British had 
already made a start , and the closed markets of Siam , 
Cochin- China , Japan and Korea all appeared to contain 
great trading potentialities . 
Britain ' s predominant commercial position , 
secured through two wars with China (1839 - 42 and 1856- 60) , 
was based on certain established treaty rights . By the 
Treaty of Nanking , (29 August 1842) which concluded the 
first Anglo - Chinese war (the Opium War) , Hong Kong was 
ceded to Britain and trading privileges were secured in 
the five ports of Canton , Amoy , Foochow , Ningpo , and 
Shanghai . Conditions were laid down which governed the 
residential , travel , and extra- territorial rights of 
British subjects in these treaty ports and a trade tariff 
was agreed , which was then more precisely defined in the 
Treaty Tariff and General Regulations of 22 July 1843 , 
and in the Supplementary Treaty of 8 October 1843 . 2 
2 . China , the Maritime Customs , Treaties , Conventions , 
etc ., between China and Foreign States , 2 Vols ., 
Shanghai , 1917 , Vol . I , pp . 351- 6 , 383- 99 ; For 
early Anglo - Chinese relations , see M. Greenberg , 
British Trade and the Opening of China , 1800- 1842 , 
Cambridge , 1959 ; W. F. Costin , Great Britain and 
China , 1833- 1860 , Oxford , 1937 ; J . K. Fairbank , 
Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast : the 
Opening of the Treaty Ports , 1842- 1854 , Mass ., 1953 . 
The Treaty of Nanking brought about major and 
revolutionary changes in the British position in 
China . The Treaty was important not only for British 
interests, but as a foundation for the activities of 
the other imperialist Powers at the expense of China . 
Besides the opening of five ports , trade was to be 
r egulat ed by British consular officials residing at 
these ports. Further , a number of supplementary 
agreements , of which the Supplementary Treaty of 
October 1 843 would probably be the most important , 
fixed both import and export tariffs and transit dues , 
allowed British subjects and their families to buy and 
r ent properties at the five ports , forbade British 
subjects to trade at or visit places other than the five 
ports , established some provision for extra- territorial 
jurisdiction in criminal cases , and entitled the British 
to most - favoured- nation treatment . 
This position was extended and then consolidated 
by the Treaty of Tientsin (26 June 1858) , which was 
negotiated during the second Anglo - Chinese War and 
ratified at the conclusion of the war in 1860 . By 
this Treaty , an additional nine ports were opened along 
the China coast and on the Yangtze River . Conditions 
of trade were improved , the trade tariff was revised , 
and provision was made for foreigners to travel beyond 
the treaty ports on a system of passports . In addition , 
the right of foreign diplomatic residence was established 
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ln the capital , Peking , and arrangements were made for 
the forma t ion of a Chinese office of foreign affairs , the 
Tsungli Yamen , through which the foreign Powers could 
deal with China on an official basis . 3 The most 
important elements of these treaties in subsequent history 
were the most - favoured - nation treatment and extra-
territorial jurisdiction of consuls . The effect of 
the most - favoured- nation clause was to establish a 
common front of the foreign Powers in making demands on 
China , since whatever was granted to one became available 
to all, no matter what had been the circumstances or 
conditions of the first grant , and , with the later 
multiplication of treaty ports and the concession to 
foreigners of the right to travel in the interior , the 
eff ect of the extraterritorial right clause was the 
growth of autonomous fore ign settlements , some of which 
became virtually City - States within , but not of , the 
C . • 4 hlnese Emplre. 
The Tientsin Treaty served as the ultimate basis 
of Anglo - Chinese diplomatic and commercial relations 
throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century . 
3 . China , The Maritime Customs , Treaties , Conventions , 
etc . between China and Foreign States , Vol . I , 
pp . 404 - 21 . 
4 . G. F . Hudson , The Far East in World Politics , pp . 17- 21 ; 
W. W. Willoughby , Foreign Rights and Interests in China , 
Baltimore , 1927 , Vol . I , pp . 35- 45 , and Vol . II , pp . 
726- 73 3. 
The Treaty was one of ' Peace , Friendship and Commerce ', 
and the commercial sections formed the major part of its 
fifty - six Articles . However , the most revolutionary 
sections of the treaty were neither commercial nor 
missionary , but diplomatic . Article II provided for 
the mutual exchange of Ambassadors , Ministers or other 
diplomatic agents between the Courts of Peking and 
St . James , and Article III granted the right of residence 
at Peking for the British representative , and by Article 
V the Chinese Emperor agreed to nominate a high government 
official to conduct business on a footing of perfect 
equality with the British representative . By these 
Articles , the Chinese assented to Western notions of 
equality and sovereignty among nations , and to residence 
and intercourse at the Chinese capital on the basis of 
such notions , a surrender which ran counter to the very 
foundations of China . 5 
In 1860 , by the Convention of Peking , Tientsin 
itself became a treaty port . Thereafter a steady 
succession of ports were opened for British trade and 
consular residence , either as a result of direct 
pressure by the British government or under the most -
favoured- nation clause . Later , by 1900 , some thirty 
Chinese ports and inland cities were open to trade 
5. N. A. Pelcovits , Old China Hands and the Foreign 
Office , New York , King ' s Crown Press , 19 48 , p . 19 ; 
David Steeds and Ian Nish , China , Japan and 
19th Century Br itain , Dublin , Irish Academics 
Press , 1977 , pp . 29 - 38 . 
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and consular residence , and, in addition , there were , 
particularly along the Yangtze , various landing stages 
at which goods could be loaded and unloaded. 6 
The British interests In China were commercial , 
not political. The object of British policy was 
confined to the opening up of China to trade. Most of 
the British merchants were convinced that in China 
there lay a vast unexplored source of trade and wealth . 
The Foreign Office also believed in the potentialities of 
the China trade and was indifferent toward the opening 
of other countries except in the case of Siam. The 
high hopes for the China market , however , soon waned as 
the British began to learn that the average purchasing 
power in China was extremely low . Although British 
merchants in Shanghai and Hong Kong controlled 70 per 
cent of the Chinese external trade there , dominated the 
river trade and even carried half the purely coastal 
trade , the overall volume of this was small , considering 
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the size of China . The main reason for this disappointing 
situation in China trade was China ' s poverty and self-
sufficiency , rather than the malevolence of Chinese 
officialdom or the lethargy of British representatives . 
In the mid- nineties , it was not significantly greater 
6. Ibid ., pp . 29 - 30 . 
than British trade with Japan , and for Manchester it was 
no better as an outlet than Turkey , and , despite the sharp 
drop of cotton exports to India during the eighties , they 
were still five times as great as those to China . Nor 
was there any sign that trade was increasing , it remained 
static throughout. 7 
After the Taiping rebellion of 1851- 64 , it became 
clear that , while British commercial interests desired 
an extension of trade , undue pressure to achieve this could 
only weaken the existing Chinese government , aggravate 
internal discontent in China , and lead to a possible 
restriction of the existing trade to the detriment of 
Gre at Britain ' s advantageous position . Consequently , 
in the latter part of the nineteenth centur~ British 
mercantile interests became reconciled to the fact that 
official policy was directed to the maintenance of 
Britain ' s commercial pre- eminence by peaceful means and 
to the support of Chinese political stability . During 
the latter decades of the nineteenth century , there was 
no threat to Britain ' s predominant position in China . 
The British firms dominated over their competitors in 
7. David Steeds and Ian Nish , Ibid ., pp . 30- 34 ; 
P . Joseph , Foreign DiPlomac~ China 1894 ~ 1900 , 
London , 1928 , pp. 228 - 9 , 23 ; N.A . Pelcovlts , 
Old China Hands and the Foreign Office , New York , 
1948 , pp . 53- 4 , 69 - 71 , 192- 3 , 264 ; J . A. Hobson , 
Imperialism , London , 1938 , pp. 307- 23 ; C. J . Lowe , 
The Reluctant Imperialists , London , Routledge & 
Kegan Paul , 1967 , pp . 227 - 230. 
the treaty ports . They controlled the bulk of the imports 
and coastal carrying trade , and the financing of this 
growing volume of trade was also served by British 
interests . 
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During the last few decades of the nineteenth century , 
however , several factors emerged in Far Eastern affairs 
which threatened Britain ' s political and economic dominance . 
In the 1880 ' s , the increased industrial development of the 
European countries and the United States enabled them to 
offer a widespread challenge to Britain ' s international 
trading position . Their competition was marked by the 
establishment of tariff walls in the home markets and by 
the struggle for the control of undeveloped markets 
abroad . An increased interest was shown in the 
unappropriated areas of Africa , the Pacific Islands , 
and the Far East . As the Powers could not hope to 
establish their control in these areas in open commercial 
competition with Great Britain , they tended to seek a 
form of exclusive territorial control and to press their 
mercantile enterprises with diplomatic support . As a 
result , the Open Door Policy , the principle of equal 
and open commercial activity , which Britain sought to 
maintain throughout the world , was steadily undermined by 
the activities of the other foreign Powers . The era 
of world imperialism had begun . 
Britain ' s major two rivals In colonial acquisition 
in the Far East between 1840 and 1894 were France and 
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Russia , the one approaching China from the south and the 
other from the north . Russia , which had a long history 
of cont~ct with China over a common land frontier , 
carried her activity in the mid- nineteenth century to a 
new phase . Russia ' s Far Eastern expansion in the period 
1850- 75 was the product of two different types of colonial 
activities : a west - to - east land- power advance from Lake 
Baikal , and a north- to - south sea- power advance along the 
coast from the Kamchatka and the Okhotsk Sea . The 
consequences of the Crimean war reacted on Russo - Chinese 
relations by giving Russia a strong incentive and pretext 
for violent action . Lacking command of the sea , Russia 
was cut off from communication with the Far East by 
maritime routes , and her chief base in Kamchatka , 
Petropavlovsk , was threatened with an Anglo - French 
attack . For the succour of their exposed Pacific 
coastline , the Russians demanded from China in 1854 
a right of way down the Amur , and held the whole line 
of the Amur , cutting off all the territory to the north 
of the river . China , distracted by the Tai- Ping 
rebellion , was unable to offer any resistance . To 
obtain formal recognition of this conquest from China , 
Russia appeared as a mediator on behalf of China 
between the defeated China and Britain and France in 1858 , 
and was allowed to annex all the territory north of the 
Amur and the littoral to the south of the lower Amur as 
far as the border of Korea in 1860 . As a result , 
Korea , for the first time in her history , had a common 
border with Russia . Through the initiative of Count 
Nikolai Muraviev , the Governor- General of Eastern 
Siberia , and taking advantage of the weakened China , 
which was struggling with the Tai- Ping rebellion and 
the war against Britain and France , the Russians now 
established her settlements in the Amur and the Ussuri 
regions and held the Pacific coastline of Asia from 
the Bering Strait to Possiet Bay . By the Treaty of 
Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860) , Russia acquired over 
350 , 000 square miles of territory to the north and east 
of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers . Further , she founded 
the new port of Vladivostok In 1860 , and obtained 
Japanese recognition of her claim to the island of 
Sakhalin in 1875 . 8 
The new port of Vladivostok , on the desolate shore 
of Peter the Great Bay , was a great advance on any base 
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the Russians had previously possessed . It was only about 
8 . A. Malozemoff , Russian Far Eastern Policy , 1881-
1904 , Berkeley and London , 1958 , pp . 6- 9; 
George A. Lensen , The Russian Push toward Japan ; 
Russo - Japanese Relations , 1697- 1875 , Princeton , 
1959 , p . 275 ; G. F . Hudson , The Far East in World 
Politics , pp . 55- 63 . 
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two hundred mile,s farther away by sea from Shanghai 
than the British base at Hong Kong. But Vladivostok 
was not out of range of winter sea- ice , and to obtain 
an ice- free port it was necessary to continue the advance 
still further south . The stage was thus set for a major 
shift of rivalry in the Far Ea st to that of Britain against 
Russia , which was to continue until after the turn of the 
century . 
The first crisis , though minor , occurred in 1861 
when Russia occupied Tsushima Island . This island was 
of great strategic value due to its geographic position 
which commands the southern entrance of the Sea of Japan 
and makes it a convenient stepping- stone from Korea to 
Kyushu . A survey of the Tsushima coast by a British 
warship in 1861 aroused Russian suspicion that the 
British might try to annex the island and bottle up 
Russian expansion at this point . 9 Earlier , during the 
Crimean War , French forces had landed on Urup Island , 
had destroyed the storehouse of a Russian- American 
d 1 · d th . 1 d All ' . 10 Company an proc alme e lS an an led possesslon . 
In view of this , Commodore Likhachev , Commander of the 
Russian Far Eastern Squadron , sent the Russian corvette 
' The Possadnik ' to Tsushima in March 1861 with the 
9. George A. Lensen , op . cit ., p . 448 . 
10 . Ernest G. Ravenstein , The Russians on the Amur , 
London , 1861 , p . 135 ; Urup is one of the Kurile 
Islands . 
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purpose of preventing its falling into the power of 
the British or French . In the hands of any naval 
Power the island would offer a base of operations 
against either China or Japan . It was natural that 
Britain , France , and Russia , in their rivalry for 
control of the Far East , should have been interested 
in this strategic point and have done wery possible 
thing to prevent each other from occupying the island . 
Britain acted promptly . To the British , a Russian 
occupation of Tsushima constituted a threat to the balance 
of power in the Far East . Having advised the Japanese 
government to direct a protest to the Russian government , 
the British Minister in Japan , Sir Rutherford Alcock , 
despatched Admiral James Hope , Commander of the British 
Asiatic Squadron , to the island supported by a formidable 
British fleet . Under British pressure as well as the 
protest of the Japanese government , the Russians had no 
choice but to withdraw after a six month ' s occupation . 
This was the first move of a policy which was ultimately 
to lead to the alignment of Britain and Japan against 
. . h F 11 Russla ln tear East . 
France was the third European Power to acquire 
territory on the Pacific littoral of Asia during the 
11 . G. A. Lensen , The Russian Push toward J apan , p .4 50 ; T . 
Dennet , Americans in Eastern Asia , p . 431 ; G. F . 
Hudson , op . cit ., p . 64. 
nineteenth century . The building of the French 
colony of Indo - China began in 1862 with the annexation 
of part of Cochin- China and was completed as a result 
of the Franco- Chinese war of 1883- 5. The tradition 
of French influence and the plight of the Catholic 
Church in Annam gave an opportunit y for action to the 
French . Britain was no longer in a mood to obstruct 
all French expansion in the East , and was prepared to 
allow France to acquire a new colonial possession , 
provided that it was neither too close to India nor 
on the farther side of Hong Kong. The French joined 
the British in making war on China in 1857 , and in the 
following year also invaded Annam in company with a 
Spanish force from the Philippines . By a treaty in 
1862, France obtained the cession of the three eastern 
provinces of Cochin- China , and from this base the French 
gradually extended their control and finally imposed a 
protectorate on Annam itself in 1874 . This led to 
hostilities between France and China , as China had 
asserted her right as suzerain over Annam , but after her 
defeat in the Franco- Chinese war of 1883- 5 , China 
renounced all claim to interfere In the affairs of Annam 
and r ecognized the French protectorate . In 1887 Co chin-
China , Cambodia , Annam proper and Tongking were grouped 
together as French Indo - China , and Laos was added in 
1893 . Of the thre~ large states between the Bay of 
Bengal and the South China Sea , one was thus annexed by 
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France , and Burma by Britain , and Siam, situated between 
Annam and Burma , retained her independence as a buffer 
state . 12 
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In the last few decades of the nineteenth centur~ it 
became increasingly clear that the expans ive tendencies 
of Russia and France were not turned on Europe , but on 
the establ ishment of their · positions abroad . The Far 
East , in particular , attracted the attention of the two 
Powers . Russia and France attempted to extend their 
positions in China , and later the participation of Ge~many , 
Japan and the United States in this activity resulted in an 
intense struggle for influence between the Powers in the 
Far East . In this situation , Great Britain was forced 
on to the defensive , not only to protect her established 
treaty rights but to preserve the whole basis of her 
position in China. 
Great Britain ' s aim was to ensure that the whole of 
China should be opened to foreign trade and that all 
nations should participate in it on an equal footing . 
Britain did not seek a monopolist ascendancy in China , 
and pursued a free - trade policy , because Britain already 
possessed more territory outside China than she could 
administer and would gain nothing from assuming responsi -
bility for China ' s untold millions . If China were 
12 . Ibid ., pp . 65 - 70 . 
73. 
partitioned , Britain would lose the trade she controlled 
in conditions of open competition . In contrast , Russia , 
France and , later , Germany , saw no virtue in a system 
that simply guaranteed British commercial predominance 
now that they were in a position to challenge it . The 
very cause of the free trade and the open door policy 
itself required a superiority of power sufficient to 
prevent the formation of spheres of exclusive and 
monopolistic privilege . Britain , however , was in no 
condition to fight a war in the Far East without an ally 
at that time . British Far Eastern policy was one of 
manoeuvre : on the one hand attempts to reach an under-
standing with Russia coupled with forceful diplomacy at 
Peking , and on the other , attempts to find an ally to 
counteract the Franco - Russian alliance . The outcome of 
this , later In January 1902 , was an alliance with Japan . 13 
It is necessary to note that from 1868 Japan embarked 
on a sustained programme of modernization and political 
and military reorganization , the Meiji Restoration , which 
was to bring her to the level of the major Powers by the 
turn of the century . One of the problems which faced 
the Japanese politicians of the Meiji period was the need 
to evolve a foreign policy to replace the discarded 
13 . Anglo- Japanese Alliance of 1902 will be examined 
in detail in Chapter 7; G. W. Monger , The End of 
Isolation , London , 1963 , p . 15 ; G. F . Hudson , 
British and American Policies in the Far East 
Slnce 1900 , Leeds , 1955 , p . 7; C. J . Lowe , The 
Reluctant Imperialists , London , 1967 , p . 230 . 
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Tokugawa policy of seclusion. To this end , they 
applied themselves to the problem of Japan ' s strategic 
position in the Far East , and,in particular,they displayed 
a close interest in the control of the islands and 
territories surrounding Japan. Thus in the eighteen-
seventies the Liu- chiu and Bonin islands were taken over , 
colonization was encouraged in Hokkaido, and serious 
efforts were made to extend Japanese influence in 
Formosa and Korea . In particular , the close proximity 
of Korea made it an area of primary importance in 
Japanese policy . 
Throughout the nineteenth century , however , Russia 
was the one Power which constantly challenged Great 
Britain . The British government , in turn , tried to 
thwart Russia in every corner of the globe . In Europe , 
Britain supported the decaying Turkish Empire to keep 
Russian frontiers and influence as far as possible from 
Constantinople . In Asia , Britain watched with jealousy 
and alarm any extension of Russian power into Central Asia , 
especially Turkestan , Persia , and Afghanistan , lest it 
should endanger India . The recurrent issue in Anglo-
Russian rivalry throughout the nineteenth century lay in 
the supposed vulnerability of India to Russian attack . In 
1878 and again in 1885,an Anglo - Russian war over Afghanistan 
seemed imminent , and Britain was forced to turn to more 
active measures and to attempt to arrive at a settlement 
with Russia on the north- west frontier of Indi a . Br itain 
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was equally vigilant in the Far East against every 
Russian movement toward the North Pacific . In the 
eighteen- eighties , when overt signs of Russian interference 
in Korean affairs , which will be mentioned in detail later , 
first became apparent , British attention was more on 
Russian activity in Central Asia than in the Far East. 
In so far as there was a connection in Chinese affairs , 
the safety of Kashgaria and Tibet rather than that of 
Korea exercised the diplomatic ability of the British 
representatives in Peking . Even the British occupation 
of Port Hamilton , an island off the Korean coast , in 
1885 needs to be seen in relation to the Afghan crisis 
Qf that year . The Port Hamilton ~ncident will be 
examined at length in the following chapter . 14 Thus , 
the framework in which British policy towards Korea 
evolved was many - sided and it would be necessary to trace 
out some of the key inter- relationships in the following 
chapters . 
14. W. Habberton , Anglo - Russian '~elations concerning 
Afghanistan , 1837 - 1907 , Urbana , 1937 , pp . 23- 68 ; 
C. C. Davies , The Problem of the North- West Frontier , 
1890- 1908 , Cambridge , 1932 , pp. 1- 17 , 71- 98; 
A.P . Thornton , ' Afghanistan in Anglo - Russian 
Diplomacy , 1869- 1873 ', The Cambridge Historical 
Journal , II (1954) , pp . 204 - 218. 
CHAPTER 4 . 
BRITISH- KOREAN RELATIONS : THE FIRST ACTIVE PHASE 
(1) The First British- Korean Treaty , 1882 
Britain had had no relationship with Korea until 
the early 1880 ' s . Though it was mostly British ships 
which had approached Korea in an unsuccessful attempt 
to open trade in earlier days , Britain had never tried 
hard to open relationships with Korea . 
Britain ' s approach towards Korea was different 
from that of France , the United States , and Japan . 
Britain did not attempt to force a treaty upon Korea 
because of her vested interests in China . The British 
were just cautiously awaiting some favourable opportunity 
to ensure success without provoking the sensibility of 
both China and Korea , and also to achieve success with 
as little effort and risk as possible . Britain had 
never challenged Chinese suzerainty over Korea , because 
she was satisfied with Korea ' s position under China ' s 
shadow and protection . But , as the other Powers , 
hitherto occupied in China , increasingly turned their 
attention to the surrounding territories of East Asia , 
in the latter decades of the nineteenth century , and 
especially as the struggle for the control of China ' s 
tributary dependencies developed , British interest In 
Korea became more active and forward looking . At the 
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beginning of 1881 , there were rumours that Russ i a intended 
to se i ze some Korean territory in the spring and pressures 
came from a number of directions for the opening of 
Korea in order to block Russia' s des i gn . 
Britain encouraged China to advise Korea to 
frustrate the undue growth of the influence of anyone 
Power by allowing equal commercial rights to all the 
interested foreign Powers . The British Minister in 
Peking , Thomas Wade , warned the Tsungli Yamen repeatedly 
that the persistent exclusiveness of the small states 
dependent on China was a source of danger both to China 
and to themselves . l 
Wade , in fact , expected little from Korea com-
mercially . He believed that the loss of Korea would 
b e politically serious for China , and the only way to 
avert it was to give several Powers such a vested 
interest in that country that no one would be able to 
annex it . Wade thought that for a single Power , 
especially Britain , to meddle in Korea would precipitate 
a Russian attack . He asked the Tsungli Yamen to announce 
. 2 that Korea was open to treaty relatlons . 
1 . Wade to Foreign Secretary , No. 91 , 29 June 1880, 
F. O. 17/831 : Foreign Office , General Correspondence , 
China (17) , Vol . 831 , hereafter cited as F. O. 
2 . Wade Tel . 3 , 7 Jan . and Tel . 10 , 9 Feb . 1881 , 
F.O . 17/859 . 
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The Tsungli Yamen warmly approved Wade ' s proposal 
of opening Korea , and advised Korea to establish treaty 
relations with the western Powers , and there seemed no 
obstacle to Britain making a treaty with Korea . 
However , the British did not take the initiative . 
The British hope was to see Korea opened to the foreign 
Powers , not so much to strengthen her as an independent 
state as to strengthen China . Britain saw no advantage 
in negotiating a treaty with Korea ahead of other European 
Powers . The initiative came from Japan and the United 
States , as examined in the previous Chapter . 
As soon as news of the American- Korean treaty 
spread among diplomatic circles in Peking , Western diplomats 
were anxious to follow the pattern of the United States . 
Great Britain immediately adopted a subtle yet energetic 
policy . The Admiralty ordered Rear Admiral George o. 
Willes on the China Station to watch what Shufeldt was 
doing . In May 1882 , news circulated that an American 
Squadron was assembling , apparently intending to negotiate 
with a display of force . 3 The Foreign Office saw American 
action in Korea not as a model but as a guide to how easily 
it might achieve satisfactory results . By the middle of 
MaY , Wade received instructions from the Foreign Office to 
exert himself against any interference with American 
. 4 
wlshes . Towards the end of May when Wade sought an 
3. Admiralty to Foreign Office , 23 May 1882 , 
F.O . 17/913 ; Wade to Foreign Office , No . 16 , 
12 May 1882 , F . O. 17/895 . 
4 . E. V. G. Kiernan , British Diplomacy in China , 
1880- 85 , Cambridge , 1939 , p . 80 . 
79 . 
interview with Li Hung- Chang , Li agreed to render him 
assistance if the British intended to acce pt the same 
terms , without an alteration of one word , as the 
American treaty . Wade consented to this , although he 
had found in the agreed terms of the draft treaty seve ral 
objectionable points , the worst being the American promise 
not to trade in opium . 5 Li had also told him earlier 
that in any treaty that might be made with Korea he would 
insist on an article enforcing Chinese suzerainty . With 
this promise assured , Li furnished him with a letter of 
introduction and appointed the same Chinese official , 
Ma Chien- Chung , who had accompanied Shufeldt , to return 
to Korea with the British Envoy , Admiral Willes . 
Admiral Willes , the British plenipotentiary , 
arrived on 27 May 1882 at Chemulpo, three days after 
Shufeldt had left . The Korean government appointed 
Nyong- Ha Ch~ plenipotentiar~ and Hong- Jip Kim,vice envoy. 
The negotiations took place in Chemulpo . Willes wanted 
more detail in the treaty , and proposed three additional 
clauses , namely , the same trade regulations as those of 
the Japanese : agreement for British warships to visit 
Korean harbours and be provided with necessary supplies 
5 . Wade to Foreign Office , No . 19 , Conf ., 12 May 
1882 , F.O . 17/895 . 
and food ; and the freedom to survey the coasts . 6 To 
the Korean envoy , however , these provisions were quite 
unnecessary , since the treaty would automatically meet 
these needs . Willes ' final proposal , the use of the 
island of Komun (Port Hamilton) as a base for British 
warships, was also rejected . 7 
The parties signed the treaty on 6 June 1882 . It 
consisted of fourteen articles in all and was a carbon 
copy of the American- Korean Treaty . Britain even 
accepted the clause (Art. VII) which provided an 
absolute prohibition of the opium trade . Willes con-
fessed that the treaty perhaps appeared too similar , but 
he felt the main thing was to get a footing . 8 He 
returned to Yokohama on 14 June . During the next few 
months , Willes , accompanied by William G. Aston , the 
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British Consul at Kobe , visited the treaty por ts in Korea ; 
Wonsan and Pusan , examining the harbour , trade prospects , 
and the sites for foreign settlements . The British squadron 
6 . 
7 . 
8 . 
Umchung- sa , (Diary of Yoon- Sik Kim) , 2 Vols . Seoul , 
1958 , Vol . II , 28 June 1882 . 
Chosen Sotokufu , Chosen- Shi (History of Korea) , 37 
Vols ., Seoul , 1932 - 40 , Series VI , Vol . 4, p . 614 . 
Willes report , 9 June 1882 , F . O. 17/915 ; for 
text of the Willes Treaty , see China , Imperial 
Maritime Customs , Treaties , Regulations , etc . 
between Corea and other Powers , 1876- 1889 , pp . 
53- 61. 
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also visited Port Hamilton where it remained for some 
days . 9 
Britain , In the early 1880 ' s , faced two pending 
p r oblems : the opium trade in China and treaty revision 
in Japan . A Korean treaty was not a separate but an 
integral part of British interests in East Asia . The 
Foreign Office naturally gave thought to the far - reaching 
effect and change which the new Treaty might have on 
British relations with other Asian countries , especially 
Chine and Japan . It also had to take into account the 
opinions of interested British parties . The first step 
taken by the Foreign Off ice was to refer the Korean 
Treaty to various Chambers of Commerce in order to obtain 
their opinion . The consultation lasted until the 
following spring although the Treaty was due to be ratified 
10 
within a year . The unanimous objection of the British 
merchantile community wat that the Treaty had conceded too 
much in allowing a high tariff , which ran at a rate twice 
as high as the one set in British treat i es with China and 
Japan . ll 
9 . Parkes to Granville , 25 September 1~82 , Dispatch 
from H. M. Minister in Japan forwarding a Repo r t on 
Corea , House of Commons Sessional Papers , le83 , 
Vol . 75 , pp . 257 - 268 . 
10 . ' Corea , Treaties with Great Britain and the 
United States ', Hansard ' s Parliamentary Debates , 
22 Feb . 18e3 , Vol . 276 , p . 584 . 
11 . The Chamber of Commerce to the Foreign Office , 
F . O. 17/915 ; 17 / 940 . 
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The Yokohama General Chamber of Commerce , nominally 
representing all foreign merchants but predominantly 
British in composition , was the foremost opponent of the 
treaty . In a letter to Granville on 9 January 1883 , it 
condemned the proposed treaty as meagre in its details 
and unsatisfactory in i ts provisions . It argued that 
under such conditions no foreign merchants would attempt 
to do business in Korea , especially in the face of the 
12 greater privileges granted to the Chinese and Japanese . 
The British press in Japan and China also raised 
similar objections . ' The Japan Daily Herald ' as early as 
July 1882 published an article from its sister journal 
' The North China Daily News ', which pointed out that the 
treaty was to benefit the Chinese with the lion ' s share 
while placing the foreigners in an unfavourable position . 
It blamed Shufeldt , who , in his eagerness to secure a 
treaty , accepted terms that fell far short of what he 
could have obtained . Willes ' mistake , it said , was 
that he had blindly followed Shufeldt ' s lead . 13 
In China, Britain had been facing a demand for an 
increase of the import duty on opium. The British 
government had promptly accepted the various concessions 
12 . Ibld . , 
Enclosure in Bingham to Frelinghuysen , No . 
1632 , 14 Feb . 1883 , Dispatches from the United 
States Ministers to Japan , Vol . 48 , Records 
of the Department of State , National Archives . 
H~fter cited as Japan : Dispatches . 
13 . Enclosure in Bingham to Frelinghuysen , No . 1538 , 
28 July 1882 , Japan : Dispatches , Vol . 47 . 
made by China at the Chefoo Convention in 1876 , but 
had rejected the part which allowed China to increase 
the opium duty . China ' s demand became more persistent 
since her conclusion of treaties with the United States 
in 1880 , which absolutely forbade Americans to take 
part in the opium trade . As things went so unsatis -
factorily , the Foreign Office , by the summer of 1882 , 
summoned Wade to confer on the matter . 14 
The British not only vigorously objected to the 
Willes treaty but also attempted to prevent , if possible , 
the ratification of the Shufeldt treaty by the United 
States . The Yokohama Chamber of Commerce considered 
ratification of the American treaty detrimental to 
foreigners given the pending treaty revision negotiation 
with Japan . They protested to John A. Bingham , American 
Minister to Japan , against the restrictions on trade in 
the Shufeldt treaty , and made a request that the United 
States government , before ratifying the treaty , should 
give considerations to its view . Bingham , however , 
considered the request an attempt to influence the American 
government against its own interests and to promote European 
policy in East Asia . 15 
14 . S . Lane- Poole and F . V. Dickins , Life of Sir Harry 
Parkes 2 Vols ., London , 1894 , Vol . II , p . 335 . 
15 . Enclosure in Bingham to Frelinghuysen , No . 1552 , 
28 Aug . 1882 , Japan~ Dispatches , Vol . 47 . 
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American policy had been to give Japan its commercial 
rights by treaty revision while British policy was to 
conserve the privileges which the British had secured , 
and to prevent Japan from obtaining revision from any 
treaty Power separately . 16 To Bingham the treaty con-
eluded by Shufeldt with Korea was more liberal and just 
than any Western treaty concluded with either China or 
Japan . He observed that this treaty marked an 
additional departure In the Far Eastern policy of the 
United States from that of the European Powers towards 
Asian nations . For this reason he was most anxious to 
see the United States ratify it as soon as possible . 17 
Despite British objections , the United States 
ratified the Shufeldt Treaty in February 1883 . 
President Arthur appointed Lucius H. Foote as Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary . He arrived 
in Korea on 13 May 1883 . Being unsuccessful in 
preventing the United States from ratifying , the Foreign 
Office proceeded with a plan , in co - operation with the 
treaty Powers , designed to obtain a modification of the 
Korean Treaty . It invited Germany to ro~perate and 
the two countries agreed to make a new effort to secur e 
a treaty . One commentator h~ argued that ' Britain 
16 . T . Dennett , Americans in Eastern Asia , pp . 515- 516 . 
17 . Bingham to Frelinghuysen , No . 1527 , 12 July 1882 , 
Japan : Dispatches , Vol . 47 . 
needed German goodwill in Egypt at that time and it 
18 
could be paid for cheaply at Seoul '. Aston , the 
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British Consul at Kobe , dispatched by the British Minister 
in Japan , Parkes , visited Korea from April to May 1883 , 
for the purpose of postponing ratification of the treaty 
on behalf of Britain and Germany . He asked for the 
deadline to be set for the end of 1883 - a request that 
the Korean government accepted without argument . 19 
Drafting a new treaty with Korea became one of 
Parkes ' first duties when he was transferred from Tokyo 
to Peking in the summer of 1883 . He submitted on his 
own initiative a draft of a new treaty , regulations of 
trade , and a tariff , together with lengthy explanatory 
20 
remarks . The whole document revealed Parkes ' 
precautionary measures to safeguard British interests 
in Korea . It was also an ambitious design to meet the 
demands of British opinion which the Willes Treaty had 
failed to satisfy . His scheme was domination of the 
W . . . 21 Far East by a estern bloc dlrected by Brltaln . 
18 . E. V. G. Kiernan , British Diplomacy in China , 
1880- 85 p . 104 . 
19 . Young- Mok Min to Parkes , 15 May 1883 , Youngshin 
(Correspondence with the British ~0vernment ), 
The Archives of the Korean Foreign Office , Vol . 1 . 
20 . Parkes to Granville , No . 108 , Conf ., 22 June 1883 , 
F . O. 17/920 . 
21 . E. V. G. Kiernan , op . cit ., p . 14 . 
It was not until September 1883 , that the plans 
were ready at the Foreign Office . On 4 September , 
Granville , Foreign Secretary , notified Parkes that the 
British government had authori zed him to negotiate and 
conclude a new treaty with Korea . His appointment as 
the British Plenipotentiary signified that the British 
government intended this time to admit no concessions . 
Parkes sailed from Chefoo for Korea on 18 October , 
intending to get there at the same time as Edward Zappe , 
the German Consul- General at Yokohama . 22 Parkes arrived 
at Chemulpo on 26 October 1883 . The German Envoy , 
Zappe , was already there waiting , and the two envoys 
and company left for Seoul the following day . Admiral 
Willes as well as Commodore Shufeldt had negotiated at 
Chemulpo without ever being in the capital , Seoul . 
Moreover , they had conducted negotiations through the 
Chinese Commissioner , Ma Chien- Chung . From the start 
the setting for the treaty negotiations differed from 
the previous year . 
It would be necessary to discuss the salient points 
which Parkes endeavoured and managed to modify . The 
first important question was the removal of the clause 
relating to the eventual relinquishment of extra-
22 . Foreign Office to Parkes 4 Sept . 1883 , 
F . O. 17/931 ; Parkes to Foreign Office , No . 28 , 
18 Oct . 1883 , F . O. 17/925. 
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territorial jurisdiction . The Koreans were anxious 
for reinsertion of the first treaty ' s provision , that 
extra- territoriality should be abolishe6 when Korea 
had overhauled her laws . They agreed on a compromise 
that they would omit the clause from the treaty proper 
but append it in the treaty ' s protocol . 23 The extra-
territoriality clause in the treaty proper placed every 
British subject in any civil or criminal case entirely 
under the jurisdiction of his own authorities and 
provided for a satisfactory procedure . Parkes thought 
this article was so clearly worded that he wished Britain 
had similar treaties in China and Japan which would serve 
the British interests even better than in Korea where 
British interests were comparatively small . 24 
The next question was the revision of the tariff 
and trade regulations which proved the most difficult . 
Since the British were dissatisfied with the tariff rate 
negotiated by Willes (10- 30 per cent) , Parkes proposed a 
23 . Enclosures 1 and 2 in Parkes to Granville , No . 69 , 
31 December 1883 , F . O. 17/927 . For text of the 
Anglo- Korean Treaty , see The British and Foreign 
State Papers , Vol . 74, pp . 86-97 . 
24 . S . Lane- Poole and F . V. Dickins , The Life of Sir 
Harry Parkes , Vol . II , p . 215 . 
87 . 
88 . 
different system of grading imports , with rates of 
different levels . Cotton and woollen manufactures 
were to pay 7~ per cent , while metals , raw cotton , raw 
wool and yarns , comprising the bulk of probable British 
imports were in the 5 per cent levels . These proposals 
were turned down by the Koreans . Parkes found it 
necessary to compromise on small points to secure his 
main ones , so he agreed to the exclusion of opium . 
But whereas the Shufeldt and Willes treaties provided 
for an absolute prohibition of opium in the treaty proper , 
the Parkes treaty concealed the clause in the tariff 
schedule , under Class 6 , 'Prohibited Goods ', with the 
reservation ' except medicinal use ' . 25 
Other major mofidications Parkes accomplished were : 
(1) Additional stipulations to the article relating 
to diplomatic representations that a diplomatic repres -
entative might reside permanently or temporarily at the 
capital . Parkes observed that to appoint a permanent 
diplomatic representative to Korea , as the United States 
had done , would be unnecessary . He proposed a combined 
25 . There are two forms of tariff schedule attached 
to the treaty : one arranged alphabetically and 
the other classified according to the rate of 
duty. 
appointment in view of the peculiar relations between 
China and Korea and the possible influence it might 
.. . J 26 have upon treaty questlons ln both Chlna and apan . 
(2) Conditions of trade and residence at the treaty 
ports were improved . Under the new treaty the British 
were to have some liberty to travel and trade in the 
interior as the Japanese and the Chinese; to pay no 
transit duty ; to buy land and build factories at three 
ports (Chemulpo , Pusan and Wonsan) and two interior 
points , Seoul and Yanghwachin , which Parkes secured in 
addition to the three named in the Willes Treaty . 
(3) Penalties for smuggling at non- opened Korean 
ports were lightened , and in all cases of smuggling J the 
sole jurisdiction rested with the British courts . 
(4) Provisions were made for British warships to 
establish naval stores at any of the open ports of Korea 
without payment of a duty , and to make surveys in Korean 
waters with the assistance of the Korean government . 
By this treaty , Korea surrendered not only what the 
Chinese and the Japanese treaties had granted to the 
western Powers but also a considerable amount of what 
foreigners had obtained by the extra- treaty method of 
26 . Parkes to Granville, No . 54 , Conf ., 16 Dec . 1883 , 
F. O. 17/927 . 
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interpretation . Although Parkes considered the 
Korean trade to be not more than an off- shoot of the 
trade with China and Japan , he did not overlook any 
minor point detrimental to British interests elsewhere 
. 27 
as well as ln Korea . 
After the signing of the treaty on 15 November 1883 , 
Parkes and Zappe , on November 27 , had an audi e nce with 
the Kore an King , Kojong . The King tho u ght the new treaty 
a good and thoroughly satisfactory arrangement , and 
expressed desire that Britain would give active assistance 
and protection in the event of any difficulty arising in 
the future . Parkes replied that the treaty would bring 
the two countries into close and friendly relations , and 
the commerce it secure d would prove mutually beneficial . 
Parkes sailed for China two days later . 28 
The treaty received approbation in all quarters . 
Granville , on behalf of his government , in February 1884 , 
conveyed his appreciation of Parkes ' achievement . He 
added that the results Parkes had obtained c ould not f a il 
to be highly beneficial to British commercial interests 
ln the Far East . 29 The Yokohama Chamber of Commerce also 
27 . Parkes to Granville , No . 70 , 31 Dec . 1883 , 
F . O. 17/927 . 
28 . Enclosures 1 and 2 in Parkes to Granville , 
No . 55 , 17 Dec . 1883 , F . O. 17/927 . 
29 . Granville to Parkes , 15 Feb . 1884 , F . O. 17/947 . 
expressed its satisfaction with the Parkes ' Treaty . 
The Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce expressed the same 
opinion , but proposed some minor modifications which 
the Board of Trade considered not to be of sufficient 
importance to delay the ratification of the treaty . 30 
Granville , on 7 March 1884 , notified Parkes 
that the Foreign Office , with the approval of the 
Queen , had appointed him to be Her Majesty ' s Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the 
Court of Seoul in addition to his present post , which 
was exactly what Parkes had proposed . 31 He was now 
determined to fulfill the mission . No sooner had the 
treaty been concluded than he began taking the necessary 
steps for ratification . He believed that ratifications 
should be exchanged as early as possible and that the 
Order ln Council should come out with them . The Draft 
Order in Council , which was to be cited as the China , 
Japan , and Corea Order in Council , was ready by April 
1884 . 32 
Parkes , on 21 April 1884 , left Shanghai on the 
' HMS Cleopatra ', accompanied by Aston , Hillier , and 
30 . Granville to Parkes , 28 Feb . 1884 , F . O. 17/947 ; 
Board of Trade to Foreign Office , 20 March 1884 , 
F . O. 17/969 . 
31 . Granville to Parkes , 7 March 1884 , F . O. 17/947 . 
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32 . Foreign Office to Parkes , 25 April 1884 , F . O. 17 / 969 . 
W. R. Carles . The ceremony took place at Seoul on 28 
April , the day on which Parkes , from the new British 
legation , wrote the first dispatch of the Korean series . 
On the same day ' HMS Cleopatra ' saluted the Korean flag 
at Chemulpo harbour . Parkes , on 2 May , had an audience 
with King Kojong and presented a belated letter from 
Queen Victoria , which marked the beginning of the 
diplomatic relations between Britain and Korea . 33 
33 . Parkes to Foreign Office , Corea 1 , 28 April 1884 , 
F . O. 17/949 ; Foreign Office to Parkes, 23 July , 
1884 , F . O. 17/947 . 
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(2) . Korean Internal Disturbances and Sino- Japanese 
Intervention 
At this stage , it is necessary to pause in order 
to consider both certain domestic changes in Korea itself 
and the Sino- Japanese intervention which occurred in 
responseto them . Korea had concluded treaties with 
the United States , Great Britain , Italy , Russia , Germany , 
France and Austria by 1883 . The first treaties Korea 
made with the nations of the West were unequal and were 
similar to those Japan and China had made by 1860 or 
thereabouts . Korea ' s opening , however , was not 
immediately attributable to any successful Western military 
exploit as was the case with China or Japan . And yet it 
was not the result of a voluntary decision made by 
sufficiently powerful and enlightened Koreans . Conse -
quently , there was neither an overwhelming shock , nor were 
adequate modernization measures taken by Korea to adapt to 
this opening up . Moreover , the initial and primary 
impetus for Korea ' s opening carne from two neighbours of 
Korea - China and Japan . Japan represented the force 
of change and innovation , while Chinese influence was on 
the side of maintaining the status ggQ . For a little 
over a decade following the opening of Korea , the two 
conflicting forces were in competition , thus adding a new 
dimension to the endemic factional strife within Korea . 
Shortly after the signing of treaties with the 
Western powers , a riot broke out in Seoul , known as the 
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Soldiers ' Mutiny of 23 July 1882 . This incident was the 
first violent reaction of the Koreans against the changes 
which had occurred since the opening of the country . 
The immediate cause of the riot was the ill - treatment 
suffered by the Korean troops , mostly the former royal 
guard . The underlying cause was the complex internal 
political strife of that period . In addition to the 
regular royal guards , since 1881 , there had existed a 
Special Skill Force of about three hundred men which had 
been undergoing modern training under a Japanese military 
instructor, and they received special care and favour . 
Towards this elite corps , the soldiers in the old order , 
who were poorly fed and clothed , felt envy and hostility . 
The discontent sought the leadership of the retired 
Taewongun , who found an opportunity to reinstall his 
seclusion policy . A relatively minor incident in the 
evening of 23 July 1882 quickly led to a large - scale mutiny , 
and transformed itself into a general uprising against the 
Japanese and the Queen Min faction . l 
The importance of this outbreak was that it brought 
ln China and Japan . The mutiny was not confined to the 
domestic political area . It resulted in armed inter-
vent ions from China and Japan , and brought two countries 
to the verge of war . During the agitation the mob 
attacked the Japanese legation as well as the Korean 
Royal Palace , killing seven Japanese including the military 
1 . Sun- Keun Lee , Hankuksa , pp . 425- 486 . 
instructor , Lieutenant Horimoto . The Japanese Minister 
In Seoul , Hanabusa , and some of his legation staff fled 
to Chemulpo and returned to Nagasaki in the Bri tish 
surveying ship , ' The Flying Fish ' t that had rescued them 
in the open sea off ChemulPo . 2 The Queen Min also made 
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a narrow escape . The insurrection had major consequences . 
Both Japan and China acted vigorously and rapidly . 
The Japanese government at once sent back Minister 
Hanabusa accompanied by a strong guard of troops and 
three warships to present its demands to the Korean King . 
The Chinese government moved quickly , too , in order to 
give no pretext to Japan for starting hostilities . 
Within a week of Hanabusa ' s arrival in Seoul , Ma Chien-
Chung with 3 , 000 Chinese troops and three warships reached 
Korea . The presence of two armed forces on a foreign 
soil , representing antagonistic nationalities , was a serious 
threat to peace . 
Britain encouraged China ' s action as a means of 
averting a collision between China and Japan . The 
British Minister in China , Wade , advised the Chinese 
officials of the Tsungli Yamen that , having once sent 
2 . Bingham to Frelinghuysen , No . 1547 , 19 Aug . 1882 , 
Japan : Dispatches , Vol . 47 . 
ln troops , China should restore order vigorously 
since delay would encourage the Japanese to take the 
law into their hands while other Powers , probably 
meaning Russia , would not fail to take the advantage 
of the situation . 3 
However , neither China nor Japan did resort 
to force to obtain a Korean settlement . Japan was 
not yet ready for a conclusive test of strength , and , 
above all , its current financial situation needed 
peace . Further , war almost inevitably meant 
foreign intervention and territorial dismemberment . 4 
China ' s diplomacy was also conciliatory . Li Hung- Chang 
was convinced that unless China organised a powerful 
navy and strengthened its defence , it should not under-
take aggressive steps against Japan . All he intended 
was to move in before the Japanese could act and also 
appease his political opponents at home . 5 Under Li ' s 
order , Ma Chien- Chung sought the forcible removal of the 
antiforeign Taewongun . To the Chinese , the Taewongun 
must have appeared persona non grata since he attempted 
to overthrow the rule of the Queen Min faction that had 
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been faithfully following the Chinese guidelines on matters 
3 · Wade to Foreign Office , No . 2 , 
1882 , F . O. 17/898. 
secret , 25 Aug . 
4. Young to Frelinghuysen , No . 5 , conf ., l~ Aug . 
1882 , China : Dispatches , Vol . 62 . 
5 . J . O. P . Bland , Li Hung- Chang , New Yo r k , 1917 , 
pp . 164- 5 . 
of foreign relations . Ma arrested and charged the 
Taewongun with disrespect to the Emperor of China and 
sent him to Tientsin where he remained as a prisoner 
for three years . Li thought that as long as the 
Taewongun had a free hand in Korea peace was impossible . 6 
The removal of the Taewongun had an immediate 
salutary effect on the suspended negotiations between 
Japan and Korea . Japan obtained ~ by the agreement 
signed on 31 August 1882 , an indemnity of 500 , 000 Yen , 
the right to station troops in Seoul as legation guards , 
and complete freedom of movement for Japanese officials 
in the interior of Korea . 7 
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So the mutiny against the policy of opening and also 
against the ruling Queen Min faction ended . The manner 
in which the status quo was r estored set a portentous 
precedent for foreign armed intervention in Korea . Two 
hundred Japanese soldiers remained in Seoul as legation 
guards . But , most of all , the mutiny resulted in 
the unprecedently forceful and open intervention of 
China . China now publicly asserted her authority and right 
of interference in Korean affairs . Besides the presence of 
6 . Sun- Keun Lee , Hankuksa , pp . 504 - 517 ; Tabohashi 
Kiyoshi , Kindai Nissen Kankei no Kenkyu . (A 
Stud of the Ja anese- Korean Relationshi in-Recent 
Tlmes) ~ Keijo , 19 0 , Vol . I , pp . 31-
7 . Chosen Sotokufu , Chosen- Shi ~ Series VI , Vol . 4 , 
p . 642 j Hilary Conroy , The Japanese Seizure of 
Korea : le68- 1910 , Univ .of Pennsylvania Press, 1960, 
pp . 106- 7 . 
• 
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the impressive strength of the Chinese forces that 
stayed on in Korea , the Chinese reorganiz~d and trained 
the Korean troops and supplied modern weapons . Three 
thousand Chinese soldiers plus two thousand Korean 
soldiers under Chinese control assured a near- complete 
military control over Korea . It is ironical that the 
Mutiny of 1882 only resulted in foreign armed inter-
ventions and , above all , such drastic Chinese intervention , 
contrary to the orginal intentions of the mutineers and 
the chauvinistic Taewongun and his followers . 
Another evidence of China ' s determination to assert 
her suzerain status with renewed vigour was the terms of 
a new Sino- Korean Trade Agreement signed shortly after 
the mutiny . The preamble to this agreement fixed the 
status of Korea as a dependency of Chin~andbecause of 
this relation , the Chinese were to enjoy exclusive 
advantages in residence , travel , trade , and import 
duties . The scheme of fostering trade with Korea was 
not commercial only . 
8 
control over Korea . 
China resolved to assert political 
The new trade regulations provoked the treaty 
Powers , especially the United States and Japan . However , 
they were more concerned about the political implication : 
i . e . the status of Korea , than the commercial aspects of 
8. For the Text , see Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace , Korea : Treaties and Agreements , 
Washington , 1921 , pp . 1- 6 ; and also British and 
Foreign State Papers , Vol . 75 , pp . 1334 , 1339 . 
the agreement . Renewing his idea of a joint under-
standing with the United States , Japanese Foreign 
Minister , Inouye , accused China of imposing a command 
on Korea , and proposed that both Japan and the United 
States should demand from Korea the same favours given 
to China . 9 
Great Britain , however , reacted differently . 
The British Charge d ' Affaires at Peking , T . R. Grosvenor , 
observed that China showed an arrogant intention of 
putting her Korean trade on a better footing than that 
of others and of denying the most - favoured - nation 
clause . But Philip Currie at the Foreign Office noted 
that if Korea was independent , Britain would claim most -
favoured- nation treatment ; if not , British treaties 
with China applied equally to her . Korea ' s status 
was not a matter of great concern so long as Britain 
enjoyed the most - favoured - nation treatment . 10 
In addition , in order to counteract Chinese 
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domination and to strengthen his claim to full independence , 
the King of Korea turned to the Western Powers , 
particularly the United States . Having realiz ed the 
need for moderniz ation , he had reorganiz ed the Korean 
Foreign Office and was encouraging young people to learn 
military and political sciences . He was convinced that 
9 . Inouye to Bingham , Enclosure No . 2 . in Bingham 
to Frelinghuysen , No . 1620 , 12 Jan . 1883 , 
Japan : Dispatches , Vol . 48 . 
10 . Grosvenor to Foreign Office , 14 Dec . 1882 , 
F . O. 17/900 . 
Korea must cultivate friendly relations with the 
Western Powers which would help rid Korea from long 
subservience to its immediate neighbours . The first 
move in this direction was the King ' s plan to send a 
mission to the United States . The mission led by 
Young- Ik Min , nephew of the Queen Min , left for the 
United States in August 1883 . The Korean mission to 
the United States was the first of the kind to visit 
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any Western nation and was a success , having strengthened 
friendship between the two countries and increased the 
influence of the reformers at home . On return Young- Ik Min 
became Vice- President of the Foreign Office . 
While the King was endeavouring to bring about reform 
and strengthen his position through the aid of the United 
States , a group of progressives developed the idea of 
reforming the country with the aid of Japan . During 
the years from 1882 to 1884 , a small number of young 
officials in the government gradually united in their 
desire for national independence and domestic r eform . 
Their leadership came from the respectable Yangban 
families which , however , lacked political power or wealth 
in the 1880 ' s , and mostly came from either the members of 
early missions to Japan or those of the mission to the 
United States . The most active leader was Ok- Kyun Kim , 
who had frequently visited Japan on official functions , 
including the apolog~ing mission after the Mutiny of 
1882 and negotiations for a foreign loan in 1883- 4 . 
By the autumn of le84, there was a distinct 
cleavage within the government between the progressives 
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and conservatives . The conservative element of which the 
Queen Min faction was the leading representative , with 
support of the Chinese , grew steadily in power and 
influence . The entire core of the Korean government 
began to turn to the Chinese, and the separation of the 
two parties was so wide as to render any discussion of 
public affairs between them impossible. Political 
circles in the capital were uneasy . The treasury was 
empty , only a third of the taxes raised was reaching the 
government , crops had failed . Powerful families usurped 
the functions of the Council , and there was no force 
capable of repressing disaffection. It was extremely 
difficult for the progressives to challenge the Min party . 
They had to rely on covert ways to their goal - to seize 
the government and King , and to demand from him widespread 
reforms as well as a declaration of independence from China . 
After all , Korea had to liberate itself from the Chinese 
shackles , which required the overthrow of the Queen Min 
faction . There must be reforms in every aspect of national 
life . The progressives frequented the Japanese legation 
and held discussions with the Japanese Minister , Takezoe , 
on the plan of a coup . 
It would seem that Takezoe was given a large degree 
of freedom in dealing with the progressives , as long as 
he stayed within the bounds of the two basic objectives -
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promotion of Korean independence and avoidance of 
war with China . ll In early 1884 , the Chinese govern-
ment was in a major political crisis . The unfavourable 
turn of the war with the French provided an opportunity 
for the anti - Prince Kung forces to oust the Prince from the 
Tsungli Yamen , and his successor , Prince Shun , was untried 
in the management of China ' s foreign policy . It appeared 
that China would be less willing at this time than before 
to risk a war against Japan , even if Japan was openly 
aiding the anti - Chinese progressives in Korea . 
The uprising began at Postmaster- General Young- Sik 
Hong ' s party on 4 December 1884 , to celebrate the 
opening of the new post office building . All the high 
Korean officials of both parties attended together with 
the foreign representatives . The first move in their 
plot was the attempted assassination of Young- Ik Min , 
who was severely wounded . During the ensuing confusion 
the progressive leaders hurried to the Palace and led 
the King to a smaller Palace ostensibly for safety . 
About 200 Japanese guards , led by Takezoe , had already 
rushed into the Palace to protect the King . The King 
issued a declaration of independence , while the progressive 
leaders filled the important offices so expeditiously 
vacated . In the name of the King , the progressives 
11 . C. I . Kim , H. K. Kim , Korea and the Politics of 
Imperialism , 1876- 1910 , pp . 46- 49 . 
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executed six conservative Ministers . 
The Chinese realized the urgency of quick action 
and took vlgorous steps to recover the ground lost to 
Japan . Chinese troops hastened to the Palace on the 
afternoon of 6 December , and forcibly expelled the 
Japanese who were far outnumbered . The capital filled 
with turmoil . An angry crowd attacked the Japanese 
legation and killed thirty Japanese residents . After 
fierce fighting , Takezoe , together with the leaders of 
the progressives , had to retreat to Chemulpo . Thus 
h h d '. 12 t e t ree- ay crlS1S came to an end . 
This incident at once focused diplomatic attention 
in both Peking and Tokyo . The Japanese government 
decided once again to demand satisfaction from Korea 
with a display of force . By the end of December , the 
Japanese Foreign Minister , Inouye , as special Ambassador , 
came to Korea , accompanied by 2 , 500 troops , to settle the 
issue . China , too , sent its commissioner , Wu Chang-
Ching , to settle the affair . Wu arrived in Seoul on 
1 January 1885 , with a force of 3 , 000 . 
repetition of what had happened in 1882 . 
It was a 
There was every 
possibility that further conflict might arise as a result 
of the arrival of soldiers from the two hostile powers . 1 3 
12 . For details of 1884 Coup , see Sun- Keun Lee , 
Hankuksa , pp . 615 - 651 . 
13 . Aston to Parkes , 2 Jan . 1885 , F . O. 17/996 . 
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For Britain , Parkes ' first thought was to avert 
a clash between Chinese and Japanese troops in Seoul . 
News was that the Japanese government was making military 
preparations , and that two warships and 700 men were on 
their way to Korea . Parkes asked the British Minister 
ln Tokyo , Plunkett , to warn the Japanese not to engage 
in war with China . 14 At the same time , Parkes advised 
the Chinese government not to antagonize Japan lest she 
join forces with France . He also enlarged on the danger 
that , in case of an armed coalition between France and 
Japan , Russia would welcome the opportunity for self-
help . Parkes exerted his influence to ease the tension 
and maintain the status quo in the Far East , the 
disturbance of which would seriously endanger British 
. 15 
securlty. 
The negotiations between Japan and Korea began in 
Seoul on 7 January 1885 . The foremost protest of the 
Korean government was against Takezoe ' s conduct during the 
uprising . Realizing that his government would have to 
take the responsibility for its Minister ' s act i on , Inouye 
resolutely avoided going into the details of Takezoe ' s 
conduct . Inouye only took two facts into consideration : 
first , Takezoe attended the King by his invitation ; second , 
over thirty Japanese had been killed . The agreement signed , 
14 . Parkes to Aston , No . 28 , 24 Jan . 1885 , F . O. 17/977 j 
Parkes to Granville , No . 321 , 14 Dec . 1884 , F . O. 
17/953 · 
15 . Parkes to Granville , No . 327 , 20 Dec . 1884 ; No . 338 
very conf ., 28 Dec. 1884 , F . O. 17/953 . 
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containing three maln points : Korea should apologize 
to Japan ; pay an indemnity of £55 , 000 for Japanese loss 
of life plus £10 , 000 for property damage ; and Japan 
was to be allowed to build barracks for its legation 
16 garrison which was to be increased to 1 , 000 men . 
It was ironic that Korea should apologize to Japan for 
the results of a Japanese- sponsored coup . Foreign 
representatives in the Far East praised Japan ' s policy 
as being in line with progressive international practice . 
The Japanese government chose to settle the issue 
with China without risking a war . The Japanese 
Premier , Ito Hirobumi , came to Tientsin to undertake 
negotiations with Li Hung- Chang on 31 March 1885 . 
On 18 April, Li Hung- Chang and Ito signed a convention 
at Tientsin , which provided for the withdrawal of their 
troops from Ko rea within four months from the signing of 
the treaty . It further provided that both Chinese and 
Japanese officers should not take part in training the 
Korean army , and that whenever either Power felt it 
necessary to send its troops to Korea , it must give 
notice to the other . Li Hung- Chang maintained that 
since China had duties and rights as the suzerain of Korea , 
the Chinese position was superior to that of the Japanese . 
The Japanese government made it clear that if it found 
16 . Aston to Parkes , 2 Jan . 1885 , F . O. 17/996 . 
For the text of the treaty , see The British 
and Foreign State Papers , Vol . 76 , p . 574 . 
China unwilling to accept Japanese proposals it had no 
other alternative but to go to war . The Tsungli Yamen 
decided that China was not ready for the duel , and Li 
had to concede . 17 
The CDnvention definitely advanced Japan ' s position 
in Korea . The Japanese government had three immediate 
aims : to maintain Japanese influence in Korea , to avoid 
a war with China , and to satisfy the Japanese public . 
Although Ito was unableto get some mention of the 
sovereignty or at least the autonomy of Korea into the 
Convention , he secured for Japan an equal footing with 
China in Korean affairs . For China ~ it was a relief to 
have the dispute settled without an unwelcome war and to 
have evaded recognizing the complete independence of 
Korea . China remained confident that propinquity and 
historical precedent would enable it to retri~e its 
position in Korea. 
It was clear that the Li - Ito Convention of 1885 
was nothing but a temporary compromise between the two 
rivals . Japan ' s ultimate aim was to force China to 
abandon its suzerainty over Korea and to win it for 
itself. Britain continued to support Chinese claims 
17 . T . C. Lin , ' Li Hung- Chang: His Korean Policies ~ 
1870- 85 ', Chinese Social and Political Science 
Review , XIX (1935- 6) , p . 231 . English Text 
of the Convention of Tientsin in Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace , Korea : 
Treaties and Agreements , pp . 7- 8 . 
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in Korea, with as little friction as possible . British 
representatives in Korea showed no concern or sympathy 
for Korea ' s struggle for independence and reform . 
Britain's aim was to avoid , and , if possible , prevent 
any disturbance of the status quo in the Far East , in 
case Russia should find an opportunity for encroachment . 
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(3) . British Occupation of Port Hamilton , 1885- 1887 
Throughout the nineteenth century Russia was 
the one Power which constantly challenged Great Britain . 
During the early 1880 ' s an allegation of Russian aggressive 
intention persisted which the Powers attributed to Russia ' s 
search for an ice- free port in Korea . The British 
maintained that Russia was searching for a new naval 
station and that the place the Russians considered best 
to meet their requirements was Port Lazareff in Broughton 
Bay . l Anticipation of Russian expansion towards the 
North Pacific prompted Britain to search for a naval 
base in Korean waters . As early as 1880 the Edinburgh 
Review advocated acquisition of an island station in the 
narrow waters between Japan and Korea or off the southern 
extremity of the latter peninsula . 2 Britain had no 
coaling station in the eastern seas north of Hong Kong . 
However numerous and efficient the ships which the 
British might possess , they could not carry out extended 
operations at a distance from a coaling station . Harry 
Parkes attached great importance to Korea ' s strategic 
1 . Edinburgh Review , Vol . 152 (July 1880) , p . 80 . 
2 . Ibid ., Vol . 152 , p . 88 . 
position which , he thought , would have an immense 
value in due course . 3 
In Central Asia , in the meantime , the Russians 
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had begun to push across towards Persia and Afghanistan . 
By the 1880 ' s , Russia ' s southward movement had begun to 
look as if it would never stop . One by one the little 
states gravitated toward the neighbouring colossus . 
Each Russian advance in these regions was considered 
to constitute a threat to British interests in India , 
since it was a tenet of British foreign policy to 
safeguard the Indian frontier by using both Persia 
and Afghanistan as buffer states . 4 On 14 February 
1884 , the Russians occupied Merv , a territory long 
claimed by the Afghans . Britain decided to make a 
remonst rance , b ut had no intention of straining relations 
with Russia . However , the clash between British and 
3 . Parkes to Granville , No . 4 , conf . 16 Dec . 1883 , 
F . O. 17/927 . 
4 . Edinburgh Review , Vol . 163 (Jan . - Apr . 1886) , 
p . 18 ; Rose L . Greaves , Persia and the Defence 
of India , 1884- 92 , London , The Athlone Press , 
1959 , p . 137 . 
Russian troops at Penjdeh , on 30 March 1885 , brought 
the two Powers to the verge of war . The British 
Government prepared for war . 5 The Foreign Office 
warned major Embassies in Europe that a situation of 
the utmost gravity had arisen . While the Admiralty 
was watching all Russian ships , the government 
chartered the steamships of the Peninsula and Oriental 
Company for use as armed cruisers . In India , the 
Viceroy prepared to move 25 , 000 men to Quette , 
considered several possible plans of campaign, and 
received assurance that reinforcements from Britain 
would be forthcoming . 6 
Among other measures , Britain chose to follow a 
traditional strategic plan - to attack Russia at some 
weak point in her possessions . Port Lazareff was 
under consideration . The Foreign Office consulted 
the Admiralty about Port Hamilton . The Admiralty 
thought most highly of Port Hamilton because of its 
5 . Hansard ' s Parliamentary Debates , Third Series , 
27 April 1885 , Vol . 297 , p . 847 . 
6 . R. L. Greaves , Persia and the Defence of India , 
pp . 72- 73 · 
110 . 
closeness to Russian territory and because its 
geographical formation possessed every requisite 
for a naval station . The First Lord of the Admiralty , 
Northbrook , believed that in event of war the port 
would be necessary as a base against Vladivostock . 7 
The Cabinet decided , on 11 April 1885 , to 
get ' pre - emption or first refusal ' of Port Hamilton . 
The Admiralty on 14 April instructed Vice- Admiral 
William Dowell of the China Station to occupy the 
port and report proceedings . Three warships , 
' The Agamemnon ', ' The Pegasus ', and ' The Firebrand ', 
entered Port Hamilton on 15 April 1885 , without 
hoisting the flag . The Admiralty instructed that 
the flag should not be hoisted until Russian 
warships entered the harbour . 8 
7. Foreign Office to Admiralty , conf . 20 March 1884, 
F . O. 17/969 ; Admiralty to Foreign Office , conf . 
4 April 1885 , F . O. 17/1001 . 
8 . Granville to Gladstone , 26 April 1885 , F . O. 
17/1000; A. Ramm , ed ., Political Correspondence 
of Mr . Gladstone and Lord Granville , 1876- 1886 , 
Oxford Univ . Press , 1962 , Vol . II , p . 363 . 
Ill . 
The British decision to occupy Port Hamilton 
was the result of military and strategic considerations . 
Safe anchorage in the southern extremity of Korea 
would advance the British fleet to within easy 
operating distance of Vladivostock , only 850 miles 
away , almost halfway between the Russian port and 
Hong Kong . 
In the meantime , the Russians had secured 
their objective , a foothold on the glaciers of the 
Hindu Kush and control of the Sarik Turkomen . They 
sought to consolidate their position without losing 
face . The Russian army was in the midst of 
reorganization , coast defences were unprepared , the 
treasury empty . The Russian government decided 
that the moment was not opportune for a war . They 
had repeatedly expressed hope that the unhappy 
incident at Penjdeh should not prevent negotiations . 9 
9 . Thornton to Granville , 7 May 1885 , Granville 
Papers, Public Record Office , P . R. O. 30/29/186 . 
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The British government , too , in spite of its 
determined action , was anxious to avoid war . The 
Afghans refused to admit British troops to their territory , 
lest a war between Russia and Britain should lead to 
occupation by the armies of one or both of the contending 
parties . Mo reover , Britain was without an ally on the 
Continent . Without allies , a war against Russia would 
be futile and costly . Taking these factors into con-
sideration , neither the British officials in India nor 
those at home thought that Penjdeh was worth a full - scale 
fight . Once the excitement had died away the British 
t t . 10 governmen sough a compromlse . 
The turning point came early in May 1885 when 
Britain and Russia agreed to submit their claims to an 
arbitrator . The two governments eventually dispensed 
with the services of an arbitrator and entered into 
direct negotiations , and signed a preliminary protocol 
on 10 September 1885 . 
The occupation of Port Hamilton helped to thwart 
the Russian advance in Central Asia and it was also part 
of a forward - looking strategy . Port Hamilton could 
serve as the British base from which to attack Russia ' s 
10 . Fortnightly Review , Vol . 43 (1885) , p . 728. 
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Far Eastern possessions in the event of a general war . 
Fortunately , there was no war . Nevertheless , the 
occupation of Port Hamilton , although by no means a 
major issue in British foreign policy , was to become the 
core of diplomacy in the Far East during the next two years . 
The British goverhment had undertaken the occupation 
without a clearly defined policy , leaving the detailed 
negotiations to its representatives in Peking and Seoul . 
Britain announced from the beginning that the occupation 
was a temporary measure, but the British would neither 
abandon Port Hamilton nor annex it. 
Korea , as well as China and Japan , regarded the 
British action as an invitation to Russia to make a 
countermove south which would leave them to face diffi-
culties which the British had created . As Korea ' s dignity 
and sovereignty were at stake , the Korean gove rnment, 
upset and angered , made constant protests , but they had 
no other means but verbal protests available to them . 
Negotiations were prolonged until the British found an 
opportune time to evacuate the port . 
Port Hamilton belonged to Korea , with which Britain 
had established diplomatic relations as a sovereign state . 
But, Britain ente red into and conducted negotiations 
primarily with the Chinese government , as if Korea was 
part of China . The day after the British fleet took the 
Korean port , the Foreign Secretary , Lord Granville , 
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notified the Chinese Minister in London , Tseng Chi - Tse , 
that the British decision had been taken in order to 
prevent the probable occupation of the island by 
another Power . Granville expressed readiness to come 
to an agreement with China . The Foreign Office 
furnished a draft agreement , binding China to acknowledge 
the British occupation of the port as lawful , and with 
the condition that Britain should pay to Korea any 
revenue derived from these islands , with a deduction 
for China of whatever might normally to go her as tribute . ll 
The Chinese government , however , claimed that the 
obstacle to an agreement was the threat of the Russian 
Minister in Peking , who had declared that , if China 
acquiesced in the British action , Russia would have to 
occupy another part of Korea . There was also the 
possibility that Japan might follow the same cour se . 
Under these circumstances , the Chinese government could 
not authorize its Minister to sign the draft proposed 
t ' t ' h 12 by he Brl lS government . 
11. Granville to Tseng , 16 April 1885 ; Tseng to 
Granville , 27 April 1885 ; Draft Agreement , 
Enclosure in Granville to Tseng , 28 April 
1885 ~ The British and Foreign State Papers , 
Vol. 78 , pp . 143- 6 . 
12 . Granville to O' Conor , 6 May 1885 , Ibid ., 
Vol . 78 , p . 147 . 
116 . 
The Chinese refusal took the British by surprise , 
because they had been confident that all would go smoothly . 
Granville decided to drop the matter for the time being . 
Thus , without any agreement and consent , the British 
squadron remained in occupation of Port Hamilton long 
after the crisis in Central Asia was over . 
Great Britain left Korea unnotified until about the 
latter half of May , which though unintentional , revealed 
Britain ' s lack of respect for Korea as a sovereign 
country . Granville had sent a cable to the British 
Minister in China , O' Conor , on 23 April , instructing him 
to address a confidential note to the Korean government 
informing of Britain ' s action . 
reach Seoul until 19 May . 13 
O' Conor ' s note did not 
Korea ' s silence did not betray ignorance of what 
was happening . A few Korean officials had heard of it 
through foreigners in Seoul , and felt much indignation 
against Britain for taking such action without not -
ifying to the Korean government . They regarded it as 
an open violation of international law and as a breach 
of the Anglo- Korean treaty . Some Korean officials 
13 . Granville to O' Conor , 23 April 1885 , The British 
and Foreign State Papers , Vol . 78 , pp . 144- 5 ; 
Carles to O' Conor , 7 May 1885 , F . O. 17/996 . 
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thought of making representations to the treaty Powers . 
But the Korean government refrained from making a protest 
until it received the note from the British government . 
On 16 May , officials of the Korean Foreign Office left 
for Port Hamilton to investigate the situation . When 
the Korean delegates demanded explanation , the British 
Commanding Officer , Captain J . P . MacLear , refused on the 
grounds that he was acting only under his superior' s 
orders . The Korean delegates went to Nagasaki and 
presented a written protest to the British Admiral , William 
Dowell , who promised to forward it to his govenment . 14 
However , the long- awaited dispatch from O' Conor , which 
the Vice - Consul in Seoul , Carles , delivered to the Korean 
Foreign Office on 19 May , contained nothing new from 
what the British representative had been saying , and 
there was no detailed eXPlanation . 15 
The Korean government issued a more formal protest 
than the one presented to Admiral Dowell , to the effect 
that because Port Hamilton was Korean territory no Power 
could take it . Korea hoped Britain would abandon such 
an intention out of regard for friendly relations . 
14 . Carles to O' Conor , 19 May 1885 , F . O. 17/981 ; 
Dowell to the Admiralty , 19 May 1885 , The British 
and Foreign State Papers , Vol . 78 , pp . 149- 152 . 
15 . Carles to O' Conor , No . 47 , 19 May 1885 , F . O. 
17/996 ; Chosen- Shi , Series VI , Vol . 4 , p . 76 4. 
Should Britain fail to withdraw at once , Korea had no 
choice but appeal to the treaty Powers. The British 
were embarrassed by the threat of an appeal to other 
Powers . 
The British government decided near the end of 
May 1885 , on an offer of a yearly rent of £5 , 000 , 
mainly to end the protest . Granville directed O' Conor 
to make the offer through the Chinese government , because 
Britain needed China ' s support and cooperation not only 
over Port Hamilton but because of Britain ' s commercial 
interests in China . 16 When Korea repated its protest 
in a more formal way , O' Conor , too , concluded that it 
would be better to go through the Chinese government 
than through the British Consulate in Seoul . 17 
Granville sought through the Chinese Minister in 
London , Tseng , to solicit China ' s influence in the 
interests of Britain . But the Peking government r efused 
to interfere in such negotiations . It was probable that 
China feared that Britain ' s occupation of the islands 
might be the first stage in a partition of Korea . 
O' Conor decided to turn to Li Hung- Chang , whose influence 
was absolute in Korea . Though he shared the fears of 
the Peking government , Li Hung- Chang began to see an 
16 . Granville to O' Conor , No . 120 , Conf . 27 May 
1885 ; No . 124 , Secret , 29 May 1885 , F . O. 17/975 . 
17 . O' Conor to Granville No . 251 , very conf ., 26 
May 1885 ; O' Conor to Aston , 30 May 1885 , 
F . O. 17/981 . 
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advantage in the British occupation of a Korean port . 
The presence of the British fleet in such a strategic point 
might help China check not only Russia but Japan . Li 
assured the British that although China could not consent 
to British occupation openly , it would not oppose it . 18 
Li suggested that whilst the Korean government found it 
impossible to accept the British proposal of an annual 
rental , owing to foreign opposition , that an offer of a 
lump sum , under a private arrangement , might be effective . 
O' Conor decided that the offer of such a lump sum would 
be the best lure for Korea , and asked the London government 
if it would pay a lump sum instead of an annual rent . 19 
However , the British government rejected the idea and 
Granville instructed O' Conor not to propose any lump sum 
without further notice . 20 
The Gladstone ministry did not survive to conclude 
the Port Hamilton negotiations . There was growing popular 
discontent in Britain , stemming largely from a series of 
18 . O' Conor to Granville , No . 259 , 2 June 1885 , 
F . O. 17/981 . 
19 . O' Conor to Granville , Tel . No . 48 , 9 June 1885 , 
F . O. 17/987 ; O' Conor to Granville , No . 276 , 
conf ., 10 June 1885 , F . O. 17/981 . 
20 . Memo . in F . O. 17/987 ; Granville to O' Conor , 
No . 134 , 11 June 1885 , F . O. 17/975 ; O' Conor to 
Granville , No . 284 , Conf ., 12 June 1885 , F . O. 
17/987 ; Granville to O' Conor , Tel . No . 34 , 
13 June 1885 , F . O. 17/975 . 
incidents in foreign policy . The British had retreated 
from the Sudan and left Penjdeh to the Russians . In the 
Far East , there was suspicion among the Powers about the 
seizure of Port Hamilton . A vote on the budget bill 
brought defeat of the Liberal government in June, and 
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Queen Victoria sent for Salisbury to form a new Cabinet . 
When Salisbury took office as both Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary on 24 June 1885 , he substituted a cautious 
policy for that of his predecessor . However , the Port 
Hamilton question remained unresolved for some time . 
The British government had given no written reply to the 
Korean protest of May . Salisbury ' s policy was to prove to 
be much the same as that of Granville . 
In mid July , the British Consul- General in Seoul , 
Aston , succeeded in inducing the president of the Korean 
Foreign Office , Yoon- Sik Kim , to withdraw the appeal to the 
treaty Powers . Aston argued that the British seizure of 
Port Hamilton was due to Russia ' s relations with Korea and 
not to Britain ' s trouble with Russia . Further , if Korea 
should continue to follow the advice of fri ends of Russia 
and to appeal to foreign Powers , it would make the settlement 
about Port Hamilton more difficult . Kim retorted that the 
British government had not treated Korea fairly . The 
Korean government had tried to settle the matter directly 
with Britain , but failed . It had no alternative but to 
request good offices of other Powers , which would result in 
an international conference . In the end , Kim promised to 
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abandon an appeal to the Powers until he had received 
f . . 21 an answer rom the Brltlsh government. 
Encouraged by this success , Aston , for the first 
time , brought up the subject of leasing Port Hamilton . 
He told Kim that Li Hung- Chang had suggested the idea . 
The British endeavoured to make it appear as if the 
offer had been proposed by Li Hung- Chang , that is by 
the Chinese government in Peking . He thought that this 
would influence the Korean Foreign Office . O' Conor 
drew up a draft agreement containing three points : 
Britain was to pay an annual rent to the Korean government ; 
Britain was not to use the islands against Korea and 
China ; lastly , Britain was not to impair rights of 
Koreans on the iSlands . 22 Yoon Sik- Kim admitted 
Korea's financial difficulties but thought that no 
pecuniary advantages could make up for the political 
difficulties in which concessions would involve Korea . 
Knowing that Britain would never commit herself to 
guaranteeing Korea' s integrity , Kim refused the offer to 
protect his country from multiple external pressure . 
21 . Aston to Conor , No . 81 , 10 July 1885 , F . O. 
17/996 ; O' Conor to Salisbury , Tel . No . 54 , 
16 July 1885 , F . O. 17/987 . 
22 . O' Conor to Salisbury , No . 325 , Conf . 29 
June 1885 ; Enclosure in No . 328 , 30 June 
1885 ; O' Conor to Aston , Nos . 58 , 59 , 
30 June 1885 , F . O. 17/982 . 
Even Li Hung- Chang 's direct advice at O' Conor ' s request 
brought no change to Korea ' s refusal . 23 
Meanwhile, the negotiations between O' Conor and 
Li Hung- Chang stretched out to the opening days of 1886 , 
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resulting in reiteration of proposals , counter- proposals , 
and refusals. The Korean government insisted on outright 
withdrawal . The Chinese attempted to make Britain 
guarantee Korea ' s integrity in return for recognition of 
BritiS1 occupation . The British insisted on acceptance 
of their proposals and refused to make any change in them . 
The resulting deadlock meant that Britain was not paying 
any rent for Port Hamilton but continued to enjoy its 
facilities . 
Coinciding with the British annexation of Upper 
Burma in January 1886 , the Bri tish government questioned 
whether Port Hamilton was worth hanging on to . Three 
British admirals had reported that unless the British 
government would fortify the port at great expense , it 
was worthless . Vice- Admiral Dowell reported on the 
unsuitability of Port Hamilton and r ecommended abandonment 
in May 1885 , and his predecessor , Admiral George Willes , 
had strongly agreed . When Vice - Admiral Richard V. 
Hamilton succeeded Dowell in September 1885 , the Admiralty 
gave him special orders to report fully on the matter . By 
23 . Aston to O' Conor , Nos. 84 , 85 , 10 July 1885 , 
F . O. 17/996 . 
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this time the crisis in Central Asia reached a preliminary 
settlement . The new Commander ' s report concurred with 
the views of his predecessors . He reported that the 
occupation of Port Hamilton in time of peace was an 
unnecessary expense , while in time of war it was a source 
of weakness to the Royal Navy . Even keeping two or three 
ships there weakened the cruising power of the British 
Squadron on the China Station . Forwarding the Commander ' s 
confirmatory report , the Admiralty urged the government 
t d . . 24 o come to a eClSlon . 
The British government had no objection to departure . 
The question was how to make a dignified exit. The 
British government decided to let China prevent Russia 
from occupying Port Hamilton . Before the Conservative 
government could take action , the Gladstone interlude 
(February - July 1886) began with Lord Rosebery as Foreign 
Secretary . Rosebery drew up a memorandum on 14 April 
1886 , which declared that Britain would evacuate 
Port Hamilton on condition that the Chinese government 
would either assume responsibility for the security of 
Port Hamilton , or get Russia and the other Powers to 
enter into an international agreement concerning Korea ' s 
integrity , to which Britain would be a party . 25 
24 . Secretary of the Admiralty to P . Currie , 
20 Jan . 1886 , The British and Foreign State 
Papers , Vol. 78 , pp. 157- 8 . 
25 . P . Currie to H. MacArtney , 14 April 1886 , 
The British and Foreign State Papers , 
Vol . 78 , pp . 160- 161 . 
China 
refused to give such a guarantee alone , or to enter into 
an international agreement . 
The British government appointed Sir John Walsham 
as British Minister to China and Korea . Without knowing 
what was passing between the governments of China and 
Britain , Korea kept sending notes of protest to the 
British Minister . Since the Chinese government had 
not carried out the British proposal , Walsham came out 
with a suggestion - to open both Port Hamilton and 
Port Lazareff as treaty ports . In London , Salisbury 
returned to power with Lord Iddesleigh as Foreign 
Secretary , who approved Walsham ' s suggestion . 26 But 
for both Korea and China , to open additional ports was 
out of the question . Port Lazareff was close to another 
treaty port , Wonsan , and Port Hamilton was a desolate 
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island . There was no reason for opening either port , and 
they denounced the proposal . 
Rumour of a Russian seizure of Port Lazareff in 
early August 1886 , however , helped promote the British 
position , and hasten Li Hung- Chang to negotiate with 
the Russians . Li Hung- Chang believed that because the 
Powers threatening Korea were Japan and Russia , the 
26 . Walsham to Rosebery , 31 July 1886 ; Iddesleigh 
to Walsham , 12 Aug , 1886 ; Ibid ., Vol . 78 , p. 161 . 
latter's guarantee would suffice , and there was no need 
of international agreement which would reduce China ' s 
superior position in Korea. The only way favourable to 
China was to draw from Russia a formal pledge of non-
aggression in Korea . To secure such a pledge would 
enable China to keep Japan in check jointly with Russia . 
Li ' s negotiation with the Russian Charge , Ladygensky , 
at Tientsin ended in October 1886 with a verbal promise 
that Russia would not occupy Korean territory under any 
circumstances . 
British withdrawal was anti- climactic , compared 
to the occupation twenty two months earlier . The Chinese 
government in early November 1886 notified Walsham of the 
Russian promise . Walsham informed the Korean government 
that the British decision to end the occupation of Port 
Hamilton was conformable to its original intent . The 
British Acting Consul , T. Watters , handed Walsham ' s 
dispatch to the Korean Foreign Office on 21 January 1887 . 
Evacuation took place on 27 February 1887 . The Ko r ean 
government , in spite of its understandable anger , meekly 
expressed recognition of Britain ' s good faith and its 
desire to maintain friendly relations between the two 
. 27 countrles . 
27 . The British and 'Foreign State Papers , Vol . 78 
pp . 162- 169 . 
125 . 
There was wide divergence of opinion among the 
British on the wisdom of abandoning Port Hamilton . 
On the whole , the balance of public sentiment was that 
Port Hamilton was not worth the price of Chinese enmity , 
which might result in a restriction of British trade in 
China and opposition to British plans in Burma . 28 
The British seizure of Port Hamilton had reversed 
126 . 
Russia ' s naval policy in the Far East . The incident showed 
how easily the British could block the Russian squadron 
in the Sea of Japan . The Russian government decided in 
1887 to launch a new policy for its Far Eastern posses -
sions : to depend on land forces in place of naval strength . 
This led to the building of the ~~anR - Sibe~ian RailwRY in 
1891- 1903 . Vladivostock , which the Russians had fortified 
at a great expense a decade earlier , declined in importance 
as a naval base . 29 . 
The result of the Port Hamilton Incident was to 
throw Korea more under the control of China . The way 
28 . Fortnightly Review , Vol . 47 (March- June 1887) , 
pp . 352 , 810 . 
29 . A. Malozemoff , Russian Far Eastern Policy , 
1881- 1904 , University of California , 1958 , 
pp . 33- 34 . 
Britain had proceeded with the arrangements for both 
occupation and withdrawal gave great satisfaction to the 
Chinese government and strengthened Anglo - Chinese 
friendship. Although Port Hamilton belonged to Korea , 
throughout the entire episode , Britain had treated 
127 . 
Korea and her government as being of secondary importance. 
Thus ended a short period of the first and arguably 
the only active relationship between Britain and Korea . 
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PART THREE . THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH POLICY 
CHAPTER 5. THE QU IESCENT PHASE , 1 885 - 94 
Apart from Port Hamilton , British concern during 
the summer of 1885 was with the political vacuum in Korea 
which the withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops would 
create . The Li - Ito Convention of April 1885 had 
stipulated such a withdrawal In order to prevent a 
clash between the two forces In Korea . The Korean 
government had no trained forces to replace the outgoing 
foreign troops . O' Conor consulted Consul - General Aston 
about maintaining order in Seoul by a Korean force , but 
Aston replied that although the Korean soldiers were 
sufficient in number , their reliability in an emergency 
was questionable . Aston saw no way of assuring peace 
and safety except by retaining some Chinese and Japanese 
1 troops . 
O' Conor thought it essential that China should 
maintain order and prevent disturbances in Korea . 
Moreover , Japan ' s modified policy following the Li - Ito 
1 . O' Conor to Granville , No . 252 , Conf ., 27 May 1885 , 
F . O. 17/981; Aston to O' Conor , No . 66 , 16 
June 1885 ; and No . 82 , 10 July 1885 , F . O. 17/983. 
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agreement led O' Conor to conclude that Japan was 
willing to accept Chinese dominance in Korea . The 
Japanese government had expressed no objection towards 
the various measures taken by China since the agreement , 
and there was a strong indication that Japan had altered 
. t l ' 2 0 ' l S po lCY towards Korea . Conor assumed that the 
duty of keeping order in Korea would fallon the Chinese , 
who no doubt would welcome it . He pressed the Chinese 
government to retain part of its troops in Korea . But 
the Chinese had no intention of violating the agreement 
with Japan , and the withdrawal of both foreign troops 
ended by the end of June 1885 . 3 
After withdrawal of its forces from Korea , China 
adopted a new policy which coincided with British 
interests . Britain encouraged and gave full support to 
2. O' Conor to Salisbury , No . 303 , 17 June ; No . 332 , 
2 July ; No . 340 , 6 July 1885 , F . O. 17 / 982 ; 
American Charge in Seoul , Foulk , concluded that 
' Japan had been apparently little more than a 
passive observer , yielding much to the Chinese 
claim of suzerainty '. Foulk to Bayard , 
No . 214 , 16 Aug . 1885 , G.M . McCune , Korean-
American Relations : Documents Pertaining to the 
Far- Eastern Diplomac of the U. S ., Univ . of 
California Press , 1951 , Vol . I 1883- 86) , p . 126 . 
Hereafter referred to as Korean- American Relations : 
Documents . 
3 . Aston to O' Conor , 22 June and 10 July 1885 ; 
O' Conor to Salisbury , No. 358 , 18 July 1885 
F . O. 17/983 . 
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China ' s new policy towards Korea ~ and made known that their 
interests lay in upholding Chinese suzerainty over Korea . 
The Li - Ito Convention forbade the Chinese and the 
Japanese to use troops to gain their ends ~ but various 
surreptitious ways were open . In September 1885, China 
returned the Taewongun to Korea ~ despite strong objections 
from the ruling Queen Min ' s faction . During the same 
month the Chinese constructed the fi r st telegraph line 
that linked Inchon ~ Seoul ~ Tientsin and Peking and 
appointed a Chinese official to superintend its operation . 
China ' s control of the telegraph monopoly increased 
C · 4 Korea ' s dependence on hlna . 
One of the most important steps was the appointment 
of Yuan Shih- Kai as Chinese Commissioner of Trade . Yuan ~ 
the future President of the Chinese Republic ~ was a young 
protege of Li Hung- Chang and had served under General Wu 
ln Korea in 1882 . Returning to Korea in November 1885 
as ' the Commissioner stationed in Korea to Superintend 
Diplomatic and Commercial Affairs ' ~ he was virtually a 
4. O' Conor to Salisbury ~ Corea, No . 19 , 29 Sept . 
l885 ~ F . O. 17/984 . 
Chinese Viceroy in Korea for the next nlne years until 
1894 . He showed no qualms in asserting Chinese 
authority in the peninsular kingdom even by means of 
extreme measures . As an ambitious young man (26 
years old in 1885) he was anxious to succeed . Yuan ' s 
appointment coincided with the British Consul- General, 
Aston; s resignation . His successor was E . Colborne 
Baber who had been in consular service in China since 
1866 . Baber took office in October 1885 as provisional 
acting Consul- General , and during the next eleven months 
he was to give full support to Yuan ' s programrne . 5 The 
exact English title of Yuan ' s office in the Korean 
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service was never determined . Some called him ' Resident 
Commissioner ', and some ' The Chinese Resident '. 
Whatever his title , Yuan was to bring Korea back under 
Chinese control and was to combat all efforts of the 
Korean King to assert his independence . 
Chafing under the increasingly rigid control of 
China , the Korean Court unsuccessfully sought Russian 
influence as a check to China in 1885- 6 . The central 
figure in the ill- fated appeal for Russian protection 
was the German adviser to the Korean government , Von 
Moellendorff . Although a German he had been sent to Korea 
5. Baber to O' Conor , No . 113 , 23 Oct . 1885 , 
F . O. 17/985 . 
ln 1883 by the Chinese to act as a foreign adviser 
to the Korean government . He became one of the Vice -
Presidents of the newly created Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Korea and also Inspector- General of Korean 
Customs . Be fore long he came to i~entify himself 
more with Korea than with China , and introduced some 
positive reforms and improvements in transportation , 
industry and the army . After the Emeute of 1884 , 
Von Moellendorff began to contemplate the advisability 
of military reforms under foreign tutelage , and persuaded 
the King to appeal to the Russians for assistance and 
military instructors for the Korean army . The King 
was more than willing to approve Von Moellendorff ' s 
scheme , but , faced with the strenuous opposition of 
the Que en Mi n 'sfaction and in fear of a forceful inter-
vention by foreign forces , had to reverse his stand and 
disapprove the project . As Ol Conor urged Li Hung- Chang 
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to remove Von Moellendorff , so China demanded his 
dismissal . In September 1885 , Von Moellendo rf was fi nally 
dismissed , and Henry F . Merrill , an American , replaced 
him . Although an American , Merrill maintained the most 
cordial relations with Consul Baber and Commissioner 
Yuan . Their collective position was one of virtually 
ignoring the Korean government and supporting Chinese 
1 " 6 po lCy . 
The Chinese assertion of influence became so 
irksome that even the British thought it unwise and 
ineffective . O' Conor advised Li Hung- Chang to be 
more careful not to injure the susceptibilities of 
the Korean King and provoke needless opposition . 7 . 
The King of Korea , too weak to counter Chinese 
interference , sought help from the Western treaty 
Powers . Obviously Britain could not be depended 
upon , owing to the Port Hamilton Inc ident as well as 
her support of the Chinese . Even so , when Baber took 
office as acting Consul- General in October 1885 , the 
King expressed a desire to see the British represen-
tative invested with high diplomatic rank . On r eceipt 
6 . O' Conor to Salisbury , No . 356 , 17 July ~ No . 360 , 
22 July ; No . 383 , 25 Aug . 1885 , F . O. 17/983 ; 
O' Conor to Salisbury , No . 491 , 15 Dec. 1885 , 
F . O. 17/986 ; Foulk to Bayard , No . 272 , 18 Jan j 
No . 297 , 23 Apr . 1886 , G. M. McCune , Korean-
American Relations : Documents , pp . 87 , 147- 9; 
F .H. Moersel , ' The Emeute of 1884 ', Korean 
Repository , Vol . IV (1897) , pp . 135- 40 ; Seoul 
National University , Kuksa Kaesul (History of 
Korea) , pp . 607- 8 . 
7 . O' Conor to Salisbury , Corea , No . 25 , Conf ., 
8 Nov . 1885 , F . O. 17/985 . 
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of Baber ' s dispatch,O ' Conor advised the British government 
not to comply with the Korean King ' s wish . Even the 
United States had reduced the rank of its Seoul legation 
from that of full - fledged Minister Plenipotentiary 
to Minister Resident, without reducing the Salary . 8 
Britain was constantly trying to discover Russia ' s 
policy in Korea . Its representatives were reporting 
every move the Russians made in Korea , especially since 
the arrival of the newly appointed Russian Charge d ' Affaires, 
Carl Waeber , in October 1885 . Waeber was mild and con-
ciliatory and created a favourable impression in Korean 
circles. 9 No sooner had he arrived than the British 
Consul at Tientsin , Brenan , informed O' Conor of the news 
he had received from Li Hung- Chang that Waeber had offered 
the Korean King Russian protection by dispatching a 
squadron to Chemulpo . However , having received no 
report to confirm such a Russian proposal , O' Conor 
f · f . 10 . re ralned rom actlon . 
8 . Ibid . 
9 . O' Conor to Salisbury , Corea , No . 23 , 23 Oct . 
1885 , F . O. 17/985. 
10 . O' Conor to Salisbury , No . 463 , Conf . 21 Nov . 
1885 , F . O. 17/986 . 
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The British and the Chinese were on the alert 
when Waeber tried , beginning in 1886 , to sec ure trading 
rights on the Korean frontier along the Tumen River , which 
the Russians had long coveted . The Russians proposed 
to establish a free zone of about 35 miles on each side 
of the Korean border along the Tumen River . This would 
have advanced the Russian frontier into the peninsula 
and would have enabled the Russians to push south into 
Korean territory . Fear flared again in the minds of 
the British that the design of Russia was ice - free 
Port Lazareff . One could easily see that in case of 
war between Russia and China , Russia , operating from a 
base in Korea , could attack Peking . China could not 
allow Russia such an advantage , while Britain would have 
to interfere to protect her enormous China trade . Any 
Russian move in Korea stimulated an alliance of interests 
between China and Britain . Representatives of the two 
Powers were pressing the Korean government to frame 
t I t h R . 11 coun er- proposa sot e USSlans . 
At this time , a visit of a Russian warship to 
Port Lazareff started a rumour that the Russians had 
seized the port . As the British were nervous because 
of Port Hamilton , they denounced the Russians for seizing 
11. Foulk to Bayard , No . 272 , Conf . 18 Jan . and 
No.6 , Conf . 24 Sept . 1886 ; Parker to Bayard , 
No . 24 , Conf .4Aug . 1886 , G. M. McCune , 
Korean- American Relations : Documents , pp . 87- 92 . 
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Port Lazareff , part of the Korean Kingdom . In the 
House of Commons a debate took place : if Russia occupied 
the Korean port , what steps would the British government 
take to protect British interests in the China Sea? 
The Under- Secretary of State , Sir James Furgusson , 
replied that the Foreign Secretary , Giers , had denied 
the report ' s validity , and the British government had 
received no confirmation . All Britain could do was to 
C . 12 urge hlna to protest . 
In the meantime , Yuan Shih- Kai in Seoul took 
active steps . Urging a Chinese expedition to ward 
off the Russians from Korea , Yuan denounced the Korean 
King and threatened to call a Chinese army into the 
country . Yuan suggested to Li Hung- Chang that China 
should kidnap and dethrone the King . This would have 
largely repeated the experience of the Taewon8un in 1882 . 
Yuan secured support from the Chinese government , and 
Li Hung- Chang sent a squadron to the east coast of 
Korea . 13 
12 . The Annual Register : 1886 , p . 445 ; Hansard ' s 
Parliamentary Debates , Vol . 308 (1886) , p . 166 . 
13 . Foulk to Bayard , No . 3 , 8 Sept . 1886 , 
G. M. McCune , Korean- American Relations : 
Documents , pp . 149 - 154 ; Fred H. Harrington , 
God , Mammon and the Japanese : Dr . H. N. Allen 
and Korean- American Relations , 1884 - 1905 , 1944 
(2nd Printing 1961) , New York , pp . 215 - 6 . 
When the crlSlS reached its height it suddenly 
died away . Li Hung- Chang had made an inquiry through 
the Chinese Minister at St . Petersburg and by direct 
communication with the Korean King about the authen-
ticity of the alleged secret agreement between Korea 
and Russia establishing a Russian protectorate over 
Korea . Both the Russian Foreign Office and the King 
of Korea denied knowledge of it . The Russian Charge , 
Waeber , denied that he had ever received such a 
document . Russia ' s denial of its bid for protection 
over Korea was enough for Li Hung- Chang , who knew that a 
further step might bring in the Japanese on whom he had 
to keep his eyes . Further , the visit of the Chinese 
fleet to Vladivostock proved that the Russians had no 
immediate intention of occupying Port Lazareff. Yuan ' s 
threat slid by , without a 'Chinese attack on Korea or the 
d th f . 14 e ronement 0 the Korean Klng . 
Thus, so called the ' Russian threat ' had once again 
led to British- Chinese intervention in Korean affairs . 
Great Britain , through its representatives in Peking , 
had been urging the Chinese government to interfere in 
Korean affairs . In Seoul , the British representatives 
were outspoken that Korea was a vassal state and 
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14 . Ibid ., pp . 217- 8 ; The Annual Register : 1886 , p . 445 . 
altogether incapable of self- government . The incident 
of 1886 did give an excuse to the Chinese for her 
aggressive policy towards Korea . Britain continued 
to stimulate Chinese suspicions of Russian policy in 
Korea . 15 
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This event caused further damage to the traditional 
tie between Korea and China , in that Ko rea ' s submission 
to China no longer stemmed from willingness to recogni ze 
Chinese superiority , in accordance with their traditional 
relationship . Korea , by 1890 , had been forced to submit , 
thus subverting the Confucian relations between the two 
nations that had hinged upon the personal allegiance of the 
lesser ruler to the Chinese throne . In the face of 
China ' s superior power , Korea could not openly defy 
China . But Korea ' s will to defy was subtly manifested 
in various moves to oust Yuan who personified Chinese 
control in the Korean capital . In 1888 and again in 
the following year , the Korean government requested Yuan ' s 
recall but Li Hung- Chang rejected these pleas . Li 
argued that Yuan ' s unpopularity in Korea was in itself 
a proof of his efficiency and thoroughness in carrying 
out China ' s policy , something which the Korean King 
15 . Foulk to Bayard , No . 13 , Conf ., 14 Oct . 1886 , 
G. M. McCune , Korean- American Relations : Documents , 
p . 155 ; Dinsmore to Bayard , No . 20 , 27 May 1~87 , 
Spencer J . Palmer , ed ., Korean - American Relations : 
Documents , Vol . II (1887- 1895) , p . 11 . 
and some foreign representatives did not view with 
favour . 16 
Another matter in which Britain was in line with 
China was over Korean diplomatic representation in 
Western capitals . Korea ' s treaties stipulated 
reciprocal sending and receiving of diplomatic and 
consular officers . There was no question that the 
Korean government , ln establishing legations abroad , 
was acting within its rights under the treaties it 
had concluded with foreign Powers , with China ' s approval . 
However , when the Korean Court decided in 1887 to 
establish legations in the Western countries , China 
objected , because maintenance of China ' s suzerainty 
over Korea required vigilant superintendence of Korea ' s 
dealings with other foreign Powers . When the Korean 
King decided to establish legations abroad , and appointed 
two Ministers Plenipotentiary in August 1887 , one to the 
United States and the other to Europe ,( Britain , Russia , 
16 . M. F . Nelson , Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern 
Asia , pp . 176- 77 ; Li Hung- Chang , Li Wen- chung-
kUng Chuan- chi (The Collected Writings of Li Hung-
Chan~) , Wu Ju-Lun ed., Nanking , 1908 , Memorials , 
Ch . 7 , pp . 4a- 5a ; Ch . 74 , pp . 46a- 47a . 
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Germany , France and Italy) , Yuan warned the Korean King 
directly that any important question of foreign affairs 
must first be approved by Li Hung- Chang . Yuan set 
out to wreck the whole project of the King and his 
advisers and demanded the cancellation of the plan . When 
the King di spatched Chong- Yang Park to the United States 
as Minister Plenipotentiary on 23 September 1887 , Yuan 
prevented the envoy from departing . As the British 
Consul , T . Watters , told the Chinese that the Korean 
King ' s move was a slap at Chinese suzerainty , and if 
China remained supine then Korea would become another 
Annam , Li Hung- Chang thoughtfully secured an imperial 
order to demand that the King of Korea should obtain 
China ' s consent before such action . The Korean King , 
determined to send the missions at any prjce , belatedly 
petitioned the Chinese government for permission to 
send the Park mission and a comparable mission to Europe , 
and took the procedure China requested . 17 
17 . Dinsmore to Bayard , No . 53 , 30 Sept . 1887 ; 
Yuan to the Korean Government , 23 Sept . 1887 ; 
Yuan to Dinsmore , 30 Sept . 1887 , S . J . Palmer , 
Korean- American Relations : Documents , Vol . II , 
pp . 101- 106 . 
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Even then the Chinese ruled that the rank of 
Korean envoys should never be higher than Ministers Resident , 
because even China did not have a Plenipotentiary ln any 
capital . There were three additional rules laid down 
by Li Hung- Chang which the Korean representatives were 
to observe in relations with Chinese colleagues in 
Western capitals: (a) the Korean Minister must report 
his arrival at his post first to the Chinese legation , 
and introduce themselves to the foreign office in question 
only through the Chinese Minister ; (b) at any official 
reception Koreans were to take a seat below the Chinese ; , 
(c) Koreans must consult in advance with the Chinese 
representatives on any important matte r . The King 
agreed , but secured permission to send Ministers 
Plenipotentiary as he had planned , on the understanding 
that he would replace them by Charges d ' Affaires as soon 
as they had carried out the formalities . 18 
The Minister designated to Europe (Britain and 
the other four European Powers) never proceeded on his 
mission due to Britain ' s interference . Li Hung- Chang 
asked the Chinese Minister in London to inqui re whethe r 
18 . Dinsmore to Bayard , No . 73 , Conf ., 17 Nov . 1887 ; 
Enclosure in Denby to Bayard , No . 521 , 9 Dec . 
1887 , Ibid ., pp . 108 , 110- 112 . 
the rules laid down by China were acceptable . The 
British government not only complied with them but 
volunteered the information that if the Chinese did 
not favour the Ko rean mission , Britain would refuse to 
receive the Korean envoy . The mission headed by the 
Minister Plenipotentiary , Shin- Hee Cho , left Korea on 
22 November 1887 , nine days after departure of the 
mission to the United States , but when the mission 
reached Hong Kong via Shanghai , the British saw to 
it that it did not get farther . Shin- Hee Cho returned 
home on a pretext of poor health , and his replacement , 
Jae- Soon Park , never left for his post . 19 Britain ' s 
prime object in the step might have been to please 
China . It is also probable that the British were not 
disposed to see the mission ' s headquarters established 
at St . Petersburg rather than London . While Korea 
retained diplomatic representatives in Washington , 
British activitie s deprived the Koreans of an opportunity 
I 
to work in the same way in the European capitals . 
Although China was unable to establish complete 
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control over Korea , the attitude and policies of the British 
government helped both to solidify the Chinese position in 
19 . Watters to Salisbury , No . 6 , 24 Nov . 1887 , F . O. 
17/1049; T. Dennett , Americans in Eastern Asia , 
p . 484 . 
Korea and to promote British- Chinese friendship . 
The British constantly had ih mind China ' s potential 
usefulness in the event of Anglo - Russian war . Most 
British , if not all of them , thought war with Russia 
likely , and that only co - operation with China could 
safeguard British interests in Asia . Britain also 
desired to conciliate China because it wanted the 
Chinese government not to interfere in British pacifi -
cation and control of Burma . An Anglo- Chinese convention 
of 24 July 1886 , recognized Britain ' s annexation of 
Upper Burma , and , in return , a continuation of the 
Burmese decennial tribute missions to China - these to 
save Chinese prestige . Th e s e considerations also 
prompted the British to support Chinese policy in Korea . 
But , most of all , the British believed that to resist 
Russian expansion in the Far East required stable relations 
between China and Korea . To let Korea assert independence 
was dangerous . The British did not see any contradiction 
in their treaty with Korea , which assumed equal status . 
To treat Korea as a sovereign s'tate in comme r cial matters 
was to extract as much trading benefit as possible , but 
British commercial interests in Korea in the 1880 ' s 
remained negligible . 
Foreign trade in Korea was stagnant . Although the 
greater proportion of Korean imports consisted of British 
co t ton manufactures , nearly ninety per cent of the 
shipping , import and export business was in Japanese 
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hands . As there had been no marked change In the import 
trade since 1884 , a few British merchants , who had 
pr os pe c ted the country , withdrew after incurring losses . 
They avoided entering the country and allowed the 
Japanese to carry and control the trade as before . 
Chinese merchants increas ed in number and occupied 
20 second place . 
There were several notable causes for the stagnation 
in Korean trade . One of the principal drawbacks was the 
lack of a proper medium of exchange . The only currency 
in Korea was copper coins . More important , there was 
an absence of a sufficient quantity of Korean products 
available for export to balance the cost of imported 
goods . The Europeans could not compete with the 
Japanese and the Chinese , and , further , did not care to 
engage in small business . The few Europeans who established 
themselves in Korea complained of difficulties in obtaining 
payment in silver or in kind for the commodities they 
imported . The government never regarded foreign commerce 
as an important affair of state . The people lacked 
initiative . Partly due to various official restrictions 
20 . E. C. Baber ' s report on trade , 1886, F . O. 17/1027 . 
on economic activities and partly to the long seclusion 
and self- supporting economy , they lacked incentive and 
were slow to become aware of the advantages of foreign 
trade . They worked only for necessities of the day . 
Without immediate improvement in currency , a means of 
transport , as well as increase in purchasing power of 
the Koreans , the prospect for foreign trade in Korea 
offered little hope . 21 
The experience of China in respect of moderniza~ion 
repeated itself in Korea . The government of Korea was 
incapable of providing the political , institutional 
foundations for economic development . The scholar-
bureaucrats blindly accepted Confucian philosophy and 
shunned all such practical activities as indu stry and 
commerce . Continuous political unrest , the monopoly 
system , sumptuary laws , and insecurity of property 
prevented Korean farmers and merchants from engaging in 
business . 
In the latter half of the 1880 ' s , the Korean 
economy was experiencing the usual dislocation attendant 
on throwing open an economically backward area to the 
concession- seekers and mercantile interests of superior 
21 . Ibid ., F . O. 17/1027 ; Report of a journey 
by W.R . Carles , April 1885 , F . O. 17 / 962 . 
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financial and technological Rowers . The opening of 
Seoul to foreign merchants had been one of the most 
unpalatabl e consequences of Korea ' s decision to join 
the modern family of nations . Since the rights of the 
other foreign nations were based on the trade rights 
first obtained by the Chinese , it was essential to 
negotiate first with China for the withdrawal of foreign 
merchants . But China flatly refused and Seoul stayed 
open , and the native merchants slowly lost ground in com-
petition with the Chinese and Japanese . 
The plight of the Seoul merchants was only one of 
the serious economic difficulties that confronted Korea . 
Public finances faced ever greater deficits . In 
addition to the increasingly unfavourable balance of t rade 
in the 1880 ' s , Korea incurred heavy foreign financial 
obligations . The various modernization projects under-
taken during the 1880 ' s added considerably to the already 
over- burdened treasury . The imposition of heavy taxes upon 
the populace , made more intolerable by official corruption , 
caused a few uprisings in the years between 1885 and 1893 , 
but the taxes were inadequate for the sudden and large 
increases in government expenditures . The only recourse 
f · 22 was orelgn loans . 
22 . Woo- ~un Han , The History of Korea , pp . 398- 402 ; 
Horace N. Allen , Korea : Facts and Fancy , Seoul , 
Methodist Publishing House , 1904 , p . 170. 
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The King and his close advisers solicited foreign 
loans on their own without going through regular governmental 
channels . As the years went by , the interest charges alone 
requir e d more foreign loans. Thus,after a period of 
irresponsible borrowings from foreign Powers , the sum of 
Korea ' s indebte dness in the middle of 1889 was approxi -
mately 1 . 3 to 1 . 5 million Yen , the creditors being the 
Germans , Americans , Japanese and Chinese . 23 
Meanwhile , Japanese commerce In Korea suffered a 
relative decline mainly due to the competition of the 
Chinese merchants under the powerful protection of Yuan 
Shih - Kai and the strong influence of the Ch i nese government 
in this period . China ' s trade with Korea , particularly 
Chinese exports to Korea , showed a significant gain . 
From 1885 to 1892 China ' s share in Korea ' s import trade 
increased from 19 per cent to 45 per cent , while that of 
Japan declined from 81 per cent to 55 per cent . Since 
the Emeute of 1884 Japan ' s political influence in Korea 
had waned , and even in the economic realm Japan was 
gradually losing ground . 24 
23 . Kondo (Charge in Seoul) to Okuma (Foreign Minister) , 
9 June 1889 , NGB . Vol . 22 , No.187~ 
24 . H. Conroy , The Japanese se izure of Korea : 1868- 1910 , 
p . 460 . 
These years , therefore , witnessed a growth in 
Sino- Japanese conflict of interest . In the short 
run , British friendship for the Chinese government, 
combined with the relative weakness of Japan, resulted 
in continued peace. But the growth of Japanese 
strength and military preparedness , combined with Chinese 
weaknesses and internal Korean instabilitY , created a 
new situation - a situation which was to culminate in 
the outbreak of Sino- Japanese war . 
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CHAPTER 6. THE SINO- JAPANESE WAR , le94-5 
The dramatic reversal in Korea ' s relations with 
her two neighbours in 1894- 5 developed in the wake of 
large - scale popular uprisings in the southern provinces 
of Korea led by a group of r el igionists known as the 
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Tonghak Tang . (The Society of Eastern Learnings) . During 
the first few years of the 1890 ' s , Korea , on the surface , 
presented a picture of a quiescent society in spite of 
occasional diplomatic crises . The Tonghak uprising , 
however , embodied the restiveness of the poor and the 
persecuted , who comprised the great majority of the 
population . It was a reaction by those who viewed the 
decadent luxury and corruption of the royal family and 
high officials with scorn and resentment . Public offices , 
both at the national and local levels , could be procured 
by the well- to - do who reaped the dividend for their 
investment by ruthlessly exploiting those below them either 
in the political hierarchy or in social status . Ultimately 
the heavy burden of supporting the privileged classes 
rested on the peasantry . The Tonghak Rebellion of 1894 
was essentially a political protest against the evils of 
Korean society . 
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The early Tonghak movement had started in 1860 
as a new religion promising salvation on earth . It 
opposed the Western Learnings and Catholicism . The 
new doctrine combined features from Confucianism , Buddhism 
and Taeoism , and in time it developed its own scriptures 
and rituals . The new faith became popular among the 
peasants in the populous southern provinces despite 
official persecution of this ' wicked learning '. In 
1866 , its founder, Jae - Woo Choe , and some of his chief 
supporters , were executed , but his followers carried 
1 
on proselytizing work among the people . 
As the Tonghak movement grew so did the intensity 
of the official persecution. In 1892 and 1893, the 
Tonghak believers held mass rallies to petition the 
gove rnment for an end to suppression and for clearance 
of the name of Choe . At this stage , the movement was 
conducting widespread political agitation , demanding 
the expulsion of foreigners and corrupt officials . 2 
In February 1894 , a militant Tonghak leader , 
Bong- Joon Chon , staged an uprising in the rural town of 
Kobu . Within two months , the rebellion spread throughout 
1 . Charles Allen Clark , Religions of Old Korea , 
New York , Fleming H. Revell Co ., 1932 , pp. 145 , 
158- 176 ; Benjamin B. We ems , ' Reform , Rebellion , 
and the Heavenly Way ' in the Association for 
Asian Studies , Monographs and Papers , 
Tucson , Univ . of Arizona Press , 1964 , No . XV , Ch . 2 . 
2 . B. B . Weems , Ibid ., Ch . 3 . 
151 . 
the prOVlnce and involved several thousand armed peasants. 
The rebels seized the government granaries and returned 
the tax grains to the peasants from whom they had been 
collected . The provincial troops melted away before 
the r ebel forces and the reinforcements rushed from Seoul 
in May were not in time to save the provincial capital . 
Several social and political reforms , which were demanded 
by the rebels , were finally conceded by the government . 
These included official toleration of the Tonghak religion , 
punishment of the pro- Japanese Koreans , improvement of 
the treatment of the lowest social groups , abolition of 
slavery , land redistribution , tax r efo rm , and punishment 
of corrupt officials and the arrogant Yangban class . 
These were the long- standing popular grievances which 
were at the root of the rebellion . 3 
The above concessions represented a truce which lasted 
a little over four months . The strength of the rebels grew 
in these months and they came to exercise quasi - governmental 
authority in certain parts of the southern province . The 
Korean government was unable to cope with the situation and 
the rebels advanced northwards and were soon threatening 
3. Chi - Yong Oh , Tonghaksa (The History of the 
Tonghak) , Seoul , 1940 , pp . 126 - 7 ; B. B . Weems , 
o~cit.~h . 3 · 
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the capital , Seoul. 
The irony of the Tonghak movement , which had a 
distinct anti - for e ign tendency , was that it gave rise 
to foreign armed interventions, which eventually led to the 
Sino- Japanese War . On 1 June 1894 , shortly before the 
truce in the rebellion , the Korean government unofficially 
requested Chinese assistance through Yuan Shih- Kai , the 
Chinese Resident in Korea . A formal written request was 
delivered to Yuan two days later . The Chinese government 
promptly complied, dispatching 1 , 500 soldiers and two 
. 4 
warshlps . At the same time , Li Hung- Chang notified 
the Japanese government, in accordance with the Tientsin 
Treaty . 5 
In the meantime , in Japan , dissatisfaction with the 
policy of the government in dealing with Korea had been 
voiced for some time by various individuals and groups . 
Some opposition party members in the Japanese Diet 
~arliament) took delight in embarrassing the government 
by advocating a tough line in foreign policy . 
4 . W. G. Hiller , Narrative of events in Korea , 
enclosed in O' Conor to Kimberley , No . 389 , 
24 Oct . 1894 , F . O. 17/1198 . 
The most 
5. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs , Nihon 
Gaiko Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Documents) , 
Vol. 27 , Part II , No . 50~; Referred to as NGB . 
S .J . Palmer , Korean- American Relation~,Do c uments , Vol . II , 
p . 340 . 
decisive influence for an aggressive policy by Tokyo 
in the summer of 1894 came from the Japanese army 
general staff which was controlled by General Kawakami 
Soroku , an ardent advocate of Continental expansion. 
The army had maintained a close watch on the Korean 
situation for some time through a separate intelligence 
system of its own . They thought that the rebellion 
could provide a welcome opportunity to send Japanese 
soldiers to Korea to carry out reforms and establish 
Japanese predominance . The army general staff made 
a formal proposal to the Cabinet for a decision to send 
an ar.my unit. The army prqposal , the impending mo vement 
of Chinese troops into Korea , a parliamentary crisis 
within Japan , and the popular demand for strong action 
in Korea converged to create an atmosphere of extra-
ordinary tension . The outcome was a decision by the 
Japanese Cabinet , on 2 June 1894 , to send a mixed 
brigade . Foreign Minister , Mutsu Munemitsu , was the 
most vocal advocate of a militant policy among the 
civilian leaders of the Japanese government . 6 
6 . Tabohashi Kiyoshi , Kindai Nissen Kankei no 
Kenkyu (A Study of the Japanese - Korean Relations 
in Recent Times) , Keijo , 1940 , Vol . II , pp. 
288 - 352 ; Tatsuji Takeuchi , War and Diplomacy 
in the Japanese Empire , New York , Doubleday , Doran 
& Co ., 1935 , pp . 110- 111 ; Mutsu Munemitzu , 
Kenkenroku (Memoirs) , Tokyo , 1933 , p . 16 . 
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Japanese reform of Korea ' s financial , administrative , 
and military systems . The Japanese refused to withdraw 
their troops until arrangements had been made for the 
introduction of reforms in the Korean government which 
would prevent disturbances in the future . They also 
f dt . C · ' t K 8 re use 0 recognlze hlnese suzeraln y over orea . 
Japan sent an additional infantry regiment to Korea . 
Japan had resolved to risk a war with China to regain 
her position in Korea . 9 
The Chinese government would admit no questioning 
of their suzerain rights in Korea . Further , they were 
strongly opposed to the question of reform being raised 
on the grounds that it constituted an interference in 
Korea ' s domestic affairs . In addition , China insisted 
on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea 
before any other matters were discussed . On 22 June , 
8 . O' Conor to Kimberley , Te1. 27ald28 , 24 and 25 
June 1894 , F . O. 17/1204 ~ Paget to 
Kimberley , Tel . 19 , 25 June 1894 , F . O. 46 / 440 . 
9 . Tabohashi l\ iyoshi , op. c i t .~p . 288- 352 ; 
Mutsu , Kenke nroku , pp . 33- 37 j NGB . vol . 27 , 
Part II , Nos . 551, 577 - 8 . 
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the Chinese government totally rej ected the proposals , 
. J . . 10 J Just as the apanese had antlclpated . The apanese 
Cabinet meeting of 22 June finally decided on a policy 
to reform the Korean governmental system singlehandedly . ll 
Reform was the best weapon Japan had over China . 
It is generally agreed that under Chinese influence there 
was almost no hope for modernizing and reforming Korea 
and it was Japan that could be counted upon to support 
a reform movement . Japan , with her ultimate aim of the 
domination of the peninsula , took advantage of the 
existing condition and proceeded to act directly and 
aggressively in the area of reform . In doing so , she 
was paving the road for her conquest of Korea . 
On 28 June , the Japanese Foreign Minister , Mutsu, 
instructed Otori , the Japanese Minister in Seoul , to 
advance a series of reforms that were to be imposed on 
Korea . On 3 July , Otori , supported by ·4 , 000 Japanese 
troops in the vicinity of the capital , presented to the 
10 . NGB , Vol . 27 , Pt . 11 No . 576 ; O' Conor to 
Kimberley , Tel . 27 and 28 , 24 and 25 June 
1894 , F . O. 17/1204 . 
11. NGB , Vol . 27 , Pt . I , Nos . 370 -3 71. 
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reluctant and dismayed government of Korea five articles 
of reform measures in political,financial , legal , military , 
and educational fields . The real objective was to secure 
concessions in communication , railway and mining . It 
was Japan ' s tactic to find an excuse to force reforms , 
and Korea , of course , refused such demands . 12 Otori 
notified the Korean government of Japan ' s intention to carry 
out reforms single- hande&y inthe interests of Japan , since 
Korea had rejected the Japanese proposals . 
19 July 1894 was a day of great change in Korea . 
On this day Otori received definite permission from the 
Tokyo government to use force in Korea , while Yuan Shih- Kai 
left Seoul for Tientsin. It was thought that he was afraid 
of falling into Japanese hands . In the event , a break 
occurred in diplomatic relations between Japan and China . 
This led to an increase in Japanese influence and the fall 
of Chinese domination in Korea . 13 Otori announced Japan ' s 
intention to construct a telegraph line between Seoul and 
Pusan and at the same time ordered his men to begin the 
telegraphic line for military use . He demanded not only the 
12 . Seoul National University , Kuksa Kaesul (History 
of Korea) , pp . 61~- 9; NGB , Vol . 27 , Pt . I , No . 
396 and its Annex 1 . 
13 . Morinosuke Kajima , The Diplomacy of Japan , 1894-
1922 , Kajima Institute o f International Peace , 
Tokyo , 1976 , Vol . I , p . 60 . 
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withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea but also Korea ' s 
abrogation of her commercial and trade agr eements with 
China . Despite the fact that Korea replied within the 
designated date , on 23 July, Japanese troops occupied the 
Royal Palace and gained control of Seoul and made the King 
their prisoner . 14 When the Korean guards clashed wi th 
the Japanese troops , the pro- Japanese pa r ty sent o ut a f alse 
imperial order for a cease fire . Many pro - Chinese leaders 
were banished and the Japanese put the Taewongun in powe r 
to establish a new government . On 24 July) a Council of 
State was formed with Hong- Jip Kim as its president and 
Otori himself as its adviser . This was called the New 
Government of Kap - O and was composed of pro - Japanese 
officials . A series of reforms were to be introduced 
and forced upon Korea one by one . 15 
On 29 July 1894 , the first reform programme was 
introduced and adopted by the Council of State . The political 
and social reform programme was made up of twenty - three 
. .. 16 
artlcles , WhlCh lncluded : 
14 . Hillier , Narrat i ve of Events in Korea , enclosure in 
O' Conor to Kimberley , No . 389 , F . O. 1 7/1198 ; NGB . 
Vol . 27 , Pt . I , Nos . 419 - 421 . 
15 . NGB . Vol. 27 , Pt . I , No . 424 . 
16 . Partial text of English version in H. B . Hulbe r t , 
'Korean Reforms ; Korean Reposito r y , II (1895) , pp . 
1 - 7 ; Full text in Seoul National Unive rsit~ 
Kuksa Kaesul , pp . 632 - 3 . 
Article II . The agreements with China 
shall be altered and Korean Ministers Plenipotentiary 
shall be sent to the various Powers . 17 
Article III . The distinction between patrician 
and plebeian rank shall be done away and men shall be 
selected for office according to ability , without 
distinction of birth . 18 
Article IV . The system of superiority of the 
scholar class over the military shall be abolished , 
and a form for mutual salutation shall be established 
according to rank . 
Article V. The law which renders the family 
and connections of a criminal liable to punishment shall 
be totally abrogated . 
punished . 19 
The offender only shall be 
17 . This article asserts a complete independence 
of Korea which had been recognized by Japan 
and other treaty Powers . 
18 . In Korea , a person could work his way up if 
he had talent , but a man of a high class , 
the Yangban , could not work his way down . 
By this change any man of the Yangban birth 
could engage in any occupation without 
forfeiting his claims to the name gentleman . 
19 . The law of family responsibility for a person ' s 
crime was intended as a strong criminal 
deterrent . 
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Article VI . The adoption of a child shall be 
permitted only when a person does not have any child from 
h ' " . f , 20 1S leg1t1mate W1 e or concub1ne. 
Article VII , Early marriages are strictly 
forbidden . A man must be twenty years old and a woman 
21 
sixteen before they can marry . 
Article VIII . Widows o f h igh or l ow e state shall 
22 be permitted to marry as they please . 
Article IX . The law authorizing the keeping of 
official or private male or female slaves shall be 
abolished and it shall be forbidden to buy or sell any 
23 . person . 
20 . It was an acceptable custom for a man , who did 
not have a son , to have a concubine in order 
to have his successor . 
21. In many cases , child marriage caused much 
suffering to the bride , because she was not 
fully grown up either physically or mentally . 
22 . In many cases , widows , even when they were young , 
remained as widows . Many of them regarded 
their remarriage as immoral. 
23 . This can be regarded as the Korean emancipation 
proclamation , but , although slavery had existed 
in Korea in ancient and medieval ages , it was 
in a mild form different from that which existed 
in Western countries . ' At no time were slaves 
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publicly sold in Korea ', C. C. Vinton , ' Slavery and 
Feudalism in Korea ', Korean Repository , II (1895) , 
p. 372 . The twelve articles from Article X -
XXII deal with organization of government , rank 
and duty of officials , etc . 
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Article XXIII . To select men for office by 
literary examinations is the law of the country , but 
it is difficult to test ability by literary essays 
alone . The throne is to be memorialized to alter 
the method of selection and adopt rules on the subject. 
These revolutionary reforms were far in advance of public 
opinion . To this extent they carried the seeds of their 
own failure . 
In addition to the twenty- three articles of 
political and social reform , there was an economic reform 
which included : 1) The adoption of silver and 
copper for money ; 2) A new system of monetary unit ; 
3) Centralization and uniformity of the financial system ; 
4 ) Establishment of banks ; 5) Uniformity in measure 
and weight, etc . 24 The reforms of 1894 were enforced on 
Korea by the Japanese in their own self- interest. 
At the beginning of these events , the British 
government was sympathetic towards China . Britain not 
24 . Text in Seoul National University , Kuksa Kaesul , 
pp . 633- 5; Partial English version in Hulbert , 
~orean Reform~ , Korean Repository , II (1895) , 
pp . 7- 8. 
only gave much thought to her historical relations with 
China , but also considered that China would be the 
final victor . At the time , China , by agreeing to 
simultaneous evacuation , seemed to be seeking a peaceful 
solution of the difficulty . The British government was 
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anxious to avert a conflict , which would naturally disturb 
her trade . On and after 20 June , the Chinese government 
requested both the British and the Russians to mediate between 
herself and Japan . On 24 June , the British Foreign Secretary , 
Kimberley , told the Japanese Minister in London , Aoki , that 
the British government was extremely anxious to prevent 
war , as it might lead to the involvement of third parties . 25 
In the first stages , the Korean question occupied only 
a small part of Kimberley ' s attention . What concerned him 
most was the extent to which the situation might enable 
Russian influence to expand at the expense of British 
25 . NGB . Vol . 27 , Pt . II , No . 619 . 
. fl 26 ln uence . The British concentrated at first upon 
encouraging the Chinese and the Japanese to come to an 
agreement between themselves , stressing the dangers 
inherent in foreign intervention and trying to help 
them to find terms on which they could agree to start 
.. 27 
negotlatlons . At the end of June , the Russian 
Ambassador in Tokyo urged the Japanese to comply with 
the King of Korea ' s request that they should withdraw 
their troops . 28 The Japanese refused . O' Conor , 
the British Minister in Peking , thought the Russians 
would next invite the diplomatic co - operation of the 
other Powers to whom the King of Korea had appealed 
and that the Chinese would then give all the credit 
for this assistance to the Russians . Kimberley told 
Paget , the British Charge d ' Affaires in Tokyo , to press 
the Japanese to start negotiations again on terms which 
the Chinese had been persuaded to accept . 29 
26 . Kimberley to Paget , Tel . 15 , 28 June 1894 , 
F . O. 46/439 ; Kimberley to O' Conor, Tel . 44 , 
30 June 1894 , F . O. 11/1202 . 
27 . NGB . Vol. 27 , Pt . II , No . 619 . 
28 . NGB , Vol . 27 , Pt . II , No . 633 . 
29 . O' Conor to Kimberley , 
1894 , F . O. 17/1204 ; 
Tel . 18 , 3 July 1894 , 
Kimberley to O' Conor , 
F . O. 17/1202 . 
Tel . 34 . Conf . 3 July 
Kimberley to Paget , 
F . O. 46/439 ; 
Tel . 46 , 3 July 189 4, 
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At this point , the objection of the Japanese to 
the preliminary withdrawal of their troops seemed to be 
an insuperable obstacle to negotiations . To break the 
deadlock , the British made an important suggestion. 
Kimberley suggested that the deadlock might be broken 
by their agre e ing , instead , upon a joint occupation 
of Korea and he asked the Russian government to join 
the British in recommending this proposal . 30 
Kimberley suggested to Aoki , the Japanese Minister in 
London , that ' The Chinese government , complying with my 
advice , are inclined to accept my plan for a joint 
occupation of Korea by Japan and China , that is , Japan 
should occupy the southern part of Korea while China 
occupies the northern part , with Seoul left unoccupied 
by either of the two countries ' . 31 However , by the time 
they received this proposal , the Japanese had had the 
Korean Royal Palace besieged and had forced Korea to 
accept the Japanese demands . Consequently it was 
unnecessary for the Japanese government to enter into 
such negotiations as proposed by Britain . No reply 
was sent by Japan to the British proposal . 
As war appeared increasingly inevitable , anxiety 
as to the effect of a war on their trade was the first 
preoccupation of the British . On 22 July 1894 , a week 
30 . Kimberley to O' Conor , Tel . 55 , 14 July 1894 , 
F . O. 17/1202 ; Kimberley to O' Conor , Tel . 60 , 
16 July 1894 , F . O. 17/1202 . 
31 . NGB . VOl . 27 , Pt . I I , No . 668 . 
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before the outbreak of the war , Hannen , the British 
Consul at Shanghai , learnt that the Chinese were 
preparing to block the river leading to Shanghai in 
order to protect the city from attack by the Japanese. 
Shanghai was the great centre of foreign trade with 
China and, to avoid the complete disruption of that 
trade , Hannen suggested that the Japanese should be 
asked to refrain from attacking it in the event of 
war . 32 The British government made the request at 
once and the next day the Japanese promised that if 
war broke out ' no warlike operations shall be under-
taken against Shanghai or its approaches . , 33 
Thereupon the Chinese agreed not to block the river . 34 
Meanwhile , until the last moment , Britain 
endeavoured to avert the threatened war by sendi ng 
notes in the interests of peace to both China and 
Japan . 35 Sir Edward Grey , the Parliamentary Under -
32 . Hennen to Foreign Office , 22 July 1894 , 
F . O. 17/1207 . 
33 . NGB . Vol . 27 , Pt . I I , Nos . 734 - 736 ; Kimbe rl ey 
to Paget , Tel . 27 , 22 July 1894 , F . O. 17/1209 ; 
Mutsu to Paget , 23 July 1894 , Enclosure No . 2 
in Paget to Kimberley , No . 28 , 25 July 1894 , 
F . O. 46/436 . 
34 . O' Conor to Kimberley , Tel . 58 , 27 July 1894 , 
F . O. 17/1204 . 
35. Hansard , 4th Series , Vol . 27 , p . 1263 , Sir 
Edward Grey to the House of Commons , 30 July 
1894 . 
Secretary of the Foreign Office , promised the House 
of Commons that every effort which could be properly be 
made would be used to bring about a friendly arrangement 
betwe en China and Japan. 36 
In refusing China ' s seemingly reasonable request 
that both countries simultaneously remove their troops , 
166 . 
and in continuing to act so aggressively in Korea , at the 
time when Britain was working so strenuously to preserve 
peace , Japan made an unfavourable impression on British 
public opinion . On one point , however , British public 
opinion was in agreement with the Japanese , namelY , that 
the Korean government was hopelessly corrupt and that the 
country needed a complete reformation . It was even 
admitted that under the control of Japan the condition of 
Korea would be vastly improved . But there was considerable 
doubt in some British quarters as to whether Japan would be 
successful in any attempt to force Western civilization 
upon Korea . ' The Times ' pointed out that ' the Japanese , 
being so thoroughly detested by the Koreans , were certainly 
not the race best qualified to lead the Koreans into 
the blessings of Western civilization , which we r e badly 
needed in that land ' . 37 
36. Ibid ., Vol . 26 , p . 950 , 5 July 1894 . 
37 . ' The Times ', 2 July 1894 ; 13 July 1894 ; 
16 July 1894 . 
Again , the British were further antagonized by 
the sinking on 25 July of ' The Kowshing ', a British 
steamer , which had been chartered by the Chinese to 
carry r e inforcements . A wave of wrath swept Britain 
at t he news o f such an attack upon a vessel flying the 
Brit ish flag in time of peace , for neither China nor 
Japan had as yet declared war . 38 
On 1 August 1894 , when China and Japan finally 
declared war against each other , Britain issued a 
167 . 
proclamation of neutrality . However , Britain ' s sympathy 
was with the Chinese and she had confidence in the ability 
of China to defend herself against the aggression of 
Japan . At that time , many people in Britain thought 
that Chinese strength was at last reviving and that 
she was on the verge of becoming an effective Power . 39 
Of course , the British knew that Japan had undergone 
great changes since 1868 and that foreign mentors had 
reorganized the Japanese army and navy . They were aware 
that Japan had sent several military missions to Europe 
to study Western methods of warfare , and that large sums 
had been appropriated for the purpose of placing the 
38 . Denby to Gresham , U. S . Foreign Relations No . 32 , 
p . 41, 28 July 1894 ; Captain von Hanneken ' s 
Report , Ibid. , No. 36 , p. 45 . 
39 . E. V. G. Kiernan , British Diplomacy in China , 1880-
85 , London , 1939 , pp . 300- 305 . 
168 . 
Japanese land and sea forces on a more efficient basis . 
But the British did not think it possible that Japan 
could have made such drastic changes in such a short 
. 40 tlme . 
However, as Japan won victory after victory , 
starting with the Chinese rout at Pyongyang on 15 September 
1894 and the naval encounter at Yalu on 17 September , China 
began frantically to call for help . Britain hurriedly 
sought to end the war , fearful that not only would defeat 
demoralize the Chinese market , but also that Russia would 
be given an excellent opportunity to step in and gain a 
predominant position in China and Korea . On 6 October , 
the Foreign Office inquired of Germany , France , Russia 
and the United States if they would participate in a joint 
intervention , having for its purpose the ending of war 
between China and Japan , on a basis of an indemnity for 
Tokyo and an international guarantee of Korea ' s 
independence . 41 Britain abandoned her policy of regarding 
Korea as a dependency of China . Having seen that China 
was incapable of holding Korea , the British adopted what 
seemed to be the next best method of checking Russia . 
40. ' The Times ', 24 July 1894 ; Circular to H. M. Consuls 
in China , enclosed in O' Conor to Kimberley , No . 251 , 
27 Sept . 1894 , F . O. 17/1198 ; O' Conor to Kimberley , 
No . 378 , 15 Oct . 1894 , F . O. 17/1198 . 
41 . NGB . Vol . 27 , Pt . II , No . 790 . 
Britain ' s suggestion was received , however , without 
enthusiasm by the United States and Germany . The American 
Secretary of State , Gresham , told that the United States 
could not intervene , but earnestly desired that China and 
Japan should speedily agree upon terms of peace alike 
42 honourable to both and not humiliating to Korea . 
Germany rejected Britain ' s proposal because her Far Eastern 
interests were relatively slight . Russia was agreeable to 
the intervention , but Britain was unwilling to take action 
without the support of other Powers . The peace effort 
of Oct ober failed because of German reluctance and the non-
co- operation of the United States , coupled with the hesitancy 
of Britain to take joint action with Russia and France , whose 
aims in the Far East were so much in opposition to those of 
Britain . While these negotiations were going on in Europe , 
Britain approached Japan directly , but received the polite 
reply that Japan ' s arms have not made sufficient progress 
. f f .. 43 to ensure a satls actory result 0 the negot~atlons . 
It has been suggested that Britain , and possibly 
Russia , might have stopped the war had they used gunboat 
diplomacy , either singly or in concert with other Powers , 
42 . Gresham to Bayard , U. S . Fo r eign Relat i ons ,No . 56 , p . 70 , 12 Oct . 
1894 ; Gresham to Goschen , Ibid ., No . 58 , p . 70 , 
12 Oct . 1894 . --
43 . NGB . Vol . 27 , Pt . I I , No . 806 . 
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to force both China a nd Japan to evacuate Korea . Neither 
did so . For Britain , unilateral naval intervention was 
not a r ealistic proposition . By the eighteen- nineties 
both China and Japan poss e ssed significant naval forces 
and in the summer of 1894 the Royal Navy could immediately 
deploy only the twenty - two ships of the China Squadron 
against the fifty - two ships of Japan or the eighty - seven 
assorted vessels of China. Furthermore , any unilateral 
naval action might have brought in the other European 
naval Powers in the Far East , notably France and Russia . 
Russia and France had both increased their squadrons in 
the Far East . Britain had also increased her squadron 
on the China Station but , though it was superior to 
e ither the French or the Russians alone , it was no longer 
stronger than a combination of the two . It was assumed 
that the recent signature of the Franco- Russian Alliance 
would presage their close naval co - ope r ation in which 
h . ht . f . . B . t ' 44 case t ey mlg even ln llct a deClded reverse upon rl aln . 
Apart from the delicate naval balance i n the Western 
Pacific , the situation did not warrant the use of naval 
forces by Britain . No one could foresee precisely which 
way a possible war might go , and all that could be predicted 
44. A. J . Marder , British Naval Policy , 1880- 1905 , 
19 40 , London , p . 239 ; J. Be r ryman , ' British 
Naval Po licy and the Sino- Japanese War , 1894 - 5 ~ 
i n Bulletin of the Institute o f Hi s to r i cal 
Research , Vol 43 ( 19 70) , p. 116 . 
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was that it would be fought for the control of Korea , 
where Britain had virtually no commercial interests . 
Nor was there any indication that Britain ' s interests 
would not be protected as competently as they had been 
in the war be t ween France and China in 1884- 5. More -
over , Japan , with her rapidly growing armed forces , 
might prove to be a useful new ally to defend the British 
interests against Russia in the future . In such a cir-
cumstance any use of gunboat diplomacy was out of the 
question , and it was decided that Britain ' s naval 
squadron would be used in a strictly defensive role to 
protect the treaty ports and Britain ' s sea- borne commerce . 45 
Russia also rejected the unilateral use of naval 
force and she too adopted a policy of guarded neutrality . 
But , despite the similarity of the policies adopted by 
Britain and Russia , joint naval co- operation between 
Britain , France and Russia was never seriously contemplated . 
There was the prospect that if Britain and Russia were to 
intervene they might become involved in a joint occupation 
of Korea , a possibility which was in itself enough to deter 
them from action . In such an absence of any threat to 
use armed force , the mere diplomatic entreaties of the 
Powers had been ignored by China and Japan . 46 
45 . J . Berryman , Ibid ., pp . 116- 7. 
46 . Ibid ., p . 117 . 
By this time , in Korea , the Tonghak forces , 
recruited from all the southern provinces and numbering 
tens of thousands , marched towards Seoul but suffered a 
decisive defeat at the hands of combined Korean and 
Japanese forces. Some of the rebel leaders , 
including Chon , were executed and , for the time being , 
the Tonghak organization ceased to be a political forc e . 
A major factor contributing to its failure was foreign 
intervention . Other obvious factors were the lack of 
unity and discipline among the rebels and resistance 
from the Yangban class . 
Meanwhile , on 20 August 1894 , Japan forced Korea 
to slgn the Provisional Agreement which , among other 
things , obliged Korea to accept Japanese advice on 
internal reforms. The task of advising the Korean 
government was entrusted to Inouye , the Japanese Minister 
of Home Affairs . 47 On 26 October 1894 , Inouye arrived 
in Seoul to succeed Otori as Minister at Seoul , and 
immediately commenced an oppressive policy , which brought 
about the removal of the Taewongun ' s power , and a coali-
tion government under Hong- Jip Kim and Young- Hyo Park 
l ' 48 was estab lshed . 
47 . NGB . Vol . 27 , Pt . I , No . 442 , and its Annex 1 . 
48. NGB . Vol. 27 , Pt. II, Nos. 459-496. 
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In the meantime , Japan ' s overwhelming military 
and naval superiority resulted in repeated Chinese 
defeats . Japanese victories at Pyongyang and on the 
Yalu were followed by the landing of Japanese forces 
on the Liaotung peninsula , the st rategically vital southern 
part of Manchuria . Port Arthur , the main fortified centre 
in the area , was taken on 21 November 1894 . In the face 
of a mounting Japanese threat towards Peking , the Chinese 
sued for peace . On 3 November 1894 , the Chinese Foreign 
Office convoked the representatives of Br itain , France , 
Germany , Russia and the United States and appealed to them 
to use their efforts to secure peace . It proposed as a 
basis of negotiation , what had been suggested by Britain 
to the Powers on 6 October : the independence of Korea , 
which would be guaranteed by the Powers , and the payment 
of a war indemnity . However , this proposal was r ejected 
again by the Japanese . 49 
Meanwhile , in Korea , on 7 January 1895 , the 
Japanese aga i n f o r ce d the King of Korea to take an oath 
at the Ancestral Tablet to support the Fourteen Articles 
49 . NGB . Vol . 27 , Pt . II , No . 790 ; Denby to Gresham , 
3 Nov 1894 , U. S . Foreign Relations . Appendix I , 
p . 73 , Despatch 63 . 
of Great Law , which included : 1) an acceptance of 
the independence of Korea from China ; 2) an acceptance 
of a new role of the King and the Court , and new regula-
tions governing the powers and duties of the Ministers , 
together with a reform of the taxation system ; 3) a 
clarification of the civil and criminal law ; 4) a 
general opening of government offices to the talented . 50 
The Oath was in reality the King ' s promise to 
support Japanese reforms and to keep down the power of 
the Queen Min ' s faction , which opposed the Japanese 
174 . 
reforms . The Korean King pledged that he would complete 
and perfect the laws of the state and promote efficient 
administration . He announced before an assembly of the 
Queen , the Taewongun , and other members of the royal 
family and Ministers of State , that his consort and 
relatives would no longer be permitted to interfere in 
the affairs of government . 51 
50 . 
51 . 
Text in Seoul National University , Ku~aKaesul 
(History of Korea) , pp . 633- 5 ; NGB . Vol . 28 , Pt . 
I , Nos . 256-8 ; Hulbert , ' Korean Reforms ', 
Korean Repository , II (1895) , pp . 7- 8 . 
Kuksa Kaesul , pp . 638- 9; For an English 
rendition of the full text of the Oath , see 
Spence r J . Palmer (ed . ) , Korean- American 
Relations , Vol . II , The period of ~rowing 
influence , 1887- 1895 , Univ , of Callf . Press , 
1963 , p . 351 . 
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The new governmental machinery which was set up , 
and which excluded the Min faction , was modelled on the 
Japanese Cabinet system . The Cabinet met three times 
a week under the titular presidency of the Monarch , 
but in the presence of Inouye , to pass resolutions . 
Altogether , 421 new proclamations , decrees , and other 
acts directed towards reform were announced In the period 
between 22 November 1894 and 30 June 1896 . 52 These 
numerous and detailed reform measures cover ed almost all 
aspects of Korean life . The royal household was 
separated from the government and members of the royal 
family were forbidden to interfere in the affai r s of the 
state . The King himself was to act only in consultation 
with and on the advice of his Ministers . The traditional 
Six Boards were replaced by eight Ministries (Horne Affairs , 
Foreign Affairs , Finance , Military Affairs , Justice , 
Education , Public Works , and Agriculture and Commerce ) 
with clearly defined responsibilities . Ministers headed 
these Departments of State whilst the Prime Minister 
presided over the Cabinet . The centuries - old 
discrimination against military officials was to corne to 
an end . The monopoly of governmental offices by the 
Yangban class , accompanied by the discontinuation of the 
52 . The figure is compiled from W. H. Wilkinson , 
The Corean Government : Constitutional Changes , 
July 1894 to October 1895 , Shanghai , The 
Statistical Department of the Inspectorate-
General of Customs , 1897 . 
old examination system that had helped perpetuate the 
elitist existence of this privileged class , came to an 
end . There were also regulations encouraging Korean 
men to cut off their traditional top- knots , to wear 
black garments rather than the traditional white ones , and 
to smoke short pipes rather than long ones , and so on . 53 
Back to the war , within six months of the start 
of the war , the Japanese had gained command of the sea and 
of the land approaches to the Chinese capital , Peking . 
China , eager to put an end to the conflict , made every 
effort to resume negotiations for peace . Eventually , 
negotiations between the Chinese and the Japanese were 
started , first at Hiroshima and later at Shimonoseki . 
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The Chinese had been persuaded to give full powers to their 
delegates . They also gave way to the Japanese insistence 
that their Plenipotentiary should be someone of high rank 
and appointed Li Hung- Chang . The Japanese then told them 
that negotiations would be useless if the Chinese delegates 
were unable to negotiate on the basis of the payment of an 
indemnity and the cession of territory . 
conceded this as well . 54 
The Chinese 
53 . H. B. Hulbert , 
II (1895), 
' Korean Reforms '. Korean Repository , 
pp . 1- 9 . 
54 . Kimb erley to Ol Conor , Tel . 11 , 25 Feb . 1895 , 
F . O. 17/1242 ; Ol Conor to Kimberley , Tel . 12 , 
2 March 1895 , F . O. 17/1243 . 
On 21 March 1895 , the Conference of Shimonoseki was 
opened between Li Hung- Chang and Ito Hirobumi . On 4 
April , the Japanese announced their peace terms . 
demanded : 
1. The recognition by China of the full and 
complete independence of Korea ; 
2. The cession to Japan of Formosa , the 
Pescadores , and the territories of Southern 
Manchuria situated between the Yalu and the 
Leao down to the south of the Liaotung 
Peninsula , Port Arthur and Talienwan to be 
included ; 
3 . The payment to Japan of a war indemnity of 
300 million Taels (about £30 million) in 
five instalments . 
4. The conclusion between the two countries of 
a new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation , 
They 
and of a Convention to regulate their frontier 
intercourse and trade , on the basis of China ' s 
treaties with the Western Powers . 
5. Most - favoured - nation treatment for Japan ; 
6 . The opening of seven new ports to the trade , 
residence , industry and manufactures of Japanese 
subjects , and the right to station Consuls there . 
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7 . The right to navigate the Upper Yangtze River 
with steam vessels from Ichang to Chungking ; 
the Siang River and Lake Tungting from the 
Yangtze River to Siangtan ; the West River 
from Canton to Wuchow ; the Woosung River and 
the canal from Shanghai to Soochow and Hangchow . 
8 . Exemption from every kind of internal taxation 
upon foreign goods imported by Japanese 
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subjects upon payment of a 2 per cent commutation 
tax. Chinese goods intended for home consumption 
to be free of all taxation , import duty or export 
duty , save the coast trade duties , when conveyed 
in Japanese vessels . 
9 . The right of Japanese subjects to establish 
warehouses in the interior . 
10 . The right of Japanese subjects to engage in all 
kinds of industries and to import machinery . 
11 . All merchandise manufactured by Japanese subjects 
in China to be on the same footing as imported 
Japanese goods in respect of exemption from 
taxation , etc . 
12 . An understanding by China to remove the Woosung 
bar which obstructed the water approach to 
Shanghai . 
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13 . Fengtienfu to be evacuated by the Japanese 
after pay.ment of the first two instalments of 
the war indemnity ; Weihaiwei upon payment 
of the final indemnity . No evacuation to 
take place until the Treaty of Commerce 
and Navigation was concluded and ratified . 
14 . Several other minor military matters were 
also dealt with . 55 
The Japanese introduced several modifications in 
their own peace proposals . Although Japan insisted 
that China should recognize the independence of Korea 
and its neutrality , and undertake to abstain from 
interference in the internal affairs of that count r y , 
she refused to bind herself to do so . She made 
practically no reduction in her territorial demands . 
She declined to give China most - favoured- nation treatment 
in Japan~ She did not accept the Chinese proposals for 
evacuation nor for the appointment of an arbitrator in 
case of a dispute over the interpretation of their agr ee -
ments . She insisted that there would be no evacuation 
55 . NGB. Vol. 28, Pt.II, No.1078, Annex; China , Imperial 
Maritime Customs , Miscellaneous Series , No . 30 , 
Treaties , Conventions etc . between China and 
Foreign Countries , Vol . II , p . 1818 , The Treaty 
of Shimonoseki ; O' Conor to Kimberley , Tel . 23 , 
4 April 1895 , F . O. 17/1243 ; Kimberley to O' Conor , 
Tel . 36 , 8 April 1895 , F . O. 17/1 242 ; Lowther to 
Kimberley , Tel. 33, 4 April 1895 , F . O. 46/456 . 
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until the ratification of the Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation. Th e only two modifications of any importance 
made by Japan were the reduction of the war indemnity to 
200 million Taels (about £20 million) and the withdrawal 
of the commutation of taxation clause . 56 The Chinese 
received thes e proposals with protest , but the Japanese 
were determined not to allow the Chinese to prolong the 
negotiations. They were anxious to arrange the peace 
quickly so as to avoid the intervention of the other 
Powers. 
Japan ' s refusal to accept the self- denial obliga-
tions in respect of Korea was an indication of her political 
intentions with respect to that country. Though the peace 
terms of the Japanese were difficult for the Chinese , they 
were not only consistent with their promises to Britain 
and Russia concerning the independence of Korea , but were 
calculated to meet with the approval of the British . 
Japan , in spite of the comparative unimportance of her 
trade in China , laid claim to far - reaching commercial 
advantages which the British commercial community had long 
desired , but had so far failed to obtain . Were Japan to 
obtain them , then the British would also obtain them , in 
virtue of their most - favoured- nation status . The British 
trader would probably benefit more than the Japanese 
themselves from the advantages resulting from these 
56 . O'Conor to Kimberley , Tel . 30 , 16 April 189 5, 
F.O . 17/124 ) ; O' Conor to Kimberley , Tel . 31 , 
17 April 1895 , F . O. 17/1243 . 
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conditions ; this in view of the preponderance of Br it i sh 
trade in China . Among these valuable concessions were : 
the opening to trade of towns like Shashi , Chungking , Suchow , 
and Hangchow ; steam navigation on the Yangtze River to be 
extended from Ichang to Chungking , and on the Woosung River , 
from Shanghai to Suchow and Hangchow ; the right to rent or 
build warehouses , and to store goods therein without taxes ; 
the right to engage in manufacturing in Ch i na , and to 
import the necessary machinery , subject only to the 
stipulated import duties ; and the assurance that all 
merchandise manufactured in China by foreigners would 
stand upon the same footing , in respect to taxat i on , as 
merchandise imported into China by foreigners . The 
Chinese considered these terms unduly onerous and turned 
to the Powers , requesting their intercession . 
The Tsungli Yamen appealed to the British , Russian , 
French and German governments for their good offices in 
moderating the Japanese demands . 57 They hoped that 
rubstantial support might be forthcoming from some of these 
Powers . But , despite rumours of foreign intervention , 
the Chinese could secure no promise of military assistance 
in the event of their rejecting the Japanese demands . As 
their hope of any foreign help faded , they became more 
57 . Kimberley to Ol Conor , Tel . 39 , 10 April 1895 , 
F . O. 17/1242 . 
inclined to accept the Japanese terms . The Treaty of 
Shimonoseki was signed on 17 April 1895 . Ratification 
was to take place within three weeks . 58 
Britain , being primarily interested in commerce , 
was naturally apprehensive of any nation that threatened 
to be a competitor in China . At first there was fear 
in British circles that the enterprising Japanese would 
injure Britain ' s commercial interests in the Far East . 
It soon , however , became clear that Japan had no desire 
to exclude British competiti o n , and had no intention 
of securing any commercial concessions for her exclusive 
benefit. Hence , Britain decided to give her approval 
to the Tre aty of Shimonoseki . Having accepted Japan ' s 
advent as a new P~wer and having recognized the possibility 
of her becoming a barrier to Russian expansion , the British 
government began to discuss the advisability of making an 
alliance with her . 59 
58 . Text in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , 
Korea : Treaties and Agreements , Washington , 1921 , 
pp. 11- 20 ; O' Conor to Kimberley , Tel . 28 , Secret , 
and Tel . 29 , Secret , 13 April 1895 , F . O. 17/124 3 ; 
Lowther to Kimberley , Tel . 37 , 17 April 1895 , 
F . O. 46/456 . 
59 . The Anglo - Japanese Alliance of 1902 will be 
examined in the next chapter . 
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Although Britain had decided not to intervene in 
the peace settlement , the other Powers were not inclined 
to allow Japan to occupy territory which strategically 
controlled Peking and hence would give her a preponderating 
influence over China . The Russian government had already 
decided that it was In Russia's best interest that the 
boundaries of China should remain unaltered , and that no 
Power be allowed to increase its territorial possessions 
at China ' s expense . Count Witte, the Russian Finance 
Minister , regarded Japan ' s presence on the Asian 
Continent in proximity to Korea as inimical to Russia ' s 
interests there , and as a~rious menace to the plans 
entertained by the Russian government . The German 
government also became nervous about the situation which 
was likely to develop in the Far East in consequence of 
the Japanese peace terms. On 8 April 1895 , the Russian 
and German governments suggested to Britain that the 
Powers should tell Japan in the most friendly manner that 
the acquisition of Port Arthur would form an obstacle to 
the maintenance of good relations between China and Japan 
and be a permanent menace to peace in the Far East . 60 
The Russian and German proposal for co- operation 
by the Powers was formally considered by the British 
60 . Kimberley to Lascelles , Tel . 46 , Secret , 8 April 
1895 , F. O. 65/1493 . 
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Cabinet on 8 April 1895 , and the Russian and German 
governments were informed that Britain ' s interests in East 
Asia were not sufficiently prejudiced by the Japanese 
peace terms to justify an intervention , which apparently 
could only be executed by force . Lord Kimberley , the 
British Foreign Secretary , info rmed O' Conor , the British 
Minister in Peking , that the terms did not afford grounds 
f . f 61 or lnter erence . Several factors influenced Britain 
in this attitude . The Liaotung peninsula was not an 
area of direct British concern and Britain was reluctant 
to interfere because she was convinced that force would 
have to be used against Japan . 62 Although there was some 
concern over the possible adverse e ffects of the large 
indemnity , Britain was drawn by the attractive nature 
of the commercial advantages in China which Japan had 
included , and which British merchants had long desired . 63 
On 17 April le95 , the day on which the Sino- Japanese 
Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed , Prince Lobanov , the 
Russian Foreign Minister , made a further overture for 
European intervention . This was backed eagerly by 
Germany and , rather more reluctantly , by France . On 
23 April , the Ambassadors of Russia , Germany and France 
61 . Kimberley to O' Conor , Tel . 37 , Secret , 8 April 
1895 , F . O. 17/1242 . 
62 . I . H. Nish , The Anglo - Japanese Alliance , London , 
The Athlone Press , 1966 , p . 31 . 
63. Board of Trade to Foreign Office , 29 April 
1895 , F . O. 46/459 . 
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presented to the Japanese government the friendly advice 
J h L · . 64 that apan renounce t e laotung penlnsula . 
All three governments again pressed Britain to 
JOln them . The question was raised at the Cabinet 
meeting on 23 April but the original decision not to 
intervene was reaffirmed . In the meantime , the 
Russians made a last e ffor t to persuade the British to 
support the action Lobanov suggested that Britain should 
join the protest on the secret understanding that Britain 
would not be obliged to join in using force if that became 
necessary . 65 The British Prime Minister , Rosebery, 
concurred in Kimberley ' s opinion that this arrangement 
was unacc eptable and the British government maintained 
their decision to r efrain from intervention . 66 
Th e Japanese were in a difficult position . The 
peace was not popular in Japan and the government was 
afraid that withdrawal might lead to internal trouble . 67 
64 . Lowther to Kimberley , Tel . 42 , 24 April 1895 , 
F . O. 46 / 456 ; NGB , Vol . 28 , Part II , Nos . 
671 - 673 . 
65 . Kimberley to Lascelles , No . 118A , 24 April 1895 , 
F . O. 65/1489 . 
66 . Ibid .; and Kimberley to Lascelles , Tel . 63 , 
25 April 1895 , F . O. 65/1493 . 
67 . Lowther to Kimberley , Tel . 46 , 27 April 1895 , 
F . O. 46 / 456 . 
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They were also too exhausted to engage in a fresh conflict . 
Thus , Britain ' s attitude was crucial in deciding Japan ' s 
course of action . 68 This was a period when in Siam , 
Africa and on the Indian frontier , Britain was trying 
to work with France and Russia. This made her reluctant 
to refus e Russia ' s r equest for co-operation in the Far 
East . Even so , intervention seemed to Britain to be 
unjustified and also contrary to her own best interests 
in China . Again , when Britain was asked by Japan for 
support against the ' Triple Intervention ' , she declined 
because she had no wish to risk an incident which might 
provoke a war against them . The British , therefore , took 
an intermediate position , neither joining the Powers nor 
advising Japan to r esist . When Japan inquired about the 
British help , Kimberley declared that it was Britain ' s 
intention not to interfere at all and that Britain could 
. .. 69 
not glve any tanglble asslstance . In face of all 
these circumstances , at an Imperial Council , on 29 April 
1895 , the same day as Britain ' s reply , Japan agreed to 
modify the Treaty of Shimonoseki . 70 
On 1 May , Japan acquiesced , with the reservations 
that she be allowed to keep the territory until the 
indemnity had been paid and that she retain permanently 
the Province of Kingchow , which included Port Arthur , 
68 . Lowther to Kimberley , Tel . 51 , 6 May 1895 and 
Tel . 52 , 8 May 1895 , F . O. 46/456 . 
69 . Kimberley to Lowther No . 37 , 29 April 1895 , 
F . O. 46/449 ~ Kimberley to Trench , 24 April 1895 , 
F . O. 46/449 . 
70 . Lowther to Kimberley , Tel . 51 , 6 May 1895 , F . o . 46/456 . 
whereupon she was told that she must return the entire 
peninsula , as it had been Port Arthur which had originally 
caused the ' Triple Intervention '. Japan ' s suggestion 
that she be allowed some other portion of the Chinese 
coast in lieu of the Liaotung Peninsula was also rejected . 
On 8 May , an amended Treaty of Shimonoseki was ratified at 
Chefoo . 71 
Britain ' s decision not to join the ' Triple 
Intervention ' against Japan was based upon considerations 
similar to those which had been adduced to support her 
policy of non- intervention before and during the war . 
The Japanese peace terms did not seriously threaten 
British commercial interests in China , and , quite apart 
from the fact that the diplomatic initiative was 
organized by Russia to serve Russian interests , Britain 
was still determined not to alienate a potential ally 
such as Japan , particularly since she had proved her 
military worth during the war . With the growing number 
of French , Russian and German warships being sent to the 
Western Pacific , the value of securing the powerful 
Japanese navy as an ally was becoming increasingly evident . 
Although not designed to contribute in a positive and 
immediate fashion to the furtherance of Britain ' s 
commercial hegemony in the Far East , the policy of non-
71. NGB . Vo l. 28 , Pt . I I , Nos . 751,787,805-9. 
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intervention did in the long run serve Britain ' s 
interests. The ' Triple Intervention ' was to remain 
an object of intens e resentment in Japan for many years , 
and , if it cannot be said that Britain gained Japan as 
an ally in 1895 , it is clear that the actions of Russia , 
France and Germany made it very unlikely that Japan would 
regard them as future allies . Seven years later the 
Anglo - Japanese alliance was signed . 
For Korea , the Japanese victory over China did not 
go beyond formal recognition of the termination of age-
old Chinese influence in Korea . The Japanese- inspired 
reform movement soon failed . Though the zeal with which 
the work of reform was pursued was reminiscent of the first 
years of the Japanese Meiji Restoration , the Korean reforms 
lacked the necessary support from the various strata of 
society . Powerful traditionalist forces within and 
outside the government , including commoners as well as 
officials and the Yangban class , objected to these sudden 
drastic changes . Their well - founded suspicion of the Japanese 
authorship of these innovations lent additional support to 
their opposition . Nor was the Korean government united in 
its commitment to the cause of modernization . 72 
72. S . J . Palmer , Korean- American Relations , Vol . II , 
p . 347 ; Korean Repository , II (1895) , p . 270 ; 
George N. Curzon , Problems of the Far East , 
Westerminster , Constable & Co ., 1896 , pp . 194- 5, 
379 . 
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Confronted with such difficulties in Korea and 
the unsettling international developments which had 
developed after the ' Triple Intervention ', the Japanese 
Cabinet decided on 25 May 1895 , to reverse its Korean 
policy and give up the year- old project of reforms in 
Korea . Soon the Korean King declared the resumption 
of his power to appoint and dismiss high officials at 
his will without advice from the Cabinet . At the 
same time , the Queen Min ' s faction which had been purged 
from the government , was granted a royal pardon . Thus 
the brief era of Japanese domination in Korea ended 
abruptly . So did the ambitious and forceful reform 
projects that Japan had sponsored in Korea . However , 
these events did not end Japanese ambitions in Korea 
but were a response to immediate circumstances and 
pressures . With the passage of time , changed conditions 
and growing strength , Japan would again develop a forward -
policy towards the Korean Peninsula . 73 
During this period , Britain ' s policy towards Korea 
was one of attempting to ensure that events in the peninsula 
did not disturb the existing stability in the Far East . 
73 . NGB . Vol . 28 , Pt . I , No. 288; Ito Hirobumi , 
ed ., Chosen Kosho Shiryo (Materials on Negotiations 
with Korea) , 3 Vols . Tokyo , 1936 , Vol . III , p . 112 . 
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Korean domestic developments were only of interest within 
this context and therefore received little consideration. 
Britain ' s major preoccupation throughout was the avoidance 
of a general conflict and the maintenance of her economic 
and commercial interests in China. It was China ' s 
defeat by Japan that led to a new emphasis on British 
Far Eastern policy . China ' s weakness had been exposed 
and she thus became a target for the Great Powers . 
Brit ian ' s dominant role , including her large commercial 
and financial interests , was no longer secure . This 
shift in the balance of forces led her to seek a new 
ally which would assist her naval position in particular . 
This ally was to be Japan but , as will be seen , a price had 
to be paid . 
CHAPTER 7 . THE PERIOD OF RUSSO- JAPANESE RIVALRY OVER 
KOREA , 1895- 1904 
(1) The Russo - Japanes e Negotiations 
During the first f ew years following the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki , Japan was exhausted and too weak to 
challenge Russia , while Russia was unprepared to take 
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full advantage of the situation . Therefore , both Powers 
were willing to accept the status quo in Korea in a series 
of temporary agreements . During this time , Korea chose 
to seek Russian assistance primarily because of her 
expe rience with Japanes e intervention . Russia enjoyed 
a short period of predominance in Korea . However , this 
did not last long and eventually a war broke out between 
the two rival Powers ten years later . 
The ' Triple Intervention ' taught the Japanese that 
they must look to their defences . From being elated at 
their successes against China , they were now utterly 
humiliated . The y decided to lie low for a while and 
retire into a self- enforced isolation . They decided not 
to take part in foreign adventures while they built up 
their strength . On 3 June 1895 , the Japanese Cabinet 
adopted a new policy : it resolved to eliminate intervention 
192 . 
f . 1 as ar as posslble . However, one of the immediate 
reactions to Japan ' s newly - adopted policy of non-
intervention in Korean affairs was an open defiance of 
Tokyo ' s decis ion by Japanese official s in Korea . 
Miura Goro > newly - appointed Japanese Minister in Seoul , 
was a professional soldier with no diplomatic experience 
or sophistication . He viewed the settlement of the 
tangled Korean problem merely as a matter of prompt and 
. . 2 
vlgorous actlon . 
The Korean government at the time was a coalition 
of the Queen Min ' s faction and a newly - emerging pro -
Russian faction . A cordial and coo:p=rative relationship 
developed between the two factions , and the pro - Japanese 
faction was almost without political power mainly because 
of Korea ' s experience of Japanese intervention . 
Miura felt that he had to act swiftly to remedy the 
situation , even though the Tokyo government ' s policy was 
one of extreme caution . Japan had decided to withdraw 
her troops from Korea except for a limited number of 
guards for the legation and the military telegraph lines . 
Rather than wait to see Russia eclipse Japan at the Korean 
Court , Miura decided to take matters into his own hands . 
1 . NGB . Vol . 28 > Pt . I , No . 298 . 
2 . H. B. Hulbert , The History of Korea , Vol . II , 
p . 286 . 
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On 8 October 1895 , a group of Soshi 0apanese civilian 
extremists) and plain- clothes Japanese consular guards , 
together with Korean adherents and members of the 
disaffected Japanese trained Korean army unit , protected 
by a screen of regular Japanese soldiers , stormed the 
Palace and murdered Queen Min , the central figure of 
the anti - Japanese policy at that time , and burned her 
body . The King and the Crown Prince were held captive 
together with the members of the Queen ' s family whom she 
had brought to power in an anti - Japanese movement . 3 
The King became a prisoner In his own Palace , and , 
in panic , yielded to all the Japanese demands . Within 
a few days the King had been coerced into appointing pro-
Japanese individuals to key posts in the government and 
into issuing an edict that demoted the late Queen to 
commoner status . 
The Japanese government immediately recalled 
Miura to face trial and appointed Komura Jutaro to succeed 
him . The Hiroshima district court later tried Miura and 
47 others on the charge of conspiracy and invading the 
Palace . However , the court acquitted all the defendants 
3 . The report of Uchida , the Japanese Consul in Seoul , in 
NGB . Vol . 28 , Pt . I , No.424; - H. B. Hulbert , 
The Passing of Korea , New York , 1906 , pp . 129- 147 ; 
For evidence of Japanese complicit~ see quotations 
of court r ecords of the Hiroshima trials in 
F . A. McKenzie , The Tragedy of Korea , London / 1908 , 
pp . 263- 7 ; Korean Repository , II (1895) , pp . 432 - 4 ; 
Fred Harvey Harrington , God , Mammon , and the 
Japanese : Dr . Horace N. Allen and Korean- American 
Relations , 1884- 1905 , Univ . of Wisconsin Press , 
19 44 , Pp . 267- 271 . 
on the grounds of inadequate evidence regarding their 
actual participation in the acts of violence . 4 The 
complicity of Miura had been so open that the diplomatic 
representatives of · the foreign Powers in Seoul formed a 
united front against their Japanese colleagues . They 
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organized a boycott by the entire foreign diplomatic corp 
of all the decrees issued by the new regime in Seoul , 
and provided asylum for those Koreans who feared perse -
cution by the pro - Japanes e r egime . 5 
This outrage caused a revulsion in Korea against 
all things Japanese , and the momentary Japanese success 
soon vanished . Groups of anti- Japanese forces were 
scattered throughout the country . In some areas they 
successfully repulsed government troops which had been 
sent to crush them . There was also an unsuccessful 
putsch in Seoul in November . Finally , on 11 February 1896 , 
a group of counter- revolutionaries was successful in 
smuggling the King and the Crown Prince out of the Palace . 
The Korean sovereign sought and received asylum at the 
Russian legation in the capital of his own kingdom . 
Immediately after reaching the safety of the Russian 
legation , the King decreed death sentences for several 
4 . NGB . Vol . 28 , Pt . I , Nos . 353-365, Telegraphic 
exchanges between Tokyo and Seoul , 8- 10 October 
1895 . 
5. F . H. Harrington , God , Mammon , and the Japanese , 
pp . 272- 5 . 
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leaders of the pro - Japanese regime . Deprived of the 
royal authority that had justified their positions , the pro-
Japanese Ministers were massacred almost to a man by the 
angry mobs. The events of 1895- 6, which were provoked 
initially by the Japanese , placed Korea under Russian 
. f 6 In luence . 
Facing Russian ambition in Korea , Japan had two 
alternatives : making an approach to Russia or reaching an 
understanding with other European Powers , notably Britain . 
The new Salisbury Ministry , however , was certainly not 
inclined to involve itself in Korean affairs . Neverthe-
less , on 1 May 1896 , Salisbury inquired whether Japan 
would agree to a declaration of Korean neutrality if such 
a proposal was advanced . The Japanese Foreign Minister , 
Mutsu , replied bluntly that he had already approached 
Britain on this subject but , having received no encourage -
ment , the Japanese had been forced to negotiate with Russia 
and were now on the point of signing something . Mutsu 
gave Satow , the British Minister in Tokyo , a note containing 
four questions to be referred to London for clarification . 
The questions were mainly intended to discover how far other 
Powers were likely to accept the neutralization proposal . 
6 . NGB. Vo1.29,Nos.352-398; Hyun Hwang , 
Maechon Yarok (Unofficial Reco~ds of Hyun Hwnag) , 
Seoul , 1955 , pp . 195- 7; Korean Repository , III , 
(1896) , pp . 81- 94 . 
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Mutsu argued that if this proposal were accepted by Japan 
but met with insufficient support from the other Powers , 
it would recoil upon Japan , causing the failure of her 
talks with Russia and precipitating Russia ' s assumption 
of a protectorate . 7 Satow reported that a favourable 
reply from Britain might save Japan from having to accept 
any terms Russia chose to impose . But Salisbury replied 
that the object of his inquiry was simply to find out 
Japan ' s attitude and that he had not communicated with 
other governments . Salisbury stated that t he Powe rs 
interested in Korea should combine to find a r emedy for 
the anarchy in the country but that the initiative should 
be with one of those specially interested : Japan , China 
or R . 8 USSla . Britain was interested , but only in a second 
degree . It was not a reply likely to encourage Japan to 
delay matters further with Russia . Salisbury ' s 
unexpected intervention , though trivial in itself , \'las 
revealing . However much Salisbury might protest that 
Britain had no primary interests in Korea and was not 
worried about Russia having an ice- free port there , 
Britain was keen to prevent a possible Russo - Japanese 
7. NGB . ~ ol . 28 , Pt . I , Nos . 277- 8; NGB . Vol . 29 , 
Nos . 300- 303 ; Satow to Salisbury , 4 May 1896 , 
F. O. 46 / 468 . 
8. Kato to Mutsu , 14 May 1896 , NGB . Vol . 29 , 
No . 311 ; Salisbury to Satow , 13 May 1896 , F . O. 
46/471 . 
197 . 
agreement or a Russian protectorate over Korea . Despite 
this , Britain wanted to avoid too much involvement . 
The Japanese government came to the conclusion that 
to avert Russian ascendancy in Korea and to prevent a clash 
of Russian and Japanese interests in Korea , they must come 
to an agreement with Russia . Negotiations were started 
in Seoul between Waeber , the Russian Minister in Seoul , 
and Komura , the new Japanese Minister in Seoul , which 
resulted in the signing on 14 May 1896 of a joint memorandum . 
By the terms of this agreement , 1) the Korean King was to 
return to the Palace at his own discretion , ' when no doubts 
concerning his safety could be entertained '; 2) the present 
members of the Korean Cabinet , who were anti - Japanese , were to 
be recognized and accepted by Russia and Japan ; 3) Japan 
was to continue for the time being to guard the Japanese 
telegraph line between Seoul and Pusan ; 4) Japanese 
soldiers were to be temporarily stationed in Seoul (400) , 
Pusan (200) , and Wonsan (200) for the protection of 
Japanese settlements , while Russia was entitled to keep 
an equal number of guards at those places for the protection 
of the Russian legation and consulate . 9 This agreement was 
in reality a Russian victory . By this memorandum Japan 
9 . Text in W. W. Rockhill , Treaties and Conventions 
With or Concerning China and Korea , 1894 - 1904 , Washington , 
1904 , pp . 430- 1 ; Carnegfu Endowment for International 
Peace , Korea : Treaties and Alreements , pp . 21- 2 ; 
Frederick A. McKenzie , Tragedy of Korea , London , 
Hodde r and Stoughton , 1908 , pp . 299 - 300 . 
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formally acknowledged that Russia had as much right as 
Japan to be interested in Korea . Above all , in view of 
the great disparity between Japanese and Russian interests 
in Korea , and between Russian and Japanese forces in 
Korea , the memorandum meant that Japan must reduce her 
forces , whereas Russia had Japan ' s consent to increase 
hers . Furthermore , the memorandum practically represented 
an admission of Japanese complicity in the ~vent of 8 
October 1895 by including the provision that ' the Japanese 
representative on his part gives the assurance that the most 
complete and effective measures will be taken for the con-
trol of the Japanese Soshi '. In fact , Japan acknowledged 
the past wrong doings of her nationals , the Soshi . 
The Komura- Waeber Memorandum , had dealt with 
specific issues in Korea without any agreement on the more 
basic question of what should be done with Korea. Japan 
planned a broader agreement with Russia . Late in April 
1896 , Marquis Yamagata Aritomo , one of the most powerful 
Japanese elder statesmen , left for Russia to represent 
Japan at the coronation of Czar Nicholas II , and in the 
latter part of May and in June he negotiated with the 
Russian Foreign Minister , A. B. Lobanov- Rostovsky , on Korean 
affairs . On 9 June 1896 , the Lobanov- Yamagata Agreement , 
also known as the Moscow Protocol , was signed: both countries 
were to aid Korea ' s financial reform with loans and to leave 
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to Korea the formation and maint enance of an a rmed force 
for the preservation of internal peace . 10 It was me r ely 
an extension of the previous Komura- Waeber Agreement , 
from which were eliminated a f ew more points on which 
Russia and Japan disagreed. The agreement included a secret 
article providing that neither Russ ia nor Japan would send 
troops into Korea unless the other nation gave its consent , 
and if Russia and Japan should decide at any time to send 
their troops into Korea , each would de fin e the area to be 
occupied and would agree beforehand on the zone of 
operations of their troops and the neutral zone between 
the forces of the two Powers in order to prevent conflict 
between them . ll 
There were ye t other political defeats for Japan . 
Japan, whose economic interests in Korea we re far greater 
than those of any other nation , willingly conceded to Russia 
an equal status with regard to loans for Korea . On the 
question of the training of the Korean armed forc es , Japan ' s 
10 . Text in NGB . Vol . 29 , No. 478; 
W. W. Rockhill , Treaties and Conventions with or 
Concerning China and Korea , p . 432 . Carne gi e 
Endowment for International Peace , Korea : Treat ies 
and Agreements , pp . 23- 4 . 
11 . Ibid .; British and Foreign State Papers , Vol . 88 , 
pp . 471- 2 . 
ob jective of leaving it in the hands of a neutral Power 
had been frustrated , and , instead , a vague promise to 
leave it to the Koreans themselves was substituted in 
circumstances in which the final int e rpretation of 
this article would lie in the hands of the King of Korea , 
who was still in the Russian legation . It was merely a 
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higher- level confirmation of the Komura- Waeber Memorandum , 
with the only notable and important except ion of the novel 
and unt ested proposition for a partition of Korea into two 
spheres of influence . 
Within a month after the signing of the Lobanov-
Yamagata Agreement , the Russian government was undermining 
the idea of a Russo - Japanese condominium . In July, 
negotiations were begun to bring in Russian instructurs 
for the Korean army . In August , Colonel Strelbitskii 
arrived at Seoul as the Russian military agent , and 
D. D. Pokotilov as the financial agent of the Russian 
General Staff arrived with three officers and ten non-
commissioned officers and began the organization of the 
Korean army , starting with the Palace guard . Colonel 
Putiata later came and became the commander of the 
newly- reconstituted royal guard unit. The Russian economlC 
expert Pokotilov , together with the newly created Russo -
Chinese Bank in China , concluded a secret loan agreement 
with the Korean government by which the Russo - Chinese Bank 
WqS to lend three million Yen to Korea , on the security of 
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the customs receipt , for the purpose of repaying a Korean 
debt to Japan . Russian economic penetration also took 
the form of a timber concession along the Yalu River 
which the Korean government granted to a Russian merchant , 
Iulii Ivanovich Briner , in September 1896 . The Japanese 
. ff 12 government protested wlthout e ect. 
In the meantime , within Korean political circles , 
distrust of Russian influence and particularly of pro -
Russian Korean collaborators began to develop . Some 
of the old conservative politicians and the younger , 
enlightened but nationalistic officials,who had been pro -
Russian against the Japanese only a short time before , 
began to urge the King , early in 1897 , to return to the 
Palace . The King decided to leave the Russian legation 
on 20 February 1897 . The Korean King had stayed in the 
Russian legation a little over a year . Following the 
King ' s departure from the Russian legation , a series of 
discordant notes began to sound in Korean- Russian relations . 
On 7 September 1897 , Carl Waeber , whose diplomatic tact had 
12 . Satow to Salisbury , 26 March 1898 . F . O. 46 / 496 ; 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs , ed . Komura 
Gaikoshi (History of K0mura Jutaro ' s Diplomacy ), 
2 Vols ., Tokyo , 1953 , I , p . 93 ; I . L. Bishop , 
Korea and Rer Ne ighbours , London , 1898 , pp . 263-
290 ; Kanichi Asakawa , The Russo - Japanese Conflict , 
Boston , 1904 , pp . 262- 9 ; Andrew Malozemoff , Russian 
Far Eastern Policy , 1881- 1904 , Univ . of Calif . 
Press , 1958 , pp . 89 - 92 . 
won him the royal favour and the goodwill of many foreign 
diplomats in Korea , was replaced by Alexis de Speyer , a 
young and overly aggressive imperialist . Speyer had a 
grandiose programme in mind . He evolved plans for 
timber, mining , and railroad enterprises and aimed at 
Russian domination of the army , the customs service , and 
a Russian naval base at Dee r Island off the port of 
Pusan . 13 
The g radual growth of sentiments hostile to Russia 
and Speyer among those Koreans who were politically 
articulate and the sudden shift in Russia ' s own Far 
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Eastern policy brought about a sudden collapse of Russia ' s 
predominance in Korea in 1898 . At the time the Russians 
were concentrating their efforts on developing the ice - free 
ports of Port Arthur and Talien and on linking southern 
Manchuria by rail with northern Manchuria . Thus , Russia ' s 
interest in Korea temporarily took second place . This , 
combined with Speyer ' s tactless and oVerbearing behaviour , 
drew vigorous protests from many Korean officials and 
especially from the Independence Club , an organization of 
reformists who demanded an end to all foreign interference . 14 
13 . F. H. Harrington , God , Mammon , and the Japanese , 
p . 299 . 
14 . The reform movement by the Independewe Club will 
be examined on pp . 20e- 213. 
Impatient with these and other signs of resistance to 
Russian encroachments , in March 1898,Speyer threatened 
to end the service of Russian advisers unless the Korean 
government would unequivocally demonstrate its pro-
Russian orientation by punishing anti - Russian Korean 
officials . When the Korean government , obviously 
irritated by the tactless Speyer , refused to comply , 
Speyer fell into his own trap and was forced to withdraw 
all Russian employees of the Korean government . 15 
During this period the necessity of placating 
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J apan for the acquisition of Port Arthur influenced Russian 
actions in Korean affairs . Russia intimated a desire for 
an agreement with Japan to terminate continual friction in 
Korea on the basis of Russian recognition that Japan had 
greater interests in Korea than Russia. Th i s conciliatory 
attitude of Russia ' s was partly due to her concern over 
Japan ' s hostile reaction to the Russian lease of the 
Liaotung peninsula , but was also a reaction to the possibility 
of an Anglo - Japanese alliance . Further , Russia could not 
afford to ignore the rapidly developing military 
capabilities of Japan . After the ' Triple Intervention ' 
the Japanese peacetime army had been expanded threefold 
while Russian forces east of Lake Baikal were i nc r eased 
15 . NGB. Vol. 31 , Pt . I , Nos . 122, 125, 131, 133, 143; 
Harrington , God , Mammon and the Japanese , 
p . 301. 
only on a very gradual scale . By November 1897 , Russia 
had some 40 , 000 men at her disposal in the Far East , in 
contrast to 170 , 000 in the Japanese peacetime army.16 
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The obscurity of political alignments , the numerical 
superiority of the Japanese army over the Russian forces In 
the Far East , and the del icat e balance in naval forces 
influenced Russia and Japan to act cautiously and pushed 
them towards a compromise on Korea . On 17 March 1898 , 
the Russian government made a proposal in regard to Korea , 
in which she expressed her intention to lease Port Arthur 
and to give Japan a pledge that Russia would not interfere 
in the internal affairs of Korea . Two days later , the 
Japanese government suggested an agreement by which Russia 
woul d recognize Japan ' s fre edom of action in Korea and 
in return Japan would r egard Manchuria as being outside 
her sphere of interest . This was a formula which was to 
be repeated by Japan at regular intervals down to 1904 and 
came to be known as the ' Mankan Kokan ' (literally , the 
&change of Manchuria f or Korea) . This exchange policy 
was endors ed by Marquis Ito , Yamagata , and the leading 
Japanese statesmen , s uch as Nishi , Ko mura and Hayashi . 
The Russian response , however , was much firmer than Japan 
had anticipated . In Tokyo the Russian Minister , Rosen , 
16 . N G B. Vo 1 . 31 , Pt . I , No . 99; 
A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy , 1881-
1904 , pp . 108- 9 . 
declared that ' As a matter of principle , we cannot admit 
that Russia should divert herself of all interest In a 
state with which she has a common frontier ' . 17 
For nearly a month , the Russian Minister in Tokyo , 
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Baron R. R. Rosen , and the Japanese Foreign Minister , Nishi , 
continued bargaining until an agreement was finally worked 
out . On 25 April 1~9B , the Russo - Japanese Protocol , known 
as the Nishi - Rosen Agreement , was signed . This stated in 
Article I that both signatory Powers recognized the 
independence of Korea and pledged themselves not to 
interfere in her internal affairs. Article II provided 
for a mutual agreement not to take any measure regarding 
the nomination of military instructors and financial 
advisers , without having previously arrived at a mutual 
accord on the subject . The most important Article III 
stated : ' In view of the great development of the commercial 
and industrial enterpris es of Japan in Korea and also of 
the considerable number of Japanese subjects residing in 
that country , the Russian Imperial Government shall not obstruct 
the development of the commercial and industrial relations 
lB between Japan and Korea .' This was Russia ' s first 
17 . NGB . Vol. 31 , Pt . I , Nos. 122,141,144,150,152,157,163; 
Malozemoff , op . cit ., pp . 10B- 9 . 
18 . Text in Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace , Korea : Treaties and Agreements,pp . 24 - 25 ; 
The French and Japanese Text and an English 
t rans lation also appear in NGB. Vol. 31 , Pt . I , 
No. 164. 
recognition of the particular interest of Japan ln 
the economic development of Korea . 
This agreement came short of Japan ' s demand that 
she should be given a free hand in Korea . Russia 
admitted only Japan ' s special industrial and commercial 
rights in the peninsula . It made no concession on the 
main issue . ~t once again put the interests of Japan 
and Russia on an equal footing within an independent 
Korea . There was on the whole little advance for Japan 
over the 1896 treaty . The joint occupation would 
continue as before . Japan could not yet exclude Russia 
from Korea but had at least regained an equal status in 
the matter of political influence over the Korean 
government . Moreo ver , Japan had obtained Russia ' s 
I 
reluctant admission that Japan ' s economic interest in 
Ko rea was large . In 1898, Japan ' s share in Korea ' s 
export and import trade was 79 . 2 per cent and 57 . 4 per 
cent , respectively , in value , while those of Russia were 
only 1 . 0 per cent and 0 . 9 per cent . 19 
19 . Nohara Shiro , ' Kinsei Shina Chosen 0 Meguru 
Nichiro no Kankei ' (Russo - Japanes e Relat ions 
with Regard to China and Ko rea in the Recent 
Period) , in Sekai Rekishi Taikei (An Outline 
of World History) , 25 Vols ., Tokyo , 1934 , 
Vol . 9 , pp . 402 , 403· 
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Irrespective of the wording of the diplomatic 
documents , things were easier , in practice , for the 
Japanese in Korea after 1898 . Japanese immigrants 
and traders entered Korea in large numbers and soon 
established themselves as the preponderant economic 
group ln Korea . From this point onwards , Japan ' s 
struggle with Russia over Korea was made very much 
easier . The six years that followed the Nishi - Rosen 
Agreement of 1898 saw Japan and Russia co- existing in 
Kor e a but with suspicions of each other . Beginning 
with its occupation of Manchuria in 1900 , Russia ' s 
interest in Korea had only secondary importance for 
its policy - makers , with the exception of a few periods 
of short duration . On the other hand , the intensifi -
cation of Japan ' s political interest in Korea was 
accompanied by an improvement o~ her international 
position as signified by the Anglo - Japanese Alliance 
of 1902 . However , Russia refused to make a complete 
renunciation of its political interest in Korea . The 
official Russian position was that Russia could not 
renounce her interest in Korea altogether and that 
Manchuria could not be considered as a q uid pro quo 
for Korea . The Russo - Japanese controversy that was to 
lead to open hostilities stemmed ~rom such dif~erences , 
thus making a Russo - Japanese conflict highly likely . 
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The other Powers had little interest in Korea 
and were not much worried by Japanese ambitions there . 
Britain wished to ensure that Korean territory and 
Korean harbours were not made the base for schemes for 
territorial aggrandizement so as to disturb the balance 
in the Far East and give to one Power a maritime 
supremacy in the Eastern Seas . Britain thought the 
Korean government to be incurably corrupt and doubted 
the country ' s capacity to retain its independence . 
Britain was not prepared to interfere actively in 
Korean affairs to buttress a regime which was not likely 
to last . Britain was interested mainly in the inter-
national implications and then only in so far as her 
naval and commercial interests were threatened or the 
peace of the Far East was likely to be broken . This 
British attitude towards Korea was demonstrated by the 
Anglo - Japanese Alliance of 1902 , which will be 
examined in detail in the next chapter . 
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During this period , in Korea , a nascent form of 
nationalism began to develop accompanied by the introduction 
of mass communication media and mass political movements . 
In January 1896 , Jae - Pil Suh (Philip Jaisohn) returned to 
Korea after spending more than ten years in the United 
States . He had been a young member of the attempted 
coup by the progressive group in 1884 . After that 
failure he had fled to the United States and had 
become an American citizen and a physician . On 
returning to Korea , he started the first private 
newspape r ' Toknip Sinmun ' ( ' The Independent ' ) in 
April 18 96 . At the same time he helped a small 
group of 30- odd reform advocates , some in the government 
and many ex- officials , to organize the Toknip Hyophoi 
(The Independence Club) . He himself declined formal 
membership but became an adviser to the Club . The 
new organization began the publication of a journal twice 
a month to promote pat rioti sm , reforms , and Western 
knowledge . They also erected a stone arch , the Gate 
of Independence , to arouse nationalistic pride . At 
first they confined their activities to discussions on 
lssues of lesser importance , such as street lights and 
so on , at their weekly Sunday public debates , but these 
reformists were soon voicing their views on matters of 
greater significance . Their slogan of complete national 
independence was at first welcomed by the King and the 
Korean government headed by Hong- Jip Kim . However , 
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Suh ' s untiring and outspoken advocacy of libertarian 
reforms and his blunt remonstrations to the Korean 
sovereign soon made him unwelcome to the Korean government . 
By this time , Suh and the Independence Club began to 
advocate radical changes In the political system . Their 
programme was ultimately to lead to some form of repres -
entative government under a constitutional monarch . 
In the years of 1896- 1898 , the conservatives were in the 
ascendancy in the Korean government . In sharp contrast 
to the rising voice for reforms outside the government , 
the officials in power were gradually undoing earlier 
reform measures . They were devoted to the traditional 
absolute monarchy and viewed Suh and his reformist 
supporters in the Independence Club with increasing 
'l ' t 20 hostl 1 y . 
One of the few occasions when the nationalistic 
reformists and the conservatives could agree was in 1897 
concernlng the elevation of the royal title from that of 
a King to Emperor . The name of the country was also 
changed from ' The Kingdom of Chosun (Korea) ' to ' The 
Empire of Taehan (Great Han) ' .21 The Independence Club 
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soon became an active political pressure group that could 
20 . Philip Jaisohn , ' What Korea needs most ', Ko r ean 
Repository , III (1896) , pp . 108- 110 ; Sun- Keun Lee , 
Hankuk Toknip Undongsa (History of Korean Independence 
Movement) , Seoul , 1956 , p . 200 ; Philip Jaisohn , 
' Korean Finance ', Korean Repository , III (1896) , 
pp . 166- 168 ; Hulbert , History of Korea , Vol . II , 
p . 310 ; Horace N. Allen , Korea : Fact and Fancy , 
Seoul , Methodist Publishing House , 1904 , p . 198 ; 
C. I . E . Kim and Han Kyo Kim , Korea and the Politics 
of Imperialism, 1876- 1910 , pp . 103- 118 . 
21 . Allen , op . cit ., p . 201 . Britain , Russia , Japan and 
all the Powers r ecogn i zed the new title for the 
Korean sovereign . 
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successfully mobilize several thousands in anti - foreign 
or anti - corruption rallies . In 1898 , Suh had to leave 
for the United States because of the pressures from the 
Korean government . Under the leadership of the new 
President , Chi- Ho Yoon , the Independence Club devoted 
most of its attention to domestic reforms . In October 
1898 , it began demanding the dismissal of six high 
government officials and staged a mass demonstration in 
front of the royal Palace . The Emperor succumbed to 
this di splay of mass strength and dismissed the accused . 
Ministers . Again , on 14 October , the leaders of the 
Club presented a revolutionary r equest that the Joongchoowon 
(Privy Council) , which had replaced the more active Reform 
Council in 1894 , should be reconstituted to admit 25 
popular representatives who would be elected by a people ' s 
22 
assembly . For the first time in the history of Korea , 
a demand for something approaching popular participation 
in the government was voiced . 
On 29 October , the Club held another mass rally and 
adopted six resolutions which included a pledge not to 
rely on foreign aid , a demand for more strict control of 
contracts with fore igners , a demand for a fair public 
trial for important offenders , a demand requiring the 
22 . Hulbert , History of Korea , Vol . II , p . 316 ; Kato 
to Okuma , 5 October 1898 , NGB , Vol . 31 , Part II , 
No. 850. 
sovereign to appoint Ministers only with the concurrence 
of the majority of the Cabinet , a demand for a unitary 
system of taxation administ e r ed by the Ministry of 
Finance and for publication o f annual estimates and 
balances , and a demand for the faithful and impartial 
enforcement of the ex isting laws and regulations . 23 
The Emperor had to approve the six- item resolution 
adopted at the mass rally and on 2 November the Privy 
Council was formally reorgani zed to provide equal 
repres entat ion between the government appointees and the 
popular delegates selected by the Independence Club . 
However , in reality , the government was only waiting 
for an opportune moment to crush the reform movement . 
Ko r e an history had seen precedents in which the 
discip lined and militant pedlars (the Bobusang) armed 
with cudgels acted as para- military me rcenari e s in the 
service of the government. For nearly 200 years they 
had maintained a tightly knit guild organization . The 
government decided to use the pedlars again . On 5 
November , a few days after the ent ry into Seoul of the 
pedlars , a formal decree from the throne ordered the 
23 . English text in Hulbert , History of Korea , Vol . 
II , p . 319 ; Japanese text in NGB , Vol . 31 , 
Part II , No. 859. 
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Independence Club to disband . The Independenc e Club 
was declared subversive and many of its leaders were 
24 
arrested . Thus ended the reform movement . 
The Independence Club failed to obtain many of 
its objectives in spite of the massive popular support 
which at times was strong enough to force the government 
to grant political concessions . Compared to the 
earlier attempts at reform (The coup of 1884 and the 
Kap - O reforms initiated by the Japanese in 1894 - 5), 
i t had the advantage of having no stigma of foreign 
sponsorship. Compared to the Tonghak rebellion , it 
had the advantage of a relatively enlightened and 
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socially respectable leadership. Above all , the activities 
of the Independence Club were not encumbered by inter-
national complications that had jeopardi zed those earlier 
reform movements and popular protests against the corrupt 
government . Despite all these advantages it failed . 
It can be argued that the failure can be attributed to 
such causes as : organizational weakness ; strategic 
errors ; unwillingness of the reform leaders to recogniz e 
the need for drastic changes in the existing political 
institutions , including the monarchy . 
24 . Hulbert , History of Korea , Vol . II , p . 323 ; 
William F . Sands , Undiplomatic Memories , N. Y. , 
Whittlesey House , 1 930 , pp . 152- 4 . 
(2) The Anglo - Japanese Alliance , 1902 
The nineteenth century was the climax of the 
' Pax Britannica ' . Britain had built herself the 
largest Empire in the world , and could largely pursue 
an independent policy based on the balance of power 
strategy . The ' Splendid Isolation ' was accepted 
as a sign of her strength and self- sufficiency , and 
became the guiding principle of British foreign 
policy . Towards the end of the century , however , 
circumstances had changed . Britain ceased to enjoy 
unchallenged supremacy . Two events in the last decade 
of the century precipitated a change : the Franco- Russian 
Alliance of 1894 , which united Britain ' s two most 
formidable adversaries ; and , partly as a result of the 
stalemate produced in Europe by this Alliance , a sudden 
enthusiasm by all the Great Powers for imperial and 
naval expansion . Britain was everywhere faced by new 
rivalries , new pressures which she had never known 
before . 
The eastward expansion of Russia had taken place 
most significantly under the remarkable pro - consulship 
of Nikolai Nikolaevich Muraviev , the Governor- General 
of East Siberia between 1857 and 1861 , but as the task 
of colonization without adequate land or sea transport 
214. 
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from European Russia was formidable , the :Russians seeme d 
to have concentrated until 1884 in the Near East , 
especially on the borders of Afghanistan , where their 
activities caused alarm to the authorities in British 
India . But as the building of the Trans - Siberian 
railway was inaugurated in 1891 , the Russian interest 
shifted to the Far East . This new means of communication 
offered the opportunity of stepping up the rate of 
colonization in Siberia and it also gave Russia a 
channel for increasing her armed forces in the Far 
East . Russia could not embark on the Trans - Siberian 
railway project without enlisting the support of French 
capital . This was assisted by political events when the 
Russian government entered with France into , first an 
Entente (1891) and , later , an Alliance (1894) . 1 
Some elements were common to all the problems 
facing Britain at the turn of the century : the operation 
of the Dual Alliance , an extremely formidable combination , 
1. A. Malozemoff , Russian Far Eastern Policy , pp . 20- 29 , 
34 - 39 ; B. A. Romanov , Russia in Manchuria , 1892- 1906 , 
Leningrad , 1928 , Trans . S . W. Jones , Ann Arbor , 1952 , 
pp. 38 - 44 ; Philip Joseph , Foreign Diplomacy in 
China4 1894- 1900 , New York , Octagon Books , 1971 , pp . 1 6-188 . 
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usually in practice working against Britain ; the 
steady realization of the immense potentialities of the 
Russian Empire , enabling her to bring her land power more 
effectively to bear in Central Asia and the Far East . 
Communications between European Russia and her Far 
Eastern provinces were still bad , since the Trans - Siberian 
Railway was almost , but not quite, completed when the 
Russo - Japanese war broke out in 1904 . Nevertheless , as 
a result of the Russian Finance Minister Witte ' s extensive 
railway programme they were improving every year . None 
of these would have been such a threat to the British 
Empire without the imperialist mood prevalent in Europe 
and America which drove not only France and Russia but 
also Germany and the United States to become great 
imperial and naval Powers . Never before had all the 
Great Powers concentrated their attention so exclusively on 
imperial expansion , and never before had the British been 
confronted with such intensive competition in every part 
of the world . 
Britain had difficulties allover the world , but it 
was in China that they were most acute and it was over 
China that the battle over the future of British policy 
was fought . After the Chinese defeat by Japan in 1895 , 
China was swept along in the rush for concessions as the 
Powers followed the German seizure of Kiaochow in 1897 . 
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By 1900 each of the Powers had a sphere of influence : 
Russia in Manchuria , Ge r many in Shantung , and France in 
the extreme South . Britain could not bring herself to 
abandon her old policy altogether , and laid only a half-
hearted claim to the Valley of the Yangtze as her sphere . 
The whole position was made still worse by the Boxer 
rebellion of 1900 , which resulted in the occupation of 
Manchuria by Russian troops , sent there on the pretext 
f .. 2 o suppresslng dlsorders . 
All these events in China during the period of 
between 1895 and 1900 stemmed mainly from the Sino- Japanese 
war of 1894 - 5 , which influenced international relations in 
the Far East until 1900 . The ' Triple Intervention ', the 
Port Arthur crisis and the state of Korea and South 
Manchuria throughout the period owed their origins to 
Japan ' s victory in that war . The war had left China 
weak , and the fury of the Boxer disturbances and the 
revenge which the Powers took left North Manchuria prostrate . 
The Russians sent vast forces into Manchuria , and at the 
end of the relief expedition to Peking , Russia announced 
the removal of her armies from Peki ng with the implication 
that she proposed to occupy Manchuria and thus strengthen 
her grip on a territory where she had long claimed special 
2 . For the evolution of the Major Powers ' policies in 
China during the period of 1895- 1900 , see L. K. 
Young , British Policy in China , 1895- 1902 , Oxford 
University Press , 1970 ; George Monger , The End of 
Lsolation , London , Thomas Nelson Ltd ., 1963 ; Philip 
Joseph , op . cit . 
rights . This projected withdrawal of Russian troops 
from Peking irritated the Germans , who had a large 
expeditionary force on the high seas on its way to 
China . Britain also was always known to be suspicious 
of Russia . Eventually after considerable discussions , , 
the Anglo- German Agreement was signed on 16 October 1900 . 
The Agreement was in the form of a joint undertaking to 
obse r ve certain principles : 
1 . It is a matter of joint and permanent international 
interest that the ports on the rivers and littoral of 
China should remain free and open to trade and to every 
other legitimate form of economic activity for the 
nationals of all countries without distinction ; and the 
two governments agree on their part to uphold the same 
for all Chinese territory as far as they can exercis e 
influence ; 
2 . Britain and Germany will not , on their part , make 
use of the present complication to obtain for themselves 
any territorial advantages in the Chinese dominions , and 
will direct their policy towards maintaining undiminished 
the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire ; 
3. In case of another Power making use of the compli-
cations in China in order to obtain under any form 
whatever such territorial advantages , the two Contracting 
Parties reserve to themselves to come to a preliminary 
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understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for 
the protection of their own interests in China. 3 
The most important thing which Germany gained from 
its terms was an undertaking that Britain would not close 
the Yangt ze to its commerce , and , in return , Britain 
hoped to obtain some assurance that Germany would 
co - operate against possible Russian expansion in North 
China and Manchuria . In the unsatisfactory compromise 
which resulted , the treaty became a joint unde rtaking, 
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consisting partly of a restatement of o pen doo r principles 
and partly of a self- denying ordinance over territorial 
acquisitions in China . However , the vagueness of the 
phrase prevented the treaty becoming effective . But 
this Anglo - German Agreement had some effect on the later 
Anglo - Japanese Agreement . 4 
As shown in the last chapter , amicable relations between 
Britain and Japan were established at the end of the Sino-
3 . G. P . Gooch and H. Temperley , ed ., British Documents 
on the Origins of the War , 1898- 1914 , London , 1926-
1938 , Vol. II , No . 17 , Enclosure . Hereafter 
referred to as B. D. 
4. L . K. Young , op . cit ., pp . 193- 213 ; G. Monger , 
op . cit ., pp. 21 - 45 ; Ian H. Nish , The Anglo - Japanese 
Alliance , Univ . of London , 1966 , pp . 99 - 123 . 
Japanese war , when Britain refus ed to intervene in the 
war . This bond was strengthened over the succeeding 
years and at the time of the Port Arthur crisis of 1898 
the need for an agreement with Japan was frequently 
mentioned in the British press. 5 In 1900 , there was 
a major Cabinet re - shuffle in Britain , and the new 
Salisbury Ministry had Lord Lansdowne as Foreign 
Secretary . Sir Claude Maxwell MacDonald , replaced 
Sir Ernest Satow as the British Minister in Tokyo . 
A few months earlier , a new Japanese Minister , Baron 
Hayashi Tadasu , had arrived in London . 
Since 1895 Britain ' s disadvantageous position in 
relation to the Dual Alliance Powers had occasioned 
concern, particularly when considered in terms of the 
country ' s naval self- sufficiency . At that time British 
naval policy was based on the Two- Power standard laid 
down by Lord George Hamilton in 1889 . This envisaged 
a British Navy on a scale which would at least equal the 
naval strength of any two other Powers . Between 1895 
and 1901 , however , the naval position of the Powers was 
radically changed and the old formula was no longer 
applicable . During these years Russia , Germany , and 
the United States became great naval Powers , Japan an 
important one . In 1901 , Lord Selborne , the First Lord 
of the Admiralty , placed a memorandum before the Cabinet 
5. ' The Times ', 23 and 31 Dec . le97 , 1 Feb ., 26 
March , 4 April , 30 July 1898 . 
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which assessed the significance of the naval development 
on British policy . Moreover , with the growth in 
importance of the Far East after 1895 , the struggle for 
naval superiority had been extended to those waters. 
Britain , with her naval expenditure already under strain , 
was forced either to carry this extra burden to the 
disadvantage of her Horne and Mediterranean Fleets or to 
concede the position in the Far East . According to 
Lord Selborne ' s memorandum of 4 September 1901 , which 
was on the balance of naval power in the Far East in 
relation to a possible alliance with Japan , by 1901 , 
in the Far East , Russia had 5 battleships with 3 under 
construction; Japan 6 with 1 under construction ; France 
1 ; Germany 4; and Britain 4. 6 Britain alone in the 
Far East would soon be outnumbered, and it would be 
impossible to provide reinforcements there except at 
the expense of the forces in European waters . If Japan 
should corne to an arrangement with Russia the position 
would be critical , while she aligned herself with Britain 
the ratio would be 11 : 9 against the Dual Alliance Powers . 
The first British tentative outline for a political 
agreement with Japan carne when Francis Leveson Bertie , 
an Assistant Under- Secretary at the Foreign Office , drew 
6 . Memorandum by Selborne , 4 Sept. 1901 , F . O. 
46/547 ; Z. S . Steiner , ' Great Britain and the 
Creation of the Anglo - Japanese Alliance ', Journal 
of Modern History , Vol . 31 (1959) , pp . 29 - 31. 
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up a draft under the heading 'Suggestions for Agreement 
with Japan ' which he forwarded to Lansdowne under cover of 
his memorandum of 2 July 1901.7 It appropriated to 
Britain and Japan , on a basis of naval co - operation , the 
maintenance of the principles contained in the Anglo -
German Agreement . It correlated the protection of British 
interests in the Yangtze region with the maintenance of 
Japanese interests in Korea . 
Bertie also raised the problem of Korea , the 
recognized focus of Japan ' s ambitions , and suggested that 
' if it were a condition of British policy that Korea 
should not fall under Russian occupation , then it would 
not be much of a sacrifice to make a definite promise 
of co - operation to Japan for its defence ,. 8 Bertie 
again suggested that the possession of Korea by Russia , 
taken in conjunction with her supremacy in Manchuria 
and her hold over any Chinese government , would be such 
a danger to British interests that Britain would in 
any case be forced to intervene . If Britain was bound 
to act thus in an emergency , she might as well support 
Japan in the ordinary course of events. Such support 
would have to be tangible and practical and , bearing in 
mind Britain ' s limited naval power in the Far East , 
would have to be restricted to naval , and possibly 
7. Memorandum by Bertie , Suggestions for Agreement 
with Japan , encl . in Be r tie to Lansdowne , 2 July 
1901 . F . O. 17/1506 . 
8 . Ibid . 
pecuniary , aid to Japan ln resisting any foreign 
occupation of Korea . 9 
On 29 October , Hayashi , the new Japanese Minister 
in London , presented a memorandum for British acceptance . 
This read : ' In view of the preponderating interests of 
Japan in Corea , His Britannic Majesty ' s Government 
shall acquiesce in the adoption by Japan of suitable 
f th . t f th' , 10 measures or e maln enance 0 ose lnterests . 
In effect , this meant a free hand for Japan in Korea . 
As Hayashi told Lansdowne on 16 October , Japan considered 
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' as its first and last wish the protection of its interests 
in Korea , and the prevention of interference by any other 
country in Korea . , 11 Lansdowne remarked that he did not 
like the form in which the clause had been drafted , but 
that he would find some means of meeting Japanese wishes . 12 
On 5 November , the Cabinet agreed on the conclusion 
of an alliance with Japan , and , on 6 November 1901 , the 
9 . Ibid .; Memorandum by Bertie , 22 July 1901 , F . O. 
46/54'7. 
10 . Memorandum submitted by Baron Hayashi , 29 Oct . 1901 , 
F . O. 46/563 . 
11 . A. M. Pooley ed ., The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi , 
New York , AMS Press , 1915 , p . 134. Hereafter referred 
to as Hayashi Memoirs . 
12 . Lansdowne to MacDonald , No . 113 , secret , 29 Oct . 1901 , 
F . O. 46/563 . 
preliminary draft of an agreement was handed to Hayashi . 
It reads : 
Desirous of maintaining the present state of 
affairs in the Far East , of preserving the general peace , 
and , in particular , of preventing the absorption of Korea 
by another country , and of maintaining the inde pendence 
and territorial integrity of China and of securing to 
every country equal commercial and industrial privileges 
in China , the governments of the two allied nations have 
agreed upon the following articles : 
1) If eithe r of the two nations shall be engaged 
ln war with another foreign country for the object of 
protecting the interests mentioned in the foregoing , the 
allied nation shall maintain a strict neutrality and shall 
endeavour to prevent any other nation from supporting the 
hostile country . 
2) If , in the conditions mentioned above , another 
foreign country shall join the enemy of the allied n~tion , 
then the two allied countries shall make common war , and 
peace shall only be concluded with the mutual consent of 
the two allies. 
3) The allied nations shall not enter into any 
agreement with another country affecting the interests of 
the allies in Korea without mutual consent . 
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4) In the event of Great Britain or Japan at any 
time considering the interests mentioned above as being 
jeopardized , then the governments of the two countries 
shall communicate together fully and frankly without 
concealment . 
Separate Article containing the naval provisions : 
The naval forces of the two Powers shal , so far 
as lS possible , act in concert in time of peace ; and mutual 
facilities will be g i ven for the docking of vessels of war 
of the one Power in the ports of the other and also for the 
use of coaling stations and other advantages conduci ve to the 
welfare and efficiency of their respective navies . 13 
While the draft had been prepared on the assumption 
of its limitation to China and Korea , some sections of the 
Cabinet preferred to extend its scope to India and the 
Malay peninsula . Britain was trying to guard against the 
opposite danger of being dragged into war with Russia , and 
as a consequence there was no recognition of Japan ' s 
preponderance in Korea , nor of her right to take steps 
to safeguar d the preponderance , only a statement in the 
13 . F . O. 46/ 563 ; Hayashi Memoirs , pp . 137- 8 ; 
B. D. Vol . II , No . 125 , pp . 114- 120 . 
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preamble that both Powers were specially interested in 
preventing the absorption of Korea by any foreign Power . 
Japan ' s relationship to Korea had been left unspecific in 
the draft . Britain deliberately omitted any such phrase . 
Hayashi remarked that the treatment of Korea in that draft 
did not sufficiently meet the requirements of Japan. 14 
After some delay due to a division of opinion in 
the Japanese government over the question of the alliance 
with Britain , a counterdraft was returned by Japan on 12 
December 1901 . Japan added two separate Articles : 
• 
Article II . Each of the High contracting Parties 
shall endeavour to maintain in the Far East at all times 
naval forces superior in efficacy to the naval strength 
of any other Power which has the largest naval forces in 
the Far East . 
Article III . Great Britain recognizes that Japan 
may take such suitable measures as she deems necessary 
to safeguard and promote the preponderating interests 
which she actually possesses in Korea . 
14 . Lansdowne to MacDonald , No . 115 , Secret , 6 Nov . 
1901 , F . O. 46/563 ; Hayashi Memoirs , pp . 132 - 4 . 
Japan wanted a free hand in Korea and wished to dictate 
Britain ' s naval commitments in the Far East . She 
refused to extend the scope of the alliance , and 
preferred to restrict it to a term of five years , 
. 15 
subject to renewal . 
Lansdowne told Hayashi that some of the clauses 
were unacceptable . Britain ' s naval commitment in the 
Far East would have to be determined by Imperial con-
siderations rather than with reference to purely local 
conditions . He also added that the Article III might 
have the effect of entangling Britain in war with two 
great European Powers allover the world on account 
of some comparatively trivial quarrel between Russia 
and Japan over matters of purely local interest . It 
revived British fears of being dragged into war over 
some trivial Japanese quarrel in Korea . As a safeguard 
Lansdown suggested amendments which would specify the 
measures to be taken by either Power in defence of their 
. t t 16 In e r es s . 
15. MacDonald to Lansdowne , 6 Dec . 1901 , F . O. 
46/563 ; B.D . Vol . II , No . 115 ; NGB , Vol . 34 , 
No . 65 . 
16 . Lansdowne to MacDonald , No . 128 , 12 Dec . 1901 , 
F . O. 46/563 ; No . 129 , 16 Dec . 1901 , F . O. 46/563 ; 
No . 132 , 19 Dec . 1901 , F . O. 46/563 ; NGB . Vol. 34 , 
No . 70. 
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Komura , the Japanese Foreign Minister , stated in 
two further memoranda handed over to Britain by Hayashi 
on 16 and 19 December that Japan and Korea having peculiar 
r elations on account of their geographical position , their 
history , commerce and industry , the Japanese government 
considered it highly important that they should reserve 
to themselves a certain degree of liberty of action on 
the Korean peninsula . Komura also rejected the British 
suggestion that either Power should specify the measures 
it intended to take in defence of its interests, 
expla ining that disturbances tended to arise suddenly in 
Korea and demanded prompt action and made consultation 
with Britain impossible in most cases . 17 
At the Cabinet meeting on 19 December , the 
projected alliance met with heavy criticism , but the 
idea of a Japanese alliance was generally accepted , 
and the differences of opinion were more with r e spect 
to details than to substance . Discussion centred on the 
naval clauses and Korea . It was felt that the agreement 
offered by the Japanese was much too one - sided , and that 
Japan ' s gains in Korea should be balanced by extending 
the alliance to cover India and Siam . The Ministers 
17 . NGB, Vol . 34 , Nos . 70- 72 ; Hayashi Memoirs , pp . 
166- 170 ; Lansdown to MacDonald , No . 129 , 
16 Dec. 1901 , F . O. 46/563 . 
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thought that Britain could not sacrifice the free disposal 
of her ships , and the Japanese Treaty would not repay 
them for the surrender . 1S Lansdowne told Hayashi 
that it was decidedly opposed to a binding distribution 
of British naval forces in any part of the world and 
to the Korean article which was liable to be miscon-
strued as abetting the aggressive policy of Japan in 
Korea. 19 
On 31 December , Hayashi offered to include in the 
Treaty the statement that Japan had no aggressive 
inte ntions in Korea and qualify Britain ' s naval obliga-
tions in the Far East by the words ' as far as possible ' . 20 
Lansdowne thought that there was no halfway house between 
such a recognition of Japanese preponderance in Korea , 
and a stipulation that Japan was not to be allowed to 
pick quarrels with Russia except with Britain ' s permission 
and that if Japan became involved in such quarrels without 
18. Lansdowne to MacDonald , No . 132 , 19 Dec. 1901 . 
F . O. 46/563 . 
19 . Ibid .; NGB . Vol . 34 , No . 73 . 
20 . Ibid .; Lansdowne to MacDonald , No . 133 , 31 Dec . 
1901 . F . O. 46/563 . 
Britain ' s approval , the casus foederis would not be held 
by Britain to have arisen , and to such a stipulation 
Japan would not agree . Lansdowne argued in his 
memorandum addressed to his colleagues that better 
terms could not be obtained , that the Japanese should 
certainly not enlarge the scope of the agreement , and 
that the recognition of their preponderance in Korea was 
to them the essence of the bargain . He thought that 
if Japan could involve Britain in war by pursing a 
forward policy in Korea , so could Britain involve them 
in war by pursui ng such a policy in the Yangtze . 21 
However, Lansdowne ' s anxiety to close the matter 
was not shared by the majority of the Cabinet . From 
mid- December 1901 until the signing of the treaty on 
30 January 1902 discussions continued on the Korean 
question and on the naval is sue . The Japanese demand 
on Korea was one of the main topics of greatest 
controversy . Indeed , Korea had served as the direct 
cause of the two biggest wars which had broken out in 
the Far East at the turn of the nineteenth century , the 
Sino- Japanese War of 1894 - 5 ~ and the Russo - Japanese 
War of 1904- 5 , and she had always remained at the focus 
of the greatest controversies of the international 
21 . Note by Lansdowne for the Cabinet , 16 Dec . 1901, 
F . O. 46/547 . 
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politics in the Far East . Since Japan ' s ' first and 
last wish ' was her free hand in Korea , it was not strange 
that Korea once again became the main focus of the 
greatest controversies in the negotiations of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. Eventually , most of the British 
Ministers were prepared , if necessary , with some 
misgiving , to accept the Treaty as it stood . A draft 
Treaty was drawn up on 14 January 1902 . The Japanese 
amendments were returned on 18 January . To the general 
r ecognition of her special interests in Korea Japan had 
added specific mention of her ' political as well as 
commercial and industrial ' interests in Korea . This 
was then amended by Britain to a special recognition of 
Japan ' s political and commercial interests in Korea . 
The Agreement was signed by Lansdowne and Hayashi on 
30 January 1902 . It reads : 22 
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The Governments of Great Britain and Japan , actuated 
solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general 
peace in the extreme East , being moreover specially interested 
in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of 
22 . Lansdowne to Balfour , 21 Jan . 1902 , F . O. 46/563 ; 
Memorandum by Barrington , 27 Jan . 1902 , F . O. 46/563; 
Text in Korea : Treaties and Agreements , pp. 33- 34 ; 
Also in F . O. 46 / 563 ; NGB . Vol. 35 , No. 15; 
BD , Vol . II , No . 125 . 
the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea , and in 
securing equal opportunities in those countries for the 
commerce and industry of all nations , hereby agree as 
follows :-
Article I . The High Contracting Parties , having 
mutually recognized the independence of China and Corea, 
declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any 
aggressive tendencies in either country . Having in 
view , however , the ir special int e rests , of which those 
of Great Britain relate principally to China , while 
Japan , in addition to the interests which she possesses 
in China , is inte rested in a peculiar degree politically 
as well as commercially and industrially in Corea , the 
High Contracting Parties recogni ze that it will be 
admissible for either of them to take such measures as 
may be indispensable in order to safeguard those 
interests if threatened either by the aggressive action 
of any other Power , or by disturbances arising in China 
or Corea , and necessitating the int e rvention of either 
of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the 
lives or property of its subjects . 
Article II . If either Great Britain or Japan , 
in the defence of their respective inte r ests as above 
described , should become involved in war with another 
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Power , the other High Contracting Party will maintain 
a strict neutrality , and use its efforts to prevent 
other Powers from joining in hostilities against its 
Ally . 
Article III . If in the above event any other 
Power or Powers should join in hostilities against the 
Ally , the other High Contracting Party will come to its 
assistance and will conduct the war ln common , and make 
peace in mutual agreement with it . 
Article IV . The High Contracting Parties agree 
that neither of them will , without consulting the other , 
enter into separate arrangements with another Power to 
the prejudice of the interests above described . 
Article V. Whenever , in the opinion of either 
Great Britain or Japan , the above - mentioned interests 
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are in jeopardy , the two Governments will communicate with 
one another fully and frankly . 
Article VI . The present Agreement shall come 
into effect immed i ately after the date of its signatur e , 
and remain in force for fi ve years from that date . In 
case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have 
notified twelve months before the expiration of the 
said five years the intention of terminating it , it 
shall remain binding until the expiration of one year 
from the day on which either of the High Contracting 
Parties shall have denounced it . But if , when the 
date fixed for its expiration arrives , either Ally is 
actually engaged in War , the alliance shall, ipso facto , 
continue until peace is concluded . 
In addition to the main text of Treaty , a secret 
Agr eement was signed?3 Each Government recognizes that 
its naval forces should , as far as is possible , act in 
concert with those of its Ally in time of peace , and 
agrees that mutual facilities shall be given for the 
docking and coaling of vessels of war of one country in 
the ports of the other , as well as other advantages 
conducive to the welfare and efficiency of the 
respective navies of the two Powers . 
At the present moment Japan and Great Britain 
are each of them maintaining in the Extreme East a naval 
force superior in strength to that of any other Power . 
Each ally has no intention of relaxing her efforts to 
maintain , so far as may be possible , available for 
concentration in the waters of the Extreme East a naval 
force superior to that of any third Power . 
23 . F.O . 46/563 ; NGB . Vol. 35 , No . 15. 
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The Anglo - Japanese Alliance was a landmark in British 
policy, because it was the first departure from the 
traditional policy of isolation . It was a means by 
which the burden of maintaining the ' Pax Britannica ', which 
had been the major external force in the Far East , could 
be shared with another Power . It was a practical means 
of meeting Britain ' s diplomatic needs at the time . It 
helped to maintain British interests in the Far East 
without committing Britain in Europe , which appeared to 
be the only way in which the German arrangement could be 
secured . It also opposed continued Russian expansion , 
without involving Britai n in a direct alignment 
against Russia . It was of unique significance for the 
two countries . For Japan it was her first alliance with 
a European Power and therefore a toke n that she had 
reached the ranks of the world Power . Furthermore , 
Britain could , at least , prevent Japan from seeking an 
alternative arrangement with Russia. 
British policy towards Korea at the turn of the 
nineteenth century , which could be represented by the Anglo -
Japanese Alliance , turned out to be tragic for that small 
kingdom in the Far East . The problem was that the British 
government had no large concern for Korea , but always con-
sidered it only in relation to the balance of power in the 
Far East . In regard to the balance , the British sought 
to have local nations , which had been China and was 
Japan at that time , to do the balancing , all with the 
grand purpose of preserving the Far East in favour of 
British int~ests , against Russia . When it became 
clear that sacrificing Korea ' s independence could effect 
a favourable balance , the British government did not 
hesitate to pay such a relatively small price . Not 
much earlier , when Britain occupied Port Hamilton in 
1885 , Britain was concerned with Korea . This was true 
of Britain ' s attitude in le85 , but it no longer held 
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good in 1902 . The spirit of Port -Hamilton never returned . 
Indeed the Anglo - Japanese Alliance was , as will be seen , 
the end of direct Brit i sh interest in Korea . 
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CHAPTER 8 . 
THE RUSSO- JAPANESE WAR , 1904 - lg05 
(1) The Last Stages of the Russo - Japanese Negotiations 
Since the Anglo - Japanese Alliance , Japan had improved 
her position in Korea . The British representative in 
Seoul , Sir John Jordan , wrote in March 1902 that ' their 
recent convention with us seems to have perceptibly 
stiffened their Korean policy , which still , however , 
proceeds on very cautious lines where there is any risk 
of a collision with Russia ,. l The improvement in Japan ' s 
standing in Korea depended on economic penetration. 
After the Nishi - Rosen Agreement in l8ge , the Japanese 
infiltrated into Korea as fast as they could and proceeded 
to establish their commercial and industrial rights in 
Korea. The Russians were involved in Manchuria and left 
the way clear for Japan in Korea , and the other Powers 
had little interests in Korea and were not much worried 
by Japanese ambitions there . Japan allowed her nationals 
to leave for Korea and encouraged a great expansion of 
Japanese trade with Korea . The Japanese expansion of trade 
1. Jordan to Bridge , 31 March 1902 , F . O. 350/3 . 
interests , concessions , railway constructions , and 
exploitation of timber and fishery resources was not the 
result of the Japanese domination of the Korean govern-
ment but resulted from the inactivity of the other 
Powers . 
One of the aspects of Japan ' s Korean policY , which 
clearly exemplified her long range expansionist plans , 
was the railroad project . The Japanese had earlier 
purchased from an American promoter , James R. Morse , 
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the rights for the Seoul - Inchon railway line and had 
provided the funds for a Japanese group headed by Shibusawa 
Eiichi , the President of the Daiichi Bank , to take up the 
project . In September 1898 , Japan also secured from the 
Korean government the rights to construct the Seoul- Pusan 
line , a much more important arterial line; this through 
an application of strong diplomatic pressure . Japan 
also showed great interests in acquiring the Seoul-Wiju 
line which the original French concession holder had been 
unable to construct . Japan , at the same time , was 
successful in monopolizing the modern banking system of 
Korea . Beginning in May 1902 , the Korean branch of the 
Japanese Daiichi Bank issued the so - called ' Shibusawa 
Notes ' which soon became unofficial legal tender . As 
the only foreign bank in Korea , the Daiichi Bank Korean 
Branch became the virtual ' Bank o f Korea ' and soon secured 
financial control as great as that of a central bank , 
issuing the only currency notes and making loans to the 
Korean Court . Late in 1902 , the Japanese government 
decided to vote almost two million Yen for 1903 towards 
specified projects in Korea , of which the most important 
was the building of the Seoul - Pusan railway.2 
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The tangible manifestions of Russo- Japanese rivalry 
were the struggles for concessions . In 1899 , Japan 
approached Korea for a lease of Koje Island , which was an 
important strategic position commanding the entrance to 
Masan and the Broughton Strait . Meanwhile , the Russians 
were seeking a strip of land near Masan , an ideal harbour 
site to the west of Pusan . For the Japanese , Masan 
was as serious as Port Arthur , because it might be the 
thin end of the wedge which would later enable Russia to 
command the Tsushima Straits . The Japanese were seriously 
worried and Japanese private merchants , with the certain 
assistance of their government , were quick and quiet in 
buying up all possible sites on the island . This 
pre- emption of the most desirable pieces of land by the 
Japanese and strong Japanese protest against Russian 
acquisition of land defeated the Russian ' s plan . 
2 . NGB . Vol . 35 , No . 268 ; K. Asakawa , The Russo -
Japanese Conflict , New York , Houghton , Mufflin 
and Co ., 1904 , pp . 282 - 3; A. Malozemoff , 
Russian Far Eastern Policy , 1881- 1904 , p. 231 ; 
For detail of Japanese economic penetration 
into Korea , see Conroy , Japanese Se i zure of 
Ko r ea , Ch . IX . 
Nevertheless , in 1900 , the Russian Minister in Korea , 
A. I . Pavlov , succeeded in persuading Korea to pledge 
that the Koje Island in the Masan area would not be leased 
to any foreign Power including Japan . 3 However , the most 
controversial of all was the timber concession granted to 
the Russians in 1896 for Ullung Island and for the Tumen 
and the Yalu River regions. After years of inactivity , 
in 1898 , a Russian expansionist , A. M. Bezobrazov , became 
interested in the prospect of uSlng the concession to 
develop Russian political and economic influence in the 
Lower Yalu region , and from then until the outbreak of 
the Russo - Japanese War , the rumours of Russian designs 
on Korea centred around the Yalu basin enterprise. 4 
In the battles for concessions , Japan reaped far 
more than Russia , and , moreover , additional evidence of 
Japan ' s success in the economic sphere was Japan ' s 
continuing predominance in Korean trade and the over-
whelming numerical superiority of Japanese over Russian 
residents in Korea . Japan ' s share in Korea ' s foreign 
trade maintained a high level of over 61 per cent (in 
value) of imports to Korea and over 76 per cent of exports 
3 . NGB . Vol. 32 , Nos . 101- 9 ; Vol. 33 , Nos . 154 , 166 , 
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168 , 169 ; Text of the Russo - Korean Agreement on 
Nonalienation of Koje Island , in Ibid ., Vol . 33 , No . 196. 
4 . Ma1ozemoff argued that Russia in 1903 had not the 
slightest intention of starting aggressive actions 
in Korea , and the prominence of Russian activities 
on the Yalu in the Far Eastern newspapers was due 
to the fact that they represented the only tangible 
Russian activities in Korea at that time . Malozemoff , 
Russian Far Eastern Policy , 1881- 1904 , pp . 229 - 237 . 
from Korea In the years from 1899- 1904 , while Russian 
trade with Korea was almost negligible . 5 In 1901 , 
the number of Japanese residents in Korea was nearly 
17 , 000, of which 2, 360 were in Seoul . 
30- 40 , 000 by 1904 . 6 
This grew to 
Russia ' s inferior economic position in Korea was 
partly due to her increasing commitments in Manchuria , 
espe cially after the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion . 
In January 1901 , Russia proposed to Japan a scheme for 
the neutralization of Korea under a joint guarantee by 
the Powers. 7 Japan turned down this proposal because 
she desired to maintain and expand her preponderant 
position in Korea and to induce Russia to give her a 
free hand In Korea in return for recognition of Russian 
interests in Manchuria . 8 Since the end of the Sino-
Japanese war in 1895 , there had been several types of 
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solution for Korea . First , there was the division of the 
5 . Nohara Shiro , Kinsei Shina Chosen 0 M~guru Nichiro 
no Kankei (Russo - Ja anese Relations with R2 ard to 
China and Korea in the Recent Period , in Sekai Rekishi 
Taikei (An Outline of World History) , 25 Vols . Tokyo , 
1934 , Vol . 9 , pp . 402- 3 . 
6 . Korea Review I , p . 310 ; Conroy , Japanese Seizure 
of Korea , p . 466 . 
7 . Rosen ' s proposal to Takaa ki Kato , 7 Jan . 1901 , NGB . 
Vol . 34 , No . 393. 
8. NGB . Vol . 34 , Nos . 393-409; Vol . 35 , Nos . 181-205. 
peninsula into Russian and Japanese spheres of influence 
which was incorporated into the Agreements of 1896 and 
1898 . Then there was the Russian proposal for Korea ' s 
neutralization under an international guarantee which 
was turned down by Japan in 1901 . Also there was the 
' Mankan Kokan ' formula (Exchange of Manchuria for Korea) 
which was unofficially proposed by Ito during his visit 
to St. Petersburg in November 1901 . It was a slgn of 
Japan ' s increasing strength and ambition in Korea . 
In any cas e , however , Russia was not prepare d to make 
the necessary concessions and the discussion was 
suspended . 
Meanwhile , the Korean government , at the news of 
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the Russian proposal for Korea ' s neutralization in early 
January 1901 , entertained some hope for an internationally 
guaranteed neutralization of their country and made 
inquiries regarding the Russian and Japanese responses . 
Furthermore , when it learned of the Anglo - Japanese Allianc e 
in 1902 , the Korean government feared that Japan was now 
ready to fight Russia with unpleasant consequences for 
Korea . It also feared that Japan would interfere more 
actively In Korean affairs than before. In August 1903 , 
the Korean government formally requested the Japanese and 
Russian governments to consider Korea as a neutral country 
in case of war and to spare Korea from the hostile 
military operations of either belligerent . 9 
The decision to open negotiations with Russia was 
made in Japan at the I mperial Council on 23 June 1903 , 
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which was attended by five members of the Genro (the elder -
Statesmen) - Ito , Yamagata , Oyama , Matsukata , and Inouye -
and four Ministers including the Prime Minister Katsura 
and Foreign Minister Komura . The conference adopted 
a decision to open negotiations with Russia , and the 
following terms were approved as the basis for Japan ' s 
approach to Russia : a) to preserve the independence 
and territorial integrity of China and Korea and the 
principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry 
there ; b) Japan and Russia to recognize mutually the 
rights which they possess at present in Korea and 
Manchuria respectively and the measures which have to be 
taken for their protection ; c) Japan and Russia to 
recognize mutually their rights of sending forces when 
they need to preserve their above- mentioned interests 
or to repel uprisings in these territories . Troops 
to be withdrawn immediately after the object of sending 
them has been achieved ; d) Japan possesses the special 
right to advise and assist Korea to carry out internal 
reforms . 10 
9 • . NGB . Vol. 34 , No. 396; 
Vol . 36 , Pt . I , Nos . 
Vol. 35 , 
695, 697. 
No. 24; 
10 . Draft Plan for Negotiations with Russia , from the 
Cabinet Resolution following the Imperial Council , 
23 June 1903 , NGB . Vol . 36 , Pt I , No.1 ; 
MacDonald to Lansdowne , No . 145 , 1 Oct . 1903 , 
F . O. 46/567 . 
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The British government was notified on 3 July 
1903 both of the intent and the terms of the opening 
demarche . Hayashi explained to Lansdowne that Japan 
was disposed to offer to Russia a solution of the present 
situation based on the clear definition of Russia ' s 
int erests in Manchuria as well as Japan ' s interests 
. 11 In Korea . On 14 July , the British Cabinet decided 
that a separate arrangement between Russia and Japan 
would indicate a weakening in the good understanding 
that had prevailed with Japan since 1901 and thus should 
be assessed with caution . Hayashi was told that the 
British government would not criticize in an unfriendly 
spirit an arrangement desired by their ally , and consistent 
with the interests and treaty obligations of Britain as 
well as Japan , but asked that the Russian negotiations 
should not be conducted in a manner which might suggest 
that the Anglo- Japanese agreement had in any way Deen impaired . 
Japan agreed to keep Britain informed of the course of 
.. 12 
negotlatlons . 
On 28 July , Komura instructed Kurino , the Japanese 
Minister to Russia , to acquaint the Russian Foreign 
11. Lansdowne to MacDonald, 3 July 1903 , F . O. 46/564; 
NGB . Vol . 36 , Pt. I , No . 2 . 
12 . Lansdowne to Hayashi , 16 July 1903 , F . O. 46/572. 
Minister, Lamsdorf , with the Japanese intentions. 
Lamsdorf agreed to the negotiations and received the 
Japanese note on 12 August . On 3 October, the first 
Russian counter- proposals were delivered and these added 
the following three articles: a) Mutual engagement 
not to use any part of the territory of Korea for 
strategical purposes nor to undertake on the coast 
of Korea any military works capable of menacing the 
freedom of navigation in the Korea Strait . b) Mutual 
engagement to consider that part of the territory of 
Korea lying to the north of the 39th parallel as a 
neutral zone into which neither of the contracting 
parties shall introduce troops . c) Recognition by 
Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being in all 
respects outside her sphere of influence . 13 
The next Japanese counter- proposals were handed 
over on 30 October and were a compromise. Japan 
suggested the establishment of a 50 kilometre neutral 
zone on both sides of the Korean frontier with Manchuria 
into which troops should not be sent . With regard to 
Manchuria , Japan was prepared to recognize Russia ' s 
commercial rights and special interests on the basis 
of the ' Mankan Kokan ' formula, but wished to have 
13 . Text in MacDonald to Lansdowne , No. 113, 2 Nov. 
1903, F . O. 46/568. 
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assurances about Japan ' s existing treaty rights there . 
Russ i a ' s reply was handed over in Tokyo on 11 December . 
Russia would not depart from her privileged position in 
Manchuria and made no concessions on Korea beyond those 
given to Japan in 1898 . Most of the text dealt with 
Korea , reintroducing the 39th parallel clause and the 
mutual agreement not to use any part of Korean territory 
for s trategical purposes . The Japanese answer followed 
on 23 December in a note verb ale, which asked the 
Russian government to reconsider its position on the 
. 14 
subJect . 
Britain had to consider the possibility that war 
might occur . Britain wanted to avoid doing anything to 
encourage the Japanese to go to war over Korea and 
Manchuria where she was much less hostile to Russia than 
they were , even while she was sympathetic to Japan . 
Britain had to reconcile the conflicting objectives of 
her European and Far Eastern diplomacy , to s upport its 
ally and to avoid alienating France and Russia . The 
British government had already made approaches from the 
spring of 1903 towards France , Russia ' s ally , in order 
to minimize the chances of future trouble with that country . 
14 . Malozemoff , Russian Far Eastern Policy , 1881- 1904 , 
pp . 240- 244 . 
But , if war came about , Britain and France might be 
dragged in under the terms of their respective alliances . 
If this were to be avoided , it was essential for Britain 
to pursue negotiations with France and not let relations 
with Russia deteriorate . On 11 December 1903 , Britain 
and France agreed that it was the duty of Britain and 
France to pour as much cold water as possible upon the 
embers and to exercise a moderating influence upon the 
disputants . 15 
Britain stood aloof from the developing crisis in 
the Far East . The Japanese made efforts to obtain some 
tangible sign of British sympathy , but without succes~ . 
On 29 December , Hayashi explained to Lansdowne the course 
of negotiations with Russia and inquired whethe r Japan 
might expect support from Britain in the event of war 
and in what d i rection . Lansdowne merely r eplied that 
the All i ance would not apply to a war between Japan and 
247 . 
Russia alone , and that Britain intended to follow a policy 
. l . t 1 6 of st r lct neut r a l y . 
15 . Lansdowne to Monson , 11 Dec . 1903 , in B. D. 
Vol. I I , No . 259 , p . 224 . 
16 . Lansdowne to MacDonald , Tel . 78 , 30 Dec . 1903 , 
F . O. 46/568 ; NGB . Vol . 36 , Pt . I , No . 51 . 
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Hayashi then suggested that Britain could help by 
means of a loan . The Japanes e were aware of the 
inadequacy of their financial resources for war . This 
proposal was also r e j ected by Lansdowne . 17 Britain 
decided that a loan to Japan would be as near as possible 
an act of war , and that she was already in considerable 
financial difficulties and must harvest her r esources 
18 in case she was brought into the war herself . However , 
the Japanese government , crippled by financial weakness , 
decided to ask Britain again for a loan on 24 December , 
and , on New Year ' s . Day, Hayashi passed over a message . 
It stated that Japan would feel more secure if the British 
government could offer financial assistance before the 
war broke out , and if Japan was successful in the war , 
the results of her efforts would be equally shared by 
. " . . 19 
all those wlth commerclal lnterests ln Manchurla . 
Lansdowne did not clos e the door completely but he held out 
little hope either of giving Japan a loan from government 
20 
sources or of guaranteeing a private .loan . In the 
fac e of repeated appeal the Japanese were told of Britain ' s 
inability to off er financial aid in any form . 21 While 
17 . Lansdowne to MacDonald , Tel . 7e , 30 Dec . 1903 , 
F.O . 46/ 568 ; Lansdowne to MacDonald , 31 Dec . 
1903 , F . O. 46 / 564 . 
18 . B. Dugdale , Arthur James Balfour , First Earl of 
Balfour , 2 Vols. London , 1936 , Vol . II , pp . 376-
383 . 
19. NGB . Vol . 36 , Pt . I , No . 51 . 
20 . Lansdowne to MacDonald , 1 Jan . 1904 , F .O. 46/576 . 
21 . A. Chamberlain to Lansdowne , 4 Jan. 1904 , 
F . O. 46/585 . 
they were not convinced that Britain could not get the 
money if she really wished to do so , the Japanese gave 
up the idea of securing a loan with a British government 
22 guarantee . Britain ' s decision was made not only for 
economic but also for political reasons . Britain wanted 
to avoid giving the impression that she was departing 
from neutrality and offering active encouragement to 
Japan . 23 
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In the meantime , on 6 January 1904 , Russian Minister 
Rosen passed over the third Russian counterproposals to 
Komura : Russia would admit Japan ' s position in Korea 
provided Japan would agree not to fortify the northern 
border , but in Manchuria Russia would practically exclude t he 
Japanese in common with all foreigners , and Russia would 
not renew the pledge to respect the integrity of China . 
The J apanese gover nment resolved that Russia had made no 
adequate concession over Korea but had even refused to 
enter into negotiations over Manchuria , and decided to 
. . t 24 send Russla an ultlma urn . 
22 . MacDonald to Lansdowne , 14 Jan . 1904 , F . O. 46/577 ; B. D. 
Vol . II , No . 268- 9. 
23. Lansdowne to MacDonald , 6 Jan . 1904 , F . O. 46/576 . 
24 . NGB . Vol . 37 , Pt . I . No . 44 . 
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On 13 January , the f ourth and last Japanese 
proposals were given to Rosen at Tokyo , which indicated 
that these were final conditions . The proposals called 
for the suppression of the Article concerning the neutral 
zone and the elimination from the Russian counterproposal 
of the clause ' not to use any part of Korean territory 
for strategic purposes '. On 3 February , the Japanese 
Cabinet with five Genro present discussed the situation 
and decided to wage war against Russia . On the following 
day, at the imp erial council,the decision receive d imperial 
sanction . On 5 February , Admiral Togo r ece ive d orders to 
begin operations , and on 6 February Japan broke off 
diplomatic relations with Russia . On 8 February , the 
Japanese naval squadrons attacked Russian fle et in Port 
Arthur , and on 10 Feb ruary the Japanese imperial r escript 
declaring war was issued . 25 
Britain did nothing at this stage because Japan 
was absolutely opposed to intervent i on . The Japanes e 
conside r ed the issues at stake to be confine d to Russia 
and Japan and that Russia was trying to build up an alliance 
of European Powers against Japan , as in 1895 . The 
Japanese government issue d an official statement of 
25 · NGB.Vol.37,Pt.I. Nos.45,117-23; 
Agreements , pp . 52 - 3 . 
Korea : Treat i es and 
policy on mediation: Japan would not agree to 
mediation at this juncture,sinc e Russia , in seeking or 
accepting good offices , did so only for the purpose of 
gaining time in order to strengthen and consolidate her 
position in the Far East without any desire to come to a 
complete and permanent unde rstanding on the questions . 
Any offer of mediation had to be made in the face of 
this explicit statement . Britain took the line that 
she would assist only if desired to do so by Japan and 
the Japanese never asked Britain for such helP . 26 
26 . Lansdowne to MacDonald , 5 Jan. 1904 , F . O. 46/576 . 
251 . 
(2) The Russo - Japanese War 
By January 1904 , the position of Korea had 
become desperate. At Seoul the Russians were 
intriguing to neutralize the country as a bulwark against 
Japanese aspirations and encouraging Korea to seek 
international acceptance for such a policy . 
Simultaneously , the Japanese were trying desperately 
to achieve a t ~aty foundation for the special position 
they claimed in Korea , an endeavour in which they were 
successful only after the war had begun . Meanwhile , 
guards were reaching Seoul to protect foreign nationa ls 
and interests and a Japanese descent on the Korean 
coast was expected at any time . It was in these circum-
stances that Korea made a last desperate appeal for 
support for her projected neutralization . The appeal 
was dated 21 January 1904 and was transmitted to Japan 
as well as the Western Powers . Transmitting messages 
to the West was difficult since the Japanese controlled 
the telegraph lines within the country , so it was trans -
mitted through the French Minister from Chefoo in China . 
However , the response from the Western Powers was 
. .. 1 lndeclslve . 
1 . For the text of the Korean neut r al i ty declaration , 
see N G B. Vo 1 . 37 , Pt . I , No . 332 . 
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Finally ~ on 8 February 1904 ~ the Russo - Japanese 
war broke out and the Japanese won a first naval 
encounter in Korean waters outside Inchon harbour . At 
the same time ~ the Japanese attacked the Russian fleet 
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in Port Arthur and succeeded in disabling the Russian 
ships and bottling up the whole squadron. Soon after ~ 
Japanese troops landed on Korean soil and advanced 
northward consolidating their supply lines by constructing 
a railway from Pusan to Wiju . This occurred despite the 
Korean declaration of neutrality of 21 January . 
The Japanese rapidly gained military control of 
Ko r ea and the government in Seoul soon had to accept 
Japanese demands . On 17 February ~ Ito r eached Seoul ~ 
and ~ on 23 February ~ a Protocol was signed ; that 
permitted Japan to take measures to combat any threat to 
Korea caused by foreign aggression or by an internal 
disturbance ; Korea was obliged to provide full facilities 
to the Japanese army and to allow Japanese occupation of 
such places as might be necessary for strategic purposes . 
The Protocol of February 23 was a first cautious step 
toward the e rasure of Korea as a national state. However ~ 
Article III expressed the view still necessary at this 
early stage of the war : ' The Imperial government of 
Japan definitively guarantees the independence and 
territorial integrity of the Korean Empire '. Nevertheless ~ 
at the same time ~ the Protocol also obliged Korea to accept 
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Japanese political control over the Korean government 
in two important areas : concerning internal affairs , Ko rea 
was obliged to place full confidence in the Japanese 
government and accept advice and assistance in improving 
its administration (Article I) . Furthermore , concerning 
fore ign affairs , Korean free dom of action was circumscribed 
by the stipulation that arrangements with third Powers 
that were contrary to the principles of the present 
Protocol were not to be made except by the mutual consent 
of both Korea and Japan . This provision prevented Korea 
from seeking any outside assistance in an attempt to defy 
2 Japan . 
At this stage , it might be mentioned that there 
appeared to be two alternative views of the Russo- Japanese 
War . The first sees the conflict as being about Korea 
and Manchuria and having little r e f e r ence to European 
affairs . It sees the Far Eastern problem as over-
shadowing all other issues and becoming the touchstone 
of European and international inter- state relations . 
The second view sees the Russo - Japanese War as having its 
roots in Europe and as being an extens ion , involving 
Japan in European conflicts of interest . It sees the 
Russo - Japanese War as the ~ack- door ' of European politics 
2 . T ext inN G B, Vo 1 . 3 7 , Pt . I , No . 383 ; 
Jordan (Seoul) to Lansdowne , Tel. 107 , 19 May 
1904, F . O. 17/1661; ~K_o_r~e_a_:~T~r~e~a~t_l_' e_s __ a~n __ d
Agreements , pp . 36- 7. 
and lay s stress on the existence of a struggle between 
two Power alignments : a Franco- Russo- German bloc 
vs . Anglo- Japanese - American bloc . One might argue that 
these differences are really a matter of stress and 
emphasis and that the need is to attempt to examine the 
internat:ional web as a whole . 3 
Whereas during the Sino- Japanese War Britain had 
attempted mediation to restore peace , she did not do so 
in response to the Russo - Japanes e War and the Japanese 
occupation of Korea . Her position of neutrality was 
strongly influenced by her conclusion of an agreement 
with France on 8 April 1904. 
The significance of the Anglo - French Entente for 
its two partners lay in their r espect ive needs for 
security . In the case of Britain this had been forcibly 
brought to her attention during the Boer War , which had 
revealed Britain to be without a genuine friend among 
the States of Europe . The British went out to meet the 
growing danger with a triple plan . They would make the 
alliance with Japan , they would come to an agreement with 
3 . William A. Langer , The Diplomacy of Imperialism , 
1890- 1902 , New York , Alfred A. Knopf , 1935 , 
Vol . 1 , p . 385 ; T . Dennett , Roosevelt and the 
Russo - Japanese War , Massachusetts , Peter Smith , 
1959 , p . 9 . 
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France , and they would work as rapidly as possible for 
an~reement with Russia . When this plan was accomplished 
two Triplicates of Powers would offset each other : the 
Triple Alliance of Germany , Austria , and Italy would be 
faced by Britain , France , and Russia . After the Anglo -
German Agreement of 16 October 1900 , which soon failed 
in its purpose and revealed the movement of German policy 
away from Britain , Germany appeared to have concluded that 
she could gain more by pushing Russia into the Far East 
than by joining with Britain and Japan to oppose her . 
Germany was actively as well as passively opposed to 
Britain . The ambitious German navy was seeking practical 
equality with that of Britain . The only practical 
alternative for Britain was France with whom negotiations 
had been commenced in the Spring of 1903 . Moreover , in 
the early stages of the Russo - Japanese war there was a 
reasonable doubt that Japan would win . Britain might , 
therefore , be forced to intervene to prevent the 
deterioration of her entire Far Eastern position . From 
this point of view , France loomed as moderating influence 
against a vindictive Russia . Like Britain , France wanted 
to avoid being drawn into a possible war and was seeking 
guarantees against both the weakening and strengthening 
of Russia , although France ' s interest in an Entente had its 
roots in her policy of counterbalancing the Powers and of 
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promoting her external expansion , particularly in 
Morocco . For the prosecution of French plans in 
North Africa , par.ticularly in Morocco , an agreement 
with Britain became necessar y . Now Russia ' s involve-
ment in a war in the Far East deprived France of a 
support upon which she had long depended . So came 
the Anglo- French Entente . The Anglo- French Entente 
dealt with a widely scattered collection of geographical 
localities representing points of existing and potential 
discord between the signatories . The main focus of 
the agreement , however , was in North Africa . Britain ' s 
primary interest in Egypt and France ' s in Morocco were 
clearly defined and recognized. But the terms had to 
be carefully limited . On the one hand , France was 
allied to Russia . and , on the other , Britain was allied 
to Japan , and now Russia and Japan were at war . There -
fore , while the Entente was concerned exclusively with 
colonial matters , and reached as far as the borders of 
Siam , it completely ignored China and Korea . Indeed , 
the agreement contained no r eference to the current war , 
but , in so far as it removed causes of tension between 
Britain and France , it made both countries even less keen 
to take part in the war and thus had the effect of com-
bining the war to the two contestants . 4 
4. NGB . Vol . 37 , Part II , Nos . 1260- 5 ; J . A. White , 
The Diplomacy of the Russo - Japanese War , Princeton 
Univ. Press , 1964 , pp . 170- 184 ; T . Dennett , 
Roosevelt and the Russo - Japanese War , pp . 42- 61 ; 
George Monger , The End of Isolation , London , 
Thomas Nelson , 1963 , pp . 104 - 163 . 
Meanwhile , as has been mentioned at the outbreak 
of the War , part of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur was 
severely damaged and the rest contained . The Japanese 
attack at Port Arthur continued , supported by land as 
well as sea forces . At the same time, the Japanese 
victory in the first land battle on the Yalu resulted 
In the exclusion of Russia from Korea and the penetration 
of Japan into Manchuria . With this victory on the Yalu 
and the landing of Japanese forces on the Manchurian 
coast , including the Kuantung Peninsula , the Japanese 
began the preparations for the isolation of Port Arthur . 
As the course of the war was favourable enough 
for Japan to consider taking a further and more audacious 
step , the Japanese Cabinet met on 31 May and formulat ed 
a fundamental policy regarding Korea . The objective 
was the gradual establishment of protectorate rights over 
Korea with the ultimate goal of bringing Korea unde r the 
sovereign control of Japan . This had to be done in such 
a way as to avoid arousing , if possible , ei ther internal 
rebellion or the suspicions or objections of the other 
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Powers . This objective was to be carried out by gradually 
gaining control of the administration as well as the 
broader areas of Korean life . Japan would seek control 
over the political , economic , military , and diplomatic 
affairs of Korea , and as a first step seek to obtain the 
direction of all means of communication . In other words , 
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Japan was to establish a de facto protectorate . Also 
decided at this meeting were specific steps to implement 
the above objectives : The military occupation of Korea 
would continue even afte r the conclusion of peace with 
Russia ; Korea ' s conduct of foreign affairs would be 
subject to Japanese supervision and veto , and Japan would 
make the Korean government hire an adviser for foreign 
affairs who would in turn take his orders from the Japanese 
Foreign Office ; Korea would employ a Japanese adviser 
on financial affairs ; Japan would construct and manage 
major railway lines and the telecommunications system and 
would encourage her farmers to emigrate to Korea ; It 
would also acquire additional forest , mining and fishery 
concessions in Ko r ea . 5 
This decision was put into operation by an Agreement 
signed on 19 August , whereby Korea was to employ advisers 
on financial and foreign affairs as recommended by the 
Japanese government . The former post was occupied by a 
Japanese natimal and the latter by a national of a third 
Power . 6 TanetarO Megata , head of the Bureau of Revenue 
of the Japanese Ministry of Finance , was appointed as the 
Financial Adviser , and he immediately began to take 
measures looking toward Japanese- Korean economic unity . 
5 . NGB . Vol . 37 , Pt . I , No. 390. 
6 . Text in NGB , Vol . 37 , Pt . I , No. 410; Korea : 
Treaties and Agreements , pp . 37- ~ . 
One of his first steps was the withdrawal of the old 
Korean coins from circulation and the minting of new 
ones which would correspond with the Japanese currency 
system . Late in 1904 , an American employee in the 
Japanese legation in Washington , Durham W. Stevens , was 
appointed by the Japanese government as the adviser to 
the Korean Foreign Office . 7 
Japan ' s special concern over the possibility of 
Korea ' s secret dealings with foreign Powers was 
manifested in another Agreement on 22 August 1904 . 
The new Agreement stipulated that Korea would consult 
the Japanese government in advance in concluding treaties 
and conventions with foreign Powers and in dealing with 
other important diplomatic affairs , such as the granting 
of concessions to or contracts with foreigners . S In 
short , by these agreements Japan was permitted to control 
Korea ' s financial and diplomatic affairs . 
Meanwhile , in August , the Russian fleet in Port 
Arthur made an attempt to escape but was thrown back with 
five of its six battleships seriously damaged . In late 
August and early September , the Japanese again won a 
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major land victory at Liaoyang in Manchuria . Subsequently 
7 . Lansdowne to MacDonald , No. 151 , 26 Sept . 1905 , 
S. 
F . O. 46/590 ; Hulbert , The Passing of Korea , pp . 20S - 9; 
Conroy , The Japanese Seizure of Korea , pp . 450- 1 ; 
Nelson , Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia , 
pp . 254 - 5 . 
Text in NGB . Vol . 37 , Pt . I , Nos . 
Lansdowne to MacDonald , 26 Sept. 
417-8; 
1905 , F . O. 46/590 . 
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there were no less than six other battles around Port 
Arthur . 
At this stage , the major danger for Japanese sea 
power was that the Russian fleet would be augmented from 
Europe . The Russian Black Sea Fleet might be moved 
through the Dardanelles . Even before the war had 
broken out , when Hayashi had asked what Britain would 
do if this happened , Lansdowne had replied that he could 
not give a specific undertaking but that he would certainly 
regard such an action as a grave violation of treaty 
engagements . 9 The .J.EB.S t Britain could do would be to 
refuse the Russian ships coaling facilities and to deny 
them the right of using the Suez Canal . Britain had 
decided that if Russia showed signs of preparing to 
move the Black Sea Fleet , Britain would hamper its 
.. . . th 10 partlclpatlon In e war . 
Howeve r , the progress of the Baltic Fleet which had 
set off for the Far East on 15 October was in a different 
category . The British government decided that it would 
refuse to grant coaling facilities to these ships , but , 
on the other hand , Britain realized that nothing could be 
9 . Lansdowne to MacDonald , No . 12 , 11 Jan . 1904 , 
F . O. 46/576 . 
10 . Lansdowne to Scott , 30 Jan . 1904 , in B . D., Vol. 
II , No . 285 , pp . 241 - 2 ; Ibid . , Vol. IV Nos . 41 - 60 
pp . 48 - 68 . 
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done to prevent the ships making for the Far East . The 
Baltic Fleet continued on its way , creating international 
tension whenever it came near land . On the evening of 
21- 22 October , the Dogger Bank Incident took place . 
On entering the North Sea , the Baltic Fleet encountered 
some small British fishing craft of the Hull fishing fle et 
in the Dogger Bank area . They were mistakenly taken for 
Japanese torpedo boats and fired upon . One ship sank and 
others were damaged , causing several deaths . The Russian 
ships continued on their way without pauslng to pick up 
the Bri tish survivors , and through the Straits of Dover 
and finally halted at Vigo in Spain . This incident 
caused serious international complications . Britain 
decided that , unless Russia gave satisfactory assurances , 
the British navy would prevent the Russian fleet from 
proceeding to the Far East . The Channel fleet and all 
available destroyers assembled at Gibraltar . ll The 
Russian fle et 'was in fact bottled up by the British fleet 
in Vigo harbour , a situation which might well have led to 
war . However , despite naval and public opinion which would 
have favoured a battle , the British government had no wish 
f or a show- down with Russia . The Russian government 
11 . B . D. Vol . IV , Nos . 5- 40 , pp . 5- 48 . 
promptly expressed its regret for the Incident and 
promised financial reparations on a liberal scale . It 
was jointly agreed that the case be referred to an 
international court of inquiry under the Hague 
. 12 Conventlon . However , the entire situation was 
soon transformed by the course of the war . Since 
Port Arthur was the only port in the Far East to which 
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the Baltic Fleet could safely go , all depended on whether 
it would fall before the new fleet could reach it . It 
was defended with great stubbornness and at the end of 
November the Japanese army was ordered to take it no 
matter at what cost.1 3 On 1 January 1905 , the Russians 
surrendered to the Japanes e leaving Port Arthur in possession 
of Japan . The Baltic Fleet , without a base in Chinese 
waters , might now turn back . The Japanese were now winning 
the war . The Battle of Mukden , the capital of Manchuria , 
began on 23 February , and ended in the complete rout of 
the Russian forces on 10 March . While the war at sea could 
not be decided until the Baltic Fleet was defeated , the 
capture of Mukden gave Japan a victory which might lead 
the way to peace- making . At about the same time the internal 
12 . J.A . White , The Diplomacy of the Russo - Japanese War , 
pp . 179 - 184 ; A. S . Hershey , The International Law 
and Diplomacy of the Russo- Japanese War , N. Y. 1906 , 
pp . 235 - 24 5; B. D., Vol . IV , Nos. 5- 40 . 
13 . MacDonald to Lansdowne , 23 Nov . 1904 , F . O. 46/579 . 
discontent in Russia burst into the open . The Czar was 
forced to promise re f or ms on 28 December , but could not 
ally the discontent which fermented by Bloody Sunday on 
22 January , grew until it reached the dimensions of a 
revolution . Moreover , despite their victories , the 
Japanese military leaders were also aware of their own 
shor tage of men and munitions and were in favour of 
14 peace . 
Four different methods of peacemaking were 
advocated : an internatfunal conference ; mediation through 
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Bri tain and France , the allies of the belligerents ; mediation 
by the United States ; and direct negotiation between Russia 
and Japan . Both Japan and Russia feared intervention , and 
a direct negotiation between the two belligerents through 
the mediation of a neutral seemed most desirable . In 
November 1904 , Theodore Roosevelt had been re- elected as 
the American President , and was keen to take on these tasks . 
The fall of Port Arthur and the uprisings in Russia seemed 
to create an atmosphere suitable for mediation . But the 
Japanese were still unwilling and the possibility of 
mediation continued to be discussed intermittently in 
February without either of the belligerents seriously calling 
14 . MacDonald to Lansdowne , No . 84 , 24 March 1905 , 
F . O. 46 / 591 . 
for peace . After the Battle of Mukden , on 21 April , 
the Japanese Cabinet decided to seek a favourable peace 
through American mediation and requested the President ' s 
good offices on 25 April. 15 
Meanwhile , in Korea , as the Japane se enforced 
their aggressive policies , they were meeting resistance 
from the Korean people . While the governmental r eo r -
ganization aroused the upper levels of Ko r ean society , 
the colonization and other economic measures aroused 
other groups of the population as well . Pe rsonal 
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property was seized and severe punishments for resistance 
were meted out by Japanese military courts . Discontent 
and disorder began to spread . Japan h e ld a tight military 
control over Korea . The Japane s e army and navy occupied 
and constructed many military establishments th~oughout 
the country . The Japanese gendarmes began to exercise 
police power in suppressing any anti - Japanese agitation . 
Japanese policemen were assigned to supervise the Korean 
police organization at national and provincial levels . 
Simultaneously , the Korean troops were , in the name of 
budgetary economy , reduced to six battalions and three 
companies , with 311 Officers and 8 , 214 men . 16 
15. Roosevelt to Taft , 27 Apr . 1905 , in E . E . Morison , 
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt , Cambridge , 
1951 , 8 Vols . Vol . IV , No . 1165. 
16 . NGB. Vol. 37, Pt.!, Nos. 574-584, 690-734; Vol. 38, Pt.I, Nos.696- 738 ; 
First General Report on Korean Finance, enclosed in Morgan to Root, 
27 Nov.1905, The U.S. Dept. of State, Korea:Dispatches, 22. 
) 
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Having driven the Russians out of Korea and having 
brought the entire peninsula under her military control , 
the Japanese on 1 April 1905 forced another Agreement 
on Korea that gave Japan the desired control over the 
telephone , telegraph , and postal facilities . 17 This 
was followed on 16 May by an Agreement which permitt e d 
Japan complete freedom of navigation in all the coastal 
d . f 18 an lnland waters 0 Korea . 
On 27 - 28 May , the major actions of the war closed 
in the great naval battle of Tsushima with a complete 
victory for the Japanese fleet under the command of 
Admiral Togo. The result of this great battle was the 
annihilation of the Russian fleet. The battle was the 
CUlmination of Japanese victories which had been 
altering the world balance of naval power . Russia ceased 
to be an effective force at sea , while Britain regained a 
position of superiority at sea which she had not enjoyed 
since the 1880 ' s . For Britain , the Japanese victories 
solved not only her problems in the Far East but also 
the strain on her navy which had beset the British 
government for many years . 
17 . Korea : Treaties and Agreements , pp . 38 - 40 . 
18 . Ibid ., pp . 44 - 5 ; NGB , Vol. 3~ , Pt . I , Nos . 216-230. 
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The movement to bring the belligerents together 
for peace discussions was resumed immediately after the 
Battle Tsushima . On 31 May , Komura formally requested 
Roosevelt to undertake mediation . On 8 June , Roosevelt 
issued formal invitations to the belligerents , and Japan 
and Russia accepted the invitation on 10 and 12 June 
. 19 
respectlvely . 
One of the major r easons that made both Russia and 
Japan seek peace was financial difficulties . By this 
time , both countries were exhausted and Japan , espec ially , 
had great financial difficulties . During the war Japan 
had rais ed several loans from Western syndicates . In 
May 1904 , the Japanese reached an arrangement with a 
London syndicate , consisting of Parrs Bank and the Hong 
Kong Shanghai Bank , and a New York syndicate , consisting 
of Kuhn Loeb and the National City Bank , to rais e a loan 
of £10 million at 6 per cent interest . In tb vember , the 
Japanese again signed the contract for a second loan of 
£12 million at 6 per cent with the same Anglo- American 
syndicate as before . Shortly after the Battle of Mukden , 
19 . NGB . Vols . 37 and 38 , Supplement on the Russo-
Japanes e War , Pt V, No . 207 ; Roosevelt to Lodge , 
5 and 16 June 1905 , H. C. Lodge , Selections from 
the Correspondenc e of Theodore Roosevelt and 
Henry Cabot Lodge ) 1884- 1918 , New York , 1925 , 2 
Vols . Vol . II , pp . 130- 131 . 
ln March 1905 , a further loan was arranged between the 
Yokohama Specie Bank and the Anglo - American syndicate 
for £30 million at 4~ per cent . Later the German 
bankers , supported by their government , tried to break 
the monopoly of loan operations . In July 1905 , a 
fourth loan of £30 million at 4~ per cent , in which 
Britain , America and Germany shared , was concluded . 
The British government was careful to avoid offering 
any active assistance in raising these loans , which it 
treated as a commercial transaction . However , without 
such financial help from Britain , though it was not a 
British government aid , the Japanese could not have 
financed the war . 20 
The Portsmouth Conference started on 10 August 
between Witte as the Russian Plenipotentiary and Komura 
as the Japanese representative . There were twelve 
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sessions of the conference and a few private conversations 
between Witte and Komura . The issues discussed and 
tentatively settled in the first eight conferences , up to 
18 August , were : 1) peace and amity between Russia and 
20 . MacDonald to Lansdowne , 25 Nov. 1906, 
F . O. 371/85 . 
Japan ~ 2) Japan ' s place in Korea ~ 3) the evacuation 
and restoration of Manchuria ; 4) the freedom of China 
to take measures to develop the commerce and industry of 
Manchuria ; 5) the transfer of the leased area from 
Russia to China, subject to the consent of China ~ 6) 
the transfer of the greater part of the southern section 
of the Ch inese Eastern Railway and the mining concessions 
to Japan , Russia retaining the Chinese Eastern Railway , 
that is , the segment of the Trans - Siberian system in 
northern Manchuria which provided a short cut to Vladivostock ~ 
7) mutual engagement not to expbit the Manchurian railways 
for strategical purposes ; 8) agreement to enter into a 
separate convention for the regulation of railway 
services. However , it was always extremely doubtful 
from the start up to the last moment , whether the conference 
would succeed . Neither antagonist was completely committed 
to peace and there were groups in each country determined 
to obstruct peace if it required too great a sacrifice . 2l 
The British government was trying to encourage 
Roosevelt , but there were times when America had to be 
warned of Britain ' s responsibilities towards Japan . 
Britain was opposed to encouraging America to force on 
21 . J . A. White , The Diplomacy of the Russo - Japanese 
War , Appendix 2 , Issues Discussed at the Portsmouth 
Conference , pp . 359 - 364 . 
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Japan a solution not of her own choosing . No official 
advice was given by Britain to the Japanese about the 
settlement . Japan had to act for herself and independently . 
Britain contented herself with a passive role in the peace-
making because she felt that the less interference by outside 
Powers the better for Japan . Britain was sometimes 
criticized by Roosevelt for he r lack of co - operation 
in the cause of peace . Britain might have thought that 
her true interests would be better served by the war con-
tinuing until Russia was fully exhausted . 22 
The fundamental iss ues confronting the Portsmouth 
Conference were those pertaining to Korea and Manchuria , 
two places long associated with one of the principal 
fulcrums of power in the Far East and with the sources of 
discord that led to the Russo - Japanese War . Moreover , 
Korea and Manchur ia were the specific issues over which 
the military forces had contended and their relative 
pos i tions might , consequently , be expected to be largely 
determined by the outcome of the war . 
The Korean question was discussed at the Po r tsmou th 
Conference on 12 August . The Russian counter- proposals 
had already given gene r al approval to the Japanese demand : 
' The Imperial government , recognizing that Japan possesses 
22 . B . D. Vol . IV , Nos . 81- 2 , p . 86 ; E . E . Morison , 
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt , Vol . V, No . 3671 ; 
H. F . Beale , Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of 
Amer i ca to Wo r l d Powe r , The Johns Hopkins Pr ess , 
1956 , p . 303 . 
ln Korea preponderant political , military and economic 
interests , are ready to engage neither to obstruct nor 
interfere with the measures of direction , protection and 
control which Japan may consider it necessary to take in 
Korea .' In spite of this seemingly complete agreement , 
there were some strong reservations on the part of 
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Russia . The Russian delegation made an attempt to 
include in the treaty a guarantee for the sovereign rights 
of Ko r ea . Russia contended that the sovereignty of 
Korea ought to be recognized and that whatever measures 
were taken by Japan in Korea ought to be taken in full 
accord with the Korean government . Count Witte , the 
chief Russian delegate , confided to his Japanese counter-
part that Russia wished to avoid the onus of any collusion 
with Japan against the independence of Korea , and that 
the sovereignty of Korea was an international question , and that 
this sovereignty could not and should not be cancelled out 
by a bilateral act on the part of Russia and Japan , and 
that the principle of signing a treaty which violated 
the sovereignty of another country was one that Russia 
could not approve , and that unless the sovereignty of Korea 
were specifically recognized in a treaty , criticism could 
be expected from other nations . Japanese Foreign 
Minister , Komura Jutaro , representing his government at 
the peace conference , summarily r e jected Witte ' s proposal . 
On this occasion , Komura made a significant remark to the 
effect that Korea had already suffered a partial loss of 
her sovereign rights as a result of the agreements 
between Japan and Korea signed in 1904 . He argued 
that Japan could not agree to acknowledge Korean 
sovereignty as it had been hitherto , since Japan was 
al r eady in control of the foreign affairs of Korea , 
the sovereignty of the country was severely qualified , 
and that this issue was not mere formality but one 
touching on serious Japanese interests . A compromise 
was reached on the matter , and inst e ad of e ither fully 
recognizing Korean sovereignty in the treaty itself 
as the Russians had wished or avoiding any mention of 
it as the Japanese had hoped , it was de cided to express 
the Russian idea in the protocol only : ' The Japanes e 
Plenipot e ntiaries declare that it is understood that the 
measures which Japan may find it ne cessary to take in 
Korea in the future and which impair the sovere ignty 
of that country will be taken in accord with the Korean 
government .' 23 
23 . NGB . Vols . 37 and 38 , Supplement on the Russo -
Japanese War , Pt . V, No~ 294, (pp. 315-538). 
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The second issue concerning Korea was the rights 
that Russia and Russian subjects would enjoy in Korea 
under the new dispensation . The Russian demand for 
most favoured nation treatment was accepted by Japan : 
' It is understood that Russian subjects will be treated 
in exactly the same manner as the subjects or citi zens 
of other foreign Powers , that is , they shall be on the 
same footing as the subjects or citizens of the most 
favoured nation ' . 24 
The third issue was one that had been one of the 
irritants between the two countries before the war . It 
was the f ear that military development on a joining 
territory by one country should present a threat to the 
other . The freedom of action that Japan had reserved 
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for herself to take such measures of guidance , protection , 
and control in Korea as she deemed necessary , increas e d 
Russian fears . In the end , this matter was also the 
subject of a compromise expressed as follows in the same 
Annex to the Protocol that dealt with the most favoured 
nation question : ' It is further understood that , in 
order to remove all causes of misunderstanding , Japan 
and Russia will mutually abstain from taking measures on 
24 . Ibid 
the Russo - Korean frontier , which might menace the 
security of Russian or Korean territory . , 25 
In the final course of the meetings , a sudden 
disagreement raised the danger of a prolongation of the 
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war . Russia and Japan were in almost hopeless disagree -
ment over the questiorn of indemnity and the cession of 
Sekhalin , which Hardinge , the British Minister in 
St . Petersburg , warned Lansdowne would make a settlement 
impossible if the Japanese pressed it . 26 But Lansdowne 
continued to remain in the background and refused to bring 
pressure on Japan . Even a direct appeal from Roosevelt 
failed to move him . He argued that British advice 
would not be taken and would be resented by the Japanes e . 27 
After Roosevelt proceeded to bring pressures on 
both sides , the agreement was finally reached on 29 
August . It was agreed that Sekhalin should be divided 
into two , with the 50th parallel as the boundary , without 
indemnity being paid . The Treaty of Portsmouth was 
25 . I b id .~ 
~details , see the useful Appendices in J . A. 
White , The Diplomacy of the Russo - Japanese War , pp . 349 -
378 , Appendix 1) Russo - Japanese Diplomatic Exchanges , 
1901- 1904 ; Appendix 2) Issues Discussed at the 
Portsmouth Conference ; Appendix 3) Russo - Japanese War 
Chronology . 
26 . Hardinge to Lansdowne , Telegram No . 153 , 25 Aug . 
1905 , F . O. 65 / 1706 . 
27 . President Roose velt to Durand , 23 August 1905 , 
in B.D. Vol . IV , No . 97 , p . 104 . 
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then formally signed on 5 September 190 5 . 2 8 
The Treaty provided : 1) For recognition of 
Japan ' s paramount political , military and economic 
interest in Korea ; 2) For transfer of the rights 
of Russia in the Liaotung peninsula to Japan ; 3) That 
the Southern section of the Manchurian railway be ceded 
to Japan ; 4) That the portion of Sakhalin south of 
the 50th parallel be ceded to Japan ; 5) That Russia 
and Japan should withdraw their troops from Manchuria 
but retain railway guards ; 6) That neither Japan nor 
Russia should obstruct any general measures common to 
all countries which China may take for the development 
of the commerce and industry of Manchuria ; 7) That 
railways in Manchuria be exploited purely for commercial 
and industrial , and in no way for strategical purposes 
except in the Liaotung peninsula . 
The peace , by ceding to Japan the lease of 
Port Arthur and recognizing her exclusive control over 
Korea , imposed a decisive check on Russia ' s ambitions 
in the Far East, and the international situation in the 
Far East was fundamentally changed . After biding 
their time for ten years since the ' Triple Intervention ', 
the Japanese had driven the Russians out of the Liaotung 
28 . Text in Korea : Treaties and Agreements , pp . 46 - 52 ; 
BD. Vol . IV , No . 101 , pp . 107- 111 . 
peninsula , and in reality Korea was arbitrarily awarded 
to Japan as a means of settling the Russo - Japanese 
War . The War brought Japan into the international 
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arena as one of the great world Powers and it also brought 
an end to Korea ' s sovereignty which was finally , formally 
lost later in 1910 . 
One of the most important factors which 
contributed to the Japanese victory over Russia was the Anglo -
Japanese Alliance . Although Britain had kept strict 
neutrality , without the Alliance Japan could not carry 
out her aggressive policy in the Far East , let alone 
her victory over Russia in the war . Furthermore , the 
Anglo - Japanese Alliance partly paved the way for the 
eventual Japanese annexation of Ko rea . In the second 
Anglo - Japanese Alliance , which had been negotiated between 
two countries during the war , confirmed the ' free hand ' 
of Japan in Korea . 
Since the ' Triple Intervention ' of 1895 , Japan had 
been working for her freedom of action in Korea . By 
the late autumn of 1905 , after the victory over Russia , 
the danger of foreign interference with the Japanese 
plans in Korea seemed to have been eliminated . By the 
Treaty of Portsmouth Russia was removed from the Ko rean 
peninsula . China had already been eliminated from 
the Korean scene by the Treaty of Shimonoseki . Britain 
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and America had both become something short of allies 
of Japan . With this free hand recognized , Japan could now 
move towards her final step of the annexation of Korea . 
These developments were embodied not only in the 
Treaty of Portsmouth but also in the Taft- Katsura 
Memorandum which clari f ied the Ame r ican- Japanese relations , 
and also in the second Anglo - Japanese Alliance to which 
it is now necessary to give some attention . 
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(3) The Renewal of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance , 1905 
In early 1905 , Britain ' s international position 
in the Far East had been transformed . Her ally Japan 
was inflicting a series of crushing defeats on Russia , 
the foe she had most dreaded, and if France and Germany 
intervened to aid Russia it was likely that the United 
States would come to the support of Britain and Japan. 
None of this had been foreseen only a couple of years 
earlier . On the whole, the British now had a confidence 
about the future of the Far East which they had not felt 
for many years . It was at this time that they agreed 
to take a decisive step - the renewal of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance . Because of the rapid transformation 
wrought in the Far East by Japan ' s victories, the 
original Alliance was no longer wholly relevant, especially 
since it had guaranteed the independence of Korea , and 
required to be adjusted . Although the 1902 Treaty was 
not due to expire until 1907 , it was being discussed in 
Britain as early as the Spring of 1905 . 
One of the reasons which made an approach by 
Britain to Japan a matter of urgency was the fact that 
other Powers were courting the unexpectedly powerful 
Japan. There were worries that Japan would be persuaded 
to enter a Russo - German system . l Lansdowne brought the 
1. Hardinge to Lansdowne , No . 651 , 2 Dec . 1904 , 
F.O . 65 /1 682 . 
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subject before the Cabinet on 23 March , and on the following 
day he told the Japanese Minister in London , Hayashi , that , 
although it was perhaps unusual to anticipate the date 
set in the Treaty for a discussion of its renewal , he 
felt that immediate consideration was justified by the 
exceptional circumstances of the present case . He 
proposed that the alliance should be r enewed and hinted 
that it should also be extended in scope . 2 
On 8 April , the Japanese Cabinet agreed that 
its interests would be best served by the continuation 
of the alliance on the same lines as 1902 . It f elt 
that the Treaty did not require any change except for 
an adjustment to meet changed circumstances in Kor ea 
after the war . At the same Cabinet , Japan decided to 
assume protective rights in Korea and decisions were 
taken to bring political strategy into line with military 
strategy . It was therefore necessary for this Korean 
stipulation to be included in the new alliance and for 
Britain ' s approval to be obtained . 3 On 16 April , 
2 . 
3. 
Lansdowne to MacDonald , 24 Mar . 1905 , F . O. 46/673 ; 
NGB . Vol . 38 , Pt . I , No.1. 
NGB. Vol . 38 , Pt . I , No s . 10 , 250 . 
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Komura sent Hayashi telegrams , in which the most 
significant clause stated that it might be necessary 
for Japan to take steps to preserve her special 
political interests in Korea. The provision for 
Korean independence , which had been inserted in the 
1902 Treaty , was to be dropped , and all the safeguards, 
which Britain had included to ensure that she was not 
associated with any acquisition of Korean territory, were 
omitted. 4 
On 12 April , the Committe e of Imperial Defence 
discussed the subject , and the needs of the Indian frontier 
came up for discussion. Lansdowne informed the Cabinet 
on 3 May that the British idea of extending the scope of 
th e alliance had been explicitly rejected by the Japanese , 
and it was agreed to let the matter lie until the 
Japanese alter their views. 5 
On 25 May , the Japanese Cabinet, and subsequently 
the Genro and the Chiefs of Staff, decided to accept the 
British proposals , altering the present treaty to an 
offensive- defensive alliance and agreeing to extend the 
scope to cover India and countries to the east . 6 
4 . 
5. 
6. 
Ib i d ., Vo 1 . 38 , Pt . 1 , No. 1l. 
Lansdowne to MacDonald , No . 73 , 19 April ; 
No . 80 , 3 May ; No . 83 , 10 May 1905. 
F . O. 46/673. 
MacDonald to Lansdowne , Tel. 124, 25 May 
1905 , F . O. 46/673 . 
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On 26 May , Hayashi passed over the Japanese 
proposals , containing 6 Articles and 3 separate Articles 
of which the latter were to be kept secret. Clauses 
extended the scope of the agreement to apply to India 
and to cover an offensive- de fensive alliance . Japan 
also introduced two new clauses dealing with Korea : 
Article IV . The right of Japan to take such meas ures 
as she may deem right and necessary in order to safeguard 
her special political , military and economical interests 
in Corea is fully recognized by Britain. Special Separate 
Article III. In case Japan finds it necessary to estab lish 
a protectorate over Corea in order to check the aggressive 
action of any third Power and to prevent complications in 
connection with the foreign relations of Core a , Gr eat Bri t ain 
engages to support the action of Japan . These clauses 
were to be Japan ' s price for agreeing to Britain ' s 
wishes on the other points. 7 
Unlike in 1902, when Lansdowne had kept the 
negotiations a closely guarded secret , they were in 1905 
publicly discussed in advance . On 31 May , Lansdowne 
circulated a draft treaty to the Cabinet . Th e objects 
of the alliance were declared to be the preservation of 
China ' s int egrity and the maintenance of the open door 
throughout her Empire and the protect ion of the rights 
7. Lansdowne to MacDonald, 26 and 27 May 1905 , 
F.O. 46/673 ; NGB . Vol. 38 , Pt . I , No . 20 ; 
B. D. Vol . IV , No . 118 , pp . 128- 31. 
of the two Powers in Eastern and Southern Asia 
including not only their own possessions but also those 
areas contiguous to their own possessions . If , in 
defence of these objects , either Power was involved 
by agressive action in war , its ally would come to 
its aid . After the end of the war , each Power should 
endeavour to maintain at all times available for con-
centration in the Far East a naval force superior to 
that of any third Power. Unlike the Treaty of 1902 , 
the new arrangements met with no opposition , and the 
British proposals were presented to Hayashi on 
10 June . 8 
Britain had admitted that Korea might have to 
forfeit her independent status and that a protectorate 
under Japan seemed to be preferable to a corrupt Korean 
Court , rife with Russian intrigue . This was the 
general view of Britain ' s professional advisers in the 
area . 
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The British representative in Seoul , John Jordan 
had written to MacDonald , the British Minister in Tokyo : 
8. 
' but I feel certain that nothing short of 
a protectorate will ever save the situation 
here . In the interests of the Coreans 
Minute by Lansdowne 31 May , 5 June 1905 . 
F . O. 46/673 ; Lansdowne to MacDonald , No . 101 , 
10 June 1905 , F . O. 46/673 . 
themselves this is the only possible 
solution , and the people , as distinguished 
from the officials , would , I believe, 
infinitely prefer it to the Government 
they have had during the last ten years 
of nominal independence . , 9 
MacDonald also had told Lansdowne that 
' from my experience of the country and 
people I am entirely In accord with the 
views here put forward by Sir John J 0 rdan. 
But whether we are right or wrong a 
Japanese protectorate over Corea will 
certainly be established after the war ' . 10 
Britain sacrificed the Korean independence on the ground 
that she had had the opportunity to turn herself into a 
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modernized , independent state but had failed to introduce 
effective r efo rms . Since Korea , in her weakness seemed 
to be a ready victim for Russia , the Japanese were entitled 
to intervene more conspicuously. The Japanese gave up 
acknowledging Korea ' s territorial integrity and moved 
towards a policy of territorial expansion in the 
peninsula , while Britain accepted this change and tacitly 
9 . 
10 . 
Jordan ' s private letter to MacDonald , 
7 July 1905 , enclosed in MacDonald to 
Lansdowne , No . 188 , secret , 15 July 1905 , 
F . O. 46/673 . 
Ibid . 
supported Japanese ambitions there . The Anglo-
Japanese Alliance was transformed from an essentially 
benevolent instrument designed to maintain the status 
quo into something which condoned expansion . 
Nevertheless , it was likely that Japan would have 
gone ahead with her plans , even without British 
support. Japan ' s object was to secure a renewal of 
the Alliance which would specify Britain ' s recognition 
of her changed status in Korea , and since this was 
someth i ng which Britain wo uld only reluctantly concede , 
it would require some worthwhile concession from Japan . 
Britain ' s demands were only to be granted in return for 
her recognition of Japan ' s position in Korea . Japan 
stated that : 
11 . 
' As a Japanese protectorate of Korea 
after the war was absolutely essential 
to the future peace of Japan , the Japanese 
government had considered what quid pro quo 
they could offer to Great Britain in order 
to induce he r to acquiesce in such a 
protectorate and to nullify the 
declarations respecting the independence 
of Korea contained in the Preamble and 
11 Article I of the existing Agreement '. 
MacDonald to Lansdowne , No . 170 and 171 , 
8 July 1905 , F . O. 46/673 ; NGB . Vol . 38 , 
Pt . I , No . 19 . 
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After receiving the Japanese counter-
proposal of 6 July , the British Cabinet discussed 
the topic of Korea again on 11 July . The main 
problem was to define treaty rights . Britain had 
no desire to prevent Japan from obtaining a protectorate 
over Korea but was afraid that the rights which existing 
treaties conferred on other Powers were likely to be 
interfered with by the proposed protectorate. The 
British Cabinet discussed the issue again on 19 July 
and decided not to accept a treaty obligation to 
assist Japan in any quarrel arising out of existing 
treaty arrangements between Korea and other countries . 
On the same day , Lansdowne asked Hayashi for an under-
taking that the Article on Korea did not imply the 
adoption of any meas ures in violation of established 
treaty rights and Japan did not consider herself 
entitled to call upon Britain to come to her assistance 
in support of such measures . 12 Britain ' s object was 
not to pr ohibit Japan from violating established treaty 
rights but to ensure that it was not dragged into any 
quarrel which those rights might occasion . Britain 
was concerned about the effect of the Alliance , particu-
larly , on her relations with the United States . 13 
12 . 
13 · 
Lansdowne to MacDonald , No. 124 , 18 July 
1905 ; No . 125 , 19 July 1905 , F . O. 46/673 . 
Note by A. J . Balfour , 19 July 1905 , 
Ibid . 
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Britain was thinking not so much of her 
own treaty rights , since British commercial interests 
in Korea were minimal , but of the wider problems . 
Britain found it desirable to inform the United States 
of the forthcoming Alliance and to explain her particular 
difficulty. The British Ambassador in Washington , 
Sir Mortimer Durand , explained to Roosevelt at Oyster Bay 
on 3 August about the Alliance and assured him that 
Britain could not be compelled to go to war say with the 
United States in event of a violation of established 
. t 14 treaty rlgh s. 
On 28 and 29 July , Lansdowne revealed the 
Korean question to F . B. Loomis , the American Assistant 
Secretary of State , and Senator Lddge, Roosevelt ' s 
special adviser , who were then in London , and found them 
both strongly in favour of giving Japan a free hand there . 
He was assured by both of them that the United States 
would have no objection to the establishment of Japanese 
preponderance in Korea. Roosevelt was as much prepared 
to forego Korea as was Britain and was not unduly worried 
. 15 about her treaty rlghts . 
President Theodore Roosevelt had favoured Japanese 
control of Korea even before the Russo - Japanese war . 
As early as 1900 , Roos e velt had written to his German 
14 . 
15 . 
Lansdowne to Durand , No. 109 , 29 July 1905; 
Durand to Lansdowne , 4 Aug . 1905 , F . O. 46/673. 
Lansdowne to Durand , No. 195A , 31 July 1905 , 
F . O. 46 / 673 . 
friend , Speck von Sternburg , that he would like to see 
Japan have Korea because Japan deserved it in order to 
check Russia . In May 1904 , he again advised von 
Sternburg to inform the Kaiser that the United States 
16 
was willing to see Japan take Korea . In January 
1905 , when the Japanese Minister in Washington , 
Takahira , communicated Japan ' s wish to provide 
protection , supervision and guidance to Korea , he 
fully concurred , and he told the Japanese Minister 
that Japan had the right to place Korea under its 
sphere of influence . 17 ' We cannot possibly interfere 
for the Koreans against Japan . They could not strike 
one blow in their own defenc e ' , he wrote in a brief 
note to Secretary Hay on 28 January 1905 . 18 
Roosevelt informed Durand of Taft ' s 
inte rview with Kats ura in Tokyo in July 1905 . On 
16 . 
17 · 
18 . 
Howard Beal e , Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise 
of America to World Power , The Johns Hopkins 
Press , 1956 , p . 314 . 
Komura to Takahira , 22 Jan. 1905 ; Takahira ' s 
conve r sation with Roosevelt , 24 Jan . 1905 , in 
NGB . Vol. 37,38,Supp1ement, Pt.V,Nos.192-3. 
NGB . Supplement on the Russo - Japanese War , 
V, Nos. 186, 188; T . Dennet , 
Roosevelt and the Russo- Japanese War , p . 110 . 
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29 July 1905 , American War Secretary , William H. Taft , 
as a personal representative of President Rooseve lt 
and not as a member of the Department of Stat e , 
negotiated a secret Memorandum in Tokyo . I n the secret Memo -
randum , Katsura , the Japanese Premier , disavowed any aggressive 
Japanese designs against the Philippines and emphasi zed 
Japan ' s resolve that a complete solution of the Korean 
question should be made as the logical conseque nc e of 
the war . Taft admitted the justness of Katsura ' s 
comments and remarked that: 
' the establishment by Japanes e troops of 
a suzerainty over Kore a to the extent of 
requiring that Korea enter into no forei gn 
treaties without the cons e nt of Japan was 
the logical result of the present war and 
would directly contribute to permane nt 
peace in the East '. 19 
Roosevelt completely confirmed Taft ' s stat e ment . The 
United States approved Japan ' s suzerainty over Korea in 
return for a Japanese disavowal of any aggressive intentions 
towards the Philippines . 
Katsura also suggested that America should join 
the Anglo - Japanese Alliance . He r e commended a good 
19 . Text in NGB. Vol . 38 , Pt . I , Nos . 18 9- 1 9 3 , 
Dennet , Roosevelt and the Russo -
Japanese War , pp . 112 - 4. Beal e Roosevelt 
and the Rise of America to World Power , p . 
157 . 
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understanding between the three governments of Japan , the 
United States and Great Britain in the Far East . Katsura 
well understood the traditional policy of the United 
States in this respect and perceived fully the impossibility 
of their entering into a formal alliance of such a nature 
with foreign nations , but suggested some good understanding 
or an alliance in practice , if not in name . Taft told 
Katsura that this was impossible and Roosevelt did not 
hold out any hope that any active identification of the 
United States with the Alliance was possible. 20 To 
assert that the Taft - Katsura Agreement made the United 
States an unsigned member of the Anglo - Japanese Alliance 
might be valid only in that the United States , like 
Britain , had given way before the imperialist ambitions 
of Japan on the Continent of Asia in order to secure its 
own imperial Asiatic possessions elsewhere . 
As all the information that Britain had gathered 
led to the impression that Roosevelt was prepared to 
accept the disappearance of the Korean Sovereignty , 
Britain carne to the conclusion that there was not much 
likelihood of her being tied to Japan in a quarrel with 
the United States over treaty rights in Korea . More -
20 . NGB . Vol . 38 , Pt . I , Nos . 189 - 193 
• 
over ~ the Japanese government gave an undertaking that 
it would not disregard the treaty rights of other Powers 
in Korea and that it r ecognized the binding force of 
, .. . 21 Korea s eXlstlng treatles . The Agreement was now 
ready for signature ~ and ~ on 12 August 1905 ~ the second 
Anglo - Japanese Alliance was signed by Hayashi and 
Lansdowne in London . It was an Agreement of eight 
Articles with no secret clauses or diplomatic notes ~ 
., . f t 22 and It was declded not to publlsh or the momen . 
It reads : 
PREAMBLE 
The Governments o f Great Britain and Japan, 
being desirous of replacing the Agreement 
concluded between them on the 30th January 1902 ~ 
by fresh stipulations , have agreed upon the 
following Articles~ which have for their 
object: 
(a) The consolidation and maintenance of 
the general peace in the regions of Eastern 
Asia and of India ; 
21 . MacDonald to Lansdowne , No . 184 , 3 August 1905 , 
F . O. 46 / 673. A discussion of the negotiations 
o f the existing treaty rights follows in the 
next chapter . 
22. Lansdowne to MacDonald , No. 101 . 12 August 
1905 . F.O . 46/672 . Text in Korea : Treaties 
and Agreements , pp . 40- 42 ; B.D . Vol . IV , No. 
155 ~ pp . 164 - 169 ; NGB . Vol . 38 , Pt . I , Nos . 
57 - 60 . 
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I 
(b) The preservation of the common 
interests of all Powers in China by 
insuring the independence and integrity 
of the Chinese Empire and the principle 
of equal opportunities for the commerce 
and industry of all nations in China; 
(c) The maintenance of the territorial 
rights of the High Contracting Parties 
in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India , 
and the defence of their special interests 
in the said regions 
ARTICLE I . It is agreed that whenever , 
in the opinion of either Great Britain or 
Japan , any of the rights and interests 
referred to in the preamble of this 
Agreement are in jeopardy , the two 
Governments will communicate with one 
another fully and frankly , and will consider 
in common the measures which should be 
taken to safeguard those menaced rights or 
interests . 
ART . II . If by reason of unprovoked attack 
or aggressive action , wherever arising , on 
the part of any other Power or Powers either 
Contracting Party should be involved in war 
in defence of its territorial rights or special 
interests mentioned in the preamble of this 
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Agreement , the other Contracting Party 
will at once come to the assistance of 
its ally , and will conduct the war in 
common , and make peace in mutual agree -
ment with it . 
ART . III . Japan possessing paramount 
political , military , and economic interests 
in Korea , Great Britain recognizes the right 
of Japan to take such measures of guidance , 
control , and protection in Korea as she 
may deem proper and necessary to safeguard 
and advance those interests, provided always 
that such measures are not contrary to the 
princip le of equal opportunities for the 
commerce and industry of all nations . 
ART. IV . Great Britain having a special 
interest in all that concerns the security 
of the Indian frontier , Japan recognizes 
her right to take such measures in the 
proximity of that frontier as she may find 
necessary for safeguarding her Indian 
possessions . 
ART. V. The High Contracting Parties 
agree that neither of them will, without 
consulting the other , enter into separate 
arrangements with another Power to the 
prejudice of the objects described in 
the preamble of this Agreement. 
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ART . VI . As regards the present war 
between Japan and Russia , Great Britain 
will continue to maintain strict 
neutrality unless some other Power or 
Powers should j oin in hostilities against 
Japan , in which case Great Britain will 
come to the assistance of Japan , and will 
conduct the war in common , and make 
peace in mutual agreement with Japan . 
ART . VII . The conditions under which 
armed assistance shall be afforded by 
either Power to the other in the circum-
stances mentioned in the present Agreement, 
and the means by which such assistance is 
to be made available , will be arranged by 
the Naval and Military authorities of the 
Contracting Parties , who will from time to 
time consult one another fully and freely 
upon all questions of mutual interest . 
ART . VIII . The present Agreement shall , 
subject to the provisions of Article VI ., 
come into effect immediately after the date 
of its signature , and remain in force for 
ten years from that date. 
In case neither of the High Contracting 
Parties should have notified twelve months 
before the expiration of the said ten 
years the intention of terminating it, it 
shall remain binding until the expiration 
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of one year from the day on which 
either of the High Contracting Parties 
shall have denounced it . But if , 
when the date fixed for its expiration 
arrives , eithe r ally is actually 
engaged in war , the alliance shall , 
ipso facto , continue until peace is 
concluded . 
It was a typical diplomatic quid pro quo arrange -
ment - a Japanese Korea for a British India . A 
significant omission from the treaty text was any 
mention of Korea ' s independence and her territorial 
integrity which had been explicitly recognized in the 
first Anglo - Japanese Alliance of 1902. 23 
The renewal of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance in 
1905 provided the guarantee Japan desired for her new 
course in Korea . 
23 . The Korean Government expressed its 
disappointment with the terms of the new 
Alliance and its concern about the future . 
Jordan to Campbell , 3 Oct . 1905 
F . O. 350/3 . 
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Whereas in the first Treaty Korean independence 
had been implicit , in the second Treaty the loss of 
Korean independence was explicit . 
295 . 
CHAPTER 9 . JAPAN ANNEXES KOREA , 1910 
By the late autumn of 1905 , Japan was ready to 
enter the final phase of her policy which was to lea d 
to annexation . In September , the Japanese announced 
that they had no alternative but to take charge of 
Korea ' s external relations . Lansdowne , in reply , 
made it plain that Britain was entirely favourable to 
the development of Japanes e influence in Korea and 
that Japan was not likely to encounter any difficulties 
from Britain in giving effect to her policy . l 
On 2 7 October 1905 , the Japanese Cabinet , 
recognizing that the British Alliance and the Russo-
Japanese Treaty clearly laid down that Korea must 
inevitably come under the tutelage of Japan decided 
to act and adopted a draft treaty with Korea . 
Additional troop reinforcements were to enter Seoul 
before the negotiations with the Korean government , and 
the General in command of the Japanese forces in Korea 
was ordered to provide the necessary assistance for 
f t · f th ., 2 success ul consumma lon 0 e negotlatlons . 
1 . Lansdowne to MacDonald , 26 Sept. 1905 , F . O. 
46/590 . 
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2. The text of decision in NGB . Vol . 38 , Pt . I , No . 259 . 
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Ito Hirobumi was appointed as special ambassador 
to negotiate the treaty and arrived in Seoul on 9 November 
1905 . When Ito presented a draft treaty of protection 
and demanded immediate acceptance , the Korean Emperor 
and his Ministers tried in every possible way to avoid 
taking the steps being forced upon them . The Korean 
officials tried to dissuade the Japanese from imposing 
the formal protectorate when Korea had already been 
deprived of any sUbstantive freedom of action in foreign 
affairs . The Korean Prime Minister , Kyu- Sul Han , 
strongly refused to give approval . However , when they 
realized that Japan would insist upon her major demand , 
they tried to reduce as much as possible the all -
inclusiveness and the finality of this step . They 
could succeed only in minor ways . They were able to 
persuade Ito to remove the words ' entirely to herself ' 
from the phrase ' Japan shall take over entirely to 
herself ' . Also , the Korean desire for some commitment 
on the part of Japan as to a termination of the 
protectorate was weakly reflected , as a vague and 
ineffectual time limit for the duration of the treaty, 
in the Preamble which stated that the Agreement was , to 
serve until the moment arrives when it is recognized 
that Korea has attained national strength '. And another 
ambiguous word ' primarily ' was added to the effect that 
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the Japanese Resident - General was to function primarily 
in the area of diplomatic affairs . 3 
The Protectorate Treaty , officially dated 17 
November 1905 , was signed in fact at one o ' clock i n 
the morning of 18 November , after a stormy session 
lasting from two o ' clock in the afternoon of 17 
November until early the next morning under the threat 
of Ito , accompanied by the Commanding General of the 
Japanese troop , Hasegawa Yoshimichi , sword in hand . 
The Japanese soldiers and gendarmes surrounded the 
Palace where the Cabinet meeting was being held . The 
very court yard of the Palace was filled with gleaming 
bayonets of the soldiers, and the rattling of the swords 
could be heard in the Cabinet Chamber . The Ministers 
were not given the necessary time to discuss nor any 
chance to inform or appeal to the people or foreigners . 4 
The Treaty, which contained five Articles , was essentially 
the same as the original Japanese draft : Japan , through 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry, was to have control and 
direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea , 
3. NGB . Vol. 38 , Pt . I , Nos . 264 - 9 ; 
Conroy , The Japanese Seizure of Korea , p . 334 . 
4 . Henry Chung , ~he Case of Korea : A Collection of 
Evidence on the Japanese Domination of Korea 
and on the Development of the Korean Independent 
Movement , New York, F . H. Revell Co ., 1921, p . 55 · 
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and the diplomatic and consular representativ~of Japan 
will have the charge of the subjects and interests of 
Korea in foreign countries (Article I); Korea 
was to make no international agreement except through 
the medium of the Japanese government (Article II); 
The enforcement of this control was to be in the hands 
of a Resident General who was to reside at Seoul and 
have direct access to the Korean Emperor . Japan was 
to station Residents at the treaty ports and other places 
in Korea wherever necessary , where they were to exe rcise 
the powers and functions hitherto appertaining to Japanese 
Consuls in Korea (Articl e III) ; Article VI contained 
Japanese pledge to maintain the welfare and dignity of 
the Korean imperial house . 
A Japanese declaration of 22 November announced 
the new relationship to the world . 5 
During the short negotiation, the Japanese 
exercised uncontested military control over Korea including 
the capital , Seoul , which was virtually under Japanese 
5 . Text in Communication by Hayashi , 22 Nov . 1905 , 
F . O. 46/600 ; Seoul National University , Kuksa 
Kaesul, p . 660 ; NGB. Vol . 38 , Pt . I , Nos . 264- 9; 
Korea : Treaties and Agreements, pp . 55- 6 . 
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martial law . Because of the speed of the treaty 
making process and the secrecy that surrounded it , 
anti - protectorate demonstrations did not take place 
until after the signing of the treaty . 
Following the announcement , however , the indignant 
Koreans used various means to abrogate the forced 
Agreement of Protectorate . A large number of officials , 
including the prominent members of the ruling elite , 
submitted passionate memorials to the throne, in which 
they denounced the treaty . They organized vigils 
outside the Palace gates . Having failed in their 
efforts , such patriots as Byung- Se Cho , a former Prime 
Minister , Young- Hwan Min , a highly respected young 
official , Man- Sik Hong , Sang- Chul Lee , Byung- Sun Song , 
Bong- Hak Kim committed suicide , leaving behind impassioned 
pleas for independence . The news of these suicides 
caused spontaneous public rallies in the streets . The 
popular sentiment was violently anti- Japanese and there 
were movements against Japan by the Korean soldiers in 
the various provinces . These protests produced more 
. . J 1 6 patrlotlc martyrs but could not alter the apanese pan . 
6 . F . A. McKenzie , Tragedy of Korea , London , 
Hodder & Stoughton , 1908 , pp. 131- 141 ; Kuksa 
Kaesul , pp . 671- 673 . 
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Official notifications of the treaty were 
sent to the governments of Britain , the United States , 
Germany , France , and other foreign Powers on 22 November , 
but the British government was confidentially informed 
in advance on 17 November . The British government 
thought that the perilous situation in Korea had 
rendered necessary the conclusion of this treaty , and 
had no objections as long as the treaties existing 
between the Powers and Korea were r espected by Japan, 
and all proper commercial and industrial interests 
enjoyed by the Powers in Korea were not injured. 7 
However , this did not mean that Britain was 
prepared to condone Japan ' s annexation straightaway. 
The British government view was that, while in the 
last resort it would not object to annexation , it 
hoped that Japan would be content with a protectorate . 
Lansdowne had written of his desire that Japan would 
8 
not force the pace too much. Britain was committed 
in general terms to supporting Japan ' s policy in 
Korea , but not to the exact form which that policy 
took . None the less , Britain ' s attitude was a 
narrowly commercial one . She would not criticize 
the Japanese actions , provided the open door was 
7 . MacDonald to Lansdowne , 17 Nov . 1905 , F . O. 
46/600 . 
8. Minute by Lansdowne , 4 Nov. 1905 , F.O . 
46/600 . 
maintained and the trading position of the British 
was safeguarded . Whereas Britain might have wielded 
some influence , she preferred to leave matters to 
take their own course . 
The Japanese protectorate of Korea, however , 
had some practical implications for Britain . There 
were two Britons who opposed the Japanese protectorate . 
One was the financial adviser to the Korean government, 
John McLeavy Brown , who had formerly belonged to the 
Chinese Maritime Customs Service . On the eve of 
signing the Protectorate Treaty , the Japanese tried to 
arrange with Lansdowne for Brown ' s retiremen t . The 
Japanese asked the British government to smooth the 
path of Brown ' s release by arranging for his inclusion 
in the next Honours List . But the British government 
declined to do so since Brown was not its employee . 
The Japanese proceeded to negotiate directly with Brown 
and he left Korea on 30 November 1905 . 9 
9 . NGB. Vol. 38 , Pt . I , Nos . 798 - 810 ; 
I . H. Nish , The Anglo - Japanese Alliance , 
pp . 351- 2 . 
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Another case was that of E . T . Bethell , the 
editor of the English language ' The Korean Daily News ', 
whose critical articles were a thorn in the fl esh of 
the Japanese authorities . There were seven daily 
newspapers in 1909 published in Korea . Among them 
only a f ew newspapers could manage to adopt openly 
anti - Japanese editorial policies . ' The Hwangsung 
Sinmun ', for examp le , printed just after the Protectorate 
Treaty of 1905 an inflammatory article against the 
treaty and asked if it was worthwhile for any of the 
Ko r eans to live any longer since all Koreans had become 
10 the slaves of others . But E.T . Bethell ' s English 
language paper , ' The Korean Daily News ', and its sister 
paper in Korean language , ' The Daehan Maeil Sinbo ', 
which was most widely circulated at about ten times 
more than any others , were particularly outspoken in 
criticizing the Japanese administration of Korea . 
As a citizen of Britain , the Japanese ally , Bethell 
enjoyed extraterritorial rights in Korea . After failing 
in many attempts to suppress Bethell ' s papers , Japan 
10. Kankoku Genji ni Okeru Chiho Jinshin no Jokyo 
(The Present Condition of the Public Opinion of 
the Local Populace in Korea) , 1 Nov . 1909 , The 
Japanes e Archives in Korea , 1894 - 1910 series , 
No . 305 , pp . 42 - 45 ; McKenzie , Tragedy of Korea , 
p . 140 . 
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took the matter up with the Br itish government . During the 
summer of 1906 , the Japanese authorities had several articles 
from ' The Daehan Maeil Sinbo ' translated and sent to the 
British government . They repeatedly insisted that the British 
gove rnment do someth ing about Bethell. Finally in September 
1907 , Henry Cockburn , the British Consul - General in Seoul , 
summoned Bethell to appear before a British Consular Court to 
answer the charge of adopting a course of action likely to 
cause a breach of the peace . Bethell was convicted and 
ordered to enter into recognizance of £300 to be of good 
behaviour for six months . In June 1908 , Bethell was again 
brought into the British Consular Court and sentenced to 
imprisonment for three weeks and required subsequently to give 
security for good behavio~r during six months or to be deported. 
Shortly afterwards Bethell permanently left Korea . ll On these 
two occasions , Britain had not interfered with the fulfilment 
o f Japanese plans in Korea by standing up for her own nationals . 
On 21 December 1905 , Ito was appointed as Resident -
General , and the Japanese Residency- General was formally 
opened in Seoul on 1 February 1906 , replacing the Japanese 
legation that had been in existence since 1880. As the 
new de facto ruler of Korea Ito ' s administration In Korea 
was characterized by the introduction of Japanese advisers 
int o virtually every office of the Korean government at 
the national and the local levels. Foreign affairs , 
11 . NGB. Vol . 38 , Pt . I, Nos . 825- 830 ; McKenzie , 
Tragedy of Ko rea , pp . 120 , 224 ; C. I . Kim and 
H. K. Kim , Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 
pp. 181 - 188 ; For details , see Bonar ' s Reports 
in F.O . 371/877 . 
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military defence , and commumications were placed 
directly under Japanese management and control . The 
Residency - General was an ever- growing bureaucracy , and , 
by early 1907 , it became a miniature government except 
for military affairs . Behind these civilian organi-
zations , stood the Japanese army in Korea that could be 
ordered into action by the Resident - General. The Korean 
Emperor had been reduc ed to a protesting but powerless 
figurehead . Ito ' s policy in Korea was controlling the 
Korean government through advisers without instituting 
any sudden drastic innovations in its structure . 
On the whole , Ito chose the strategy of gradualism 
and tried to maintain the outward status quo in the 
central structure of the Korean ruling oligarchy. In 
an effort to secure the peaceful assimilation of the 
peninsular nation into the Japanese Empire, Japan 
tried to utili ze the prestige of the Korean Emperor 
and at each important step in the annexation process , 
Japan obtained new treaties and agreements sanctioned by 
the Korean sovereign . Until the actual annexation in 
1910 the outward integrity of the Emperor and his Court 
was preserved . This maint enance of the outward status 
quo in the central structure of the government was 
designed to minimize popular antipathy to Japanese 
rul e and to obtain the collaboration of the ruling oligarchy 
in the Japanese consolidation of their position . Ito 
sought the co- operation o f the ruling oligarchy in Korea 
by preserving its personal interests and by maintaining 
an outward appearance of governmental stability. 
The Protectorate Treaty met no opposition from 
the Powers, since it was a formal declaration of what 
had already been approved in the second Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, the Portsmouth Treaty and the Taft - Kats ura 
Memorandum. In late 1905 , no foreign country was 
sufficiently powerful and interested in Korea to check 
Japan . In this situation , the Korean Court made a 
futile appeal to the Powers. Deserted by the 
Powers , forced to have his kingdom become a Japanese 
protectorate , and being a prisoner of the Japanese , 
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the Emperor of Korea secretly led an opposition to Japan 
with the help of the Court party and the patriots 
throughout the nation . The only and the last hope for 
Korea ' s salvation did appear in the summer of 1907 when 
the Second World Peace Conference was held at the Hague , 
Holland . It was this World Conference at which the 
Emperor and the people of Korea hoped to lay their case 
before the eyes of the world , and to appeal for help from 
the Powers to free their country from Japanese control . 
The Korean Emperor , in an attempt to win international 
support for his cause , decided to send a delegation of 
hi s own to the Hague Peace Conference . On 20 April 1907 
Joon Lee, former Police Magistrate of the Supreme Court 
and one of the Emperors favourites , with a secret letter 
from the Emperor left Seoul for VladivostOk , where he 
informed Sang- SuI Lee , ex- Vice Premier , of the imperial 
mission . The two then went via t h e Trans - Siberian 
railway to the Russian capital, St. Petersburg where 
they met Wi - Jong Lee , ex- secretary of the Korean legation 
at St . Petersburg , and then the three headed for The 
Hague . On 27 June 1907 , the three uninvited Korean 
envoys presented the credentials of their Emperor to 
the Hague Conference and called the attention to the fact 
that independent Korea did not receive any notification of 
the conference, and that the Korean delegate had a right 
to attend the conference , and asked for the recognition 
of their credentials . When they were told that Korea had 
lost her qualifications to attend the Conference because 
of the Treaty of Protectorate which gave the control of 
Korea ' s foreign affairs to Japan , the Korean mission 
replied that the Protectorate Treaty was forced on Korea 
at the point of sword having no signature of the Emperor 
of Korea , and therefore , it was illegal and should be 
nullified . However , as their credentials were refused 
in spite of their repeated appeals the only thing they 
could do was just to try to mobilize world opinion for 
12 the cause of Korean independence, but without success . 
This episode only hastened the further Japanese 
control over Korea . Japan decided to seize this 
12 . For the details of the petition to the Hague 
Conference by Korean delegation, see Donald 
G. Tewksbury , Source Materials on Korean 
Politics and Ideologies , N. Y. International 
Secretariat , Institute of Pacific Relations , 
1950 , pp . 34- 35 ; Seoul National University , 
Kuksa Kaesul , pp . 675- 679 ; Byung- Do Lee , 
Kuksa Daekwan , p . 485 . 
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opportunity to strengthen her control , and Ito forced 
the abdication of the Korean Emperor. After many 
complications , on 19 July 1907, the Emperor reluctantly 
decreed that he would order the Crown Prince to act in 
his stead, but he explicitly denied that his decision 
was that of abdication. However , Ito chose to interpret 
the decree as one of abdication and held a court reception 
on the next day at which occasion the new Emperor received 
congratulatory salutations from high government officials 
and foreign Consuls in Seoul . While the ceremony was 
being conducted , a large Japanese guard protected the 
Palace because of violent anti- abdication demonstrations 
in the street which resulted in the numerous clashes . 
The ceremony for the cr owni ng of the new Emperor , Sunjong , 
was conducted later on 27 August 1907 . 13 
A few days after the coronation of the new Emperor , 
Ito presented the draft of a new Agreement by which Japan 
was to extend its control over the internal affairs of 
14 Korea, and got the approval on the same day . By this 
13 . NGB . Vol . 40 , Pt . I , Nos . 473-497; Shakuo Shunjo , 
Chosen Heigoshi : Chosen Saikinshi (History of 
Korean Annexation : Modern Korean History) , Keijo , 
1926 , pp . 347- 367 . 
14 . Text in Korea : Treaties and "Agreements , pp . 58- 59 . 
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Agreement of 24 July 1907 , Korea consented to act under 
the guidance of the Resident - General in all administrative 
matters , and to appoint Japanese as high officials . 
Judicial affairs were to be set apart from ordinary 
administration. At the same time , a Memo randum on the 
same date bound Korea to appoint Japanese judges and 
prosecutors to all the courts of law throughout the 
country , and to appoint Japanese nationals as Vice -
Ministers in each Ministry of the government , such as 
the Chief of the Police Bureau in the Home Ministry , as 
the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet , and other officials In 
key posts at national and provincial levels . 15 With this 
appointment o f Japanese Vice - Ministers , judges , police 
chiefs, and so on to replace the Japanese advisers , 
Korea ' s loss of its independence was virtually complete . 
By this Agreement the Japanese Res ident - General 
in Seoul became a virtual Regent in Korea . This Agre ement 
transferred all interna l administrat ion of Korea to the 
Japanese , while that of 17 No vember 1905 gave external 
control to them. This Memorandum also bound Korea to 
15 . Ibid . 
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disband her army . Ito forced the new Korean Emperor 
to announce the dissolution of the Korean army , except for 
one battalion to guard the Palace, on the grounds of 
economic retrenchment and reform. This caused a nation-
wide revolt by the Korean soldiers against Japan. Most 
of the soldiers in the provinces escaped with weapons 
and joined guerrilla movements. 
There had been guerrilla movements of Ei- Byong 
(the Righteous Army) operating in the mountainous areas . 
They disguised themselves as farmers and attacked Japanese 
passers - by , settlements , and small units of Japanese troops . 
Until July 1907 , this Righteous Army existed in name only 
because of the Japanese suppression but it was revived 
through the addition of new recruits from among the recently 
disbanded Korean soldiers . Furthermore , the brutal 
Japanese suppression caused many Korean farmers to 
sympathize with them . Ei- Byong rose allover the 
country against the Japanese and their numerical strength 
increa s e d and their attack became more rampant . The 
Ri ghteousArmy , despite all difficulties and the relentless 
use of force by the Japanese , continued their active 
resistance until the middle of 1910. In 1910 , the 
British representative in Seoul , Bonar , reported that there 
were a considerable number of insurgents in organized 
form and in bands numbering up to 80 . 16 Even after the 
16. Bonar to Grey , 28 March 1910 . F. O. 371/877. 
annexation in 1910 , Ei - Byong , aided by Korean patriots , 
continued to resist and much later helped the March 1st . 
1919 Independence Movement . 17 
Meanwhile , in Japan , there had been many vociferous 
advocates of an early annexation , represented by the 
chauvinistic Kokuryukai (the Amur Society) and Uchida 
Ryohei . They wished for a speedy and complete absorption 
of Korea . Uchida , the guiding sp i rit of Kokuryukai and 
the chief Japanese agent in Korea for the early annexation , 
became an adviser to their collaborators in Korea , the 
Ilchinhoi (a pro - Japanese society in Korea) . The Japanese 
backed Ilchinhoi , which was supported by a very small number 
of pro - Japanese Koreans , and its leaders like Byung- Joon 
Song and Yong- Koo Lee , together with Uchida , worked 
vigorously for the Japanese scheme for annexation of Korea . 
Most Ko rean peoples accused them of being national traitors 
wanting to sell their country to Japan . 18 
The Russo - Japanese conversations in 1907 marked 
the beginning of Japan ' s effort to obtain final foreign 
approvals for the annexation of Korea . After months 
of protracted negotiations , wh i ch had begun in February 
1907 , the Russian Foreign Minister , A. P . Izvolsky , 
17 . 
18 . 
For the details of Ei- Byong , see C. I . Kim and 
H. K. Kim , Korea an~ the Politics of Impe r ialism , 
pp . 196- 206 ; McKenzie , Korea ' s Fight for Freedom , 
New York , F.H . Revell Co ., 1920 , Ch , VII - IX . 
Kuzu Yoshihisa , Nikkan Gappo Hishi (Secret 
History of the Merger of Japan and Korea) , 
2 . vols ., Tokyo , 1930 , Vol. I , pp . 41 , 55 - 56 , 
74 - 95 . 
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and the Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg, Motono 
Ichiro , signed a Convention , a secret Convention , and 
an additional secret Article on 30 July 1907 . 19 The 
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first contained declarations of mutual obligation to honour 
each other ' s rights in China and to uphold the open door 
principles in China ; the second was prefaced by an 
expression of the mutual wish to eliminate any cause of 
misunderstanding or conflict between Russia and Japan 
concerning Manchuria , Korea and Mongolia. The Convention 
showed clearly Russia ' s willingness to let Japan annex 
Korea in return for Japan ' s r enunciation of any interest 
in Outer Mongolia . 
The Japanese annexation of Korea became a matter 
of timing and method . As Ito resigned the post of the 
Resident - General ln Ko r ea and Sone Arasuke , the Vice -
Resident General in Korea , succeeded him in J une 1909 , 
the Japanese government reached a definite decision on 
the question of annexation . Detailed plans were 
formulated by the Japanese Foreign Office and were 
approved by the Cabinet in July 1909. They stipulated 
that , at the time of annexation an imperial decree should 
be promulgated setting forth the reasons for the action 
and also guaranteeing full protection of foreign inte r ests 
in Korea ; that the imperial family of Korea should be 
accorded honour and pension i n a manner similar to the 
members of the Japanese imperial clan . 20 
19 . N G B . Vo 1. 4 0 , Pt . I , No . 182. 
20 . NGB . Vol. 42 , Pt . I , No. 144. 
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At this time an incident occurred in October 
1909 , which provided the long awaited excuse for the 
militarists and annexationists in Japan to act . Ito 
19 ft Japan on 16 October 1909 to tour the Kwantung 
leased terri t ory and Harbin for a few weeks. On 
26 October, le o arrived at the Harbin railway station , 
where h e was greeted by Russian Finance Minister, 
Vladimir Kc kovtsov , and the Mayor of the City. 
While he was reviewing the Russian guards , a Korean 
patriot, Choong- Kun An , shot Ito dead . The assassin 
was immediately arrested and was executed later on 
26 March 1910. His execution once again climaxed the 
anti - Japanese sentiment of the Korean people as the 
British representative in Seoul , Bonar , reported : 
' Many Koreans would gloat over the man who had done so 
much harm to Japan by depriving her of a remarkable 
s tatesman ' . 21 This incident was a direct r esult of 
Kor e a ' s resentment against Japanese oppression but became 
the tragic prelude to the immediate Japanese action for 
. f 22 the complete annexatlon 0 Korea. 
21. Bonar to Grey , 28 March 1910, F . O. 371/877. 
22 . NGB. Vol. 42 , Pt . I , Nos. 156, 177. 
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The Japanese government was determined to 
push through the annexation by force , if necessary . 
On 30 May 1910, the powerful War Minister , General 
Terauchi , was appointed as the new Resident - General 
in Korea , in addition to his present office , replacing 
the civilian Sone Arasuke . On 3 June 1910 , the 
Japanese Cabinet adopted an outline for future Japanese 
role in Korea . Korea was to be ruled by a Governor-
General who would be responsible directly to the 
Japanese throne . Drafts of a treaty of annexation , 
of imperial edicts to promulgate at the time of annexation , 
and of public announcements were prepared and adopted by 
the Cabinet on 8 July 1910 . 23 
Meanwhile , Britain had been carefully watching 
the Japanese movement in Korea . Britain did not oppose 
the consolidation and strengthening of the Japanese 
position in Korea . Britain was only concerned about the 
economic matters . On 4 July 1910 , the British Foreign 
Secretary , Grey , frankly wrote that: ' On what grounds other 
than commercial can the other Powers object to the Japanese 
annexation of Korea? I am not aware that we have any 
other grounds for objecting to annexation ' . 24 
23 . NGB . vol.43, Pt.I, No.547. 
24 . Minutes by Grey , in Bonar to Grey , 28 March 1910 , 
F . O. 371/877 . 
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When the annexation seemed imminent in July 
1910 , the British government began to worry that the 
application of the Japanese tariff to Korea after 
annexation would create economic problems . When 
the Japanese annexation of Korea took place all treaties 
between Korea and the other Powers would lapse , 
extraterritoriality would be abolished , and there were 
some possibilities that the existing customs tariffs 
would also be changed . The British worried about the 
possibilities of the wholesale enforcement of the 
tariff system of Japan and the Japanese restrictions 
on manufacture and industry and the ownership of land 
by foreigners in Korea . 
By 1910 , the annual British trade in Korea 
amounted to ~30 , 000 . Even though the British merchants 
in Korea could still be numbered ' on the fingers of 
one hand ', the British trade in Korea had been diligently 
worked up since 1885 and wa~ mainly in Manchester goods . 
Iron and other manufactures also had been impor.ted in 
considerable quantities . The d i rect Br i tish trade took 
about 18 per cent of the total import trade into Korea . 
But when considering the German merchants in Chemulpo 
operating largely in British goods , and the Chinese 
merchants importing British goods from China into Korea , 
the British took at least more than one quarter of the 
total import trade into Korea. 25 
25 . Bonar to Grey , No. 36 , Very Conf i dential , 
20 June 1910 , F . O. 371 / 877 . 
Nearly half of the British trade in Korea 
consisted of cotton manufactures : (1909) 
Bri tish Share Korean Total Import 
Grey shirtings £115 , 393 £115 , 864 
White shirtings £150 , 811 £152 , 512 
T - cloths £ 1,195 £ 20 ,00 2 
Cotton drills £ 7 , 773 £ 8 ,777 
Cotton satins and £ 43,801 £ 44,447 Italians 
Cotton prints £ 2 , 006 £ 3 , 467 
Cotton Victoria £ 7 , 005 £ 7 , 137 lawns 
Next to the cotton manufactures, was t he British iron and 
machinery trade valued at £87 , 902 out of the total 
Korean import of £110 , 213 in 1909. This covered: 
iron pipes and tubes , brass bars and rods , galvanised 
wire , nails , and galvanised sheets . In addition , 
British machinery for waterworks and mining machinery 
were also imported into Korea . 26 
Again , although the British trade in railway 
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material In 1909 was small , it had amounted to £200 , 000 in 
1904 out of a total £472 , 951 . Considering the Korean 
26 . Memorandum , enclosed in Ibid . 
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government ' s project for future railways of 200- 300 
miles , the prospect for the future of British trade 
in railway material was encouraging . The British also 
enjoyed nearly one quarter of the total Korean cigarettes 
trade . The British- American Tobacco Co ., which had a 
factory in Chemulpo , took 25 per cent of £103 , 247 of 
the total cigarettes trade in Korea in 1909 . Britain 
was also interested in the import of candles , woollen 
cloth , steel , tin , lead , brass , cement , paint and oils . 27 
The existing Korean tariff on the most of the 
above trades was 7! per cent . Further , in fact,they 
entered into Korea in many cases duty free under special 
arrangements between Britain and Korea . The British 
had enjoyed by treaty and custom , or more properly 
stated ' tacit recognit i on of the Korean government ', 
. .. 28 . great prlvlleges ln Korean t r ade . After the annexatlon , 
the Japanese would apply the Japanese tar i ff , which would 
be in most cases at least more than 20 per cent . This 
application of the Japanese tari f f would be a severe 
damage to British trade in Korea . 
27 . Ibid . 
28 . Ibid . 
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Besides trade , a desire mainly for concessions , 
mining principally , had been the motive of the foreign 
capitalists in Korea since the opening of the country . 
However , the history of foreign mining In Korea was 
disappointing. It is difficult to estimate the actual 
investment of British capital in Korean mines , but by 
1910 it probably did not fall far short of one million 
pounds . 29 In the summer of 1910 , Henry Bonar , the 
British representative in Seoul , repeatedly pointed out 
the dangers which would probably ensue to British rights 
in property, mines , missions , which would follow 
on the Japanese annexation . He argued that : ' yet if Korea 
is to occupy the status of a colony , a special regime which 
would preserve to Great Britain and other countries 
commercial advantages equal to those of Japan , might be 
possible of attainment ' . 30 He suggested that Britain 
should enter into a special convention with Japan con-
firming all property and industrial rights acquired 
by British subjects in Korea , including the rights of 
purchasing and renting land , concessions as to mines 
and waterworks , and certain mining rights , and guaranteeing 
fresh acquisition of similar rights in future . 31 
29 . Ibid . 
30. Despatches by Bonar , Nos . 35, 36 , 41 , 44 , 
F.O. 371/877 ; Bonar to Grey , 24 July 1910 , 
F . O. 371/877 ; MacDonald to Grey , 22 July 
1910 , F . O. 371/878 . 
31 . Ibid. 
Britain had had a similar experience before. 
When France established her protectorate over 
Madagascar, the French government informed Britain 
that the protectorate would not change existing treaties 
between Madagascar and other countries . But after the 
annexation the French government applied the French 
tariff in Madagascar and did not admit their 
obligation not to interfere with other countries ' 
existing commercial treaty rights with Madagascar . 
The case of Korea was very similar, as the Japanese 
government , in taking charge of Korea , on 23 November 
1905, undertook to maintain and r espect the treaties 
of Korea with other Powers. The Japanese had declared 
in November 1905 that : ' In bringing this Agreement to 
the notice of the Powers having Treaties with Corea , 
the Imperial Government declare that , in assuming 
charge of the foreign relations of Corea and und ertaking 
the duty of watching over the execution of the existing 
Treaties of that Country , they will see that those 
Treaties are maintained and respected , and they also 
engage not to prejudice in any way the legitimate , 
commercial and industrial interests of those Powers in 
Corea ' . 32 
If Japan annexed Korea , France would be debarred 
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from appealing to Britain to join in a protest on economic 
32. Communication by Hayashi, 22 Nov . 1905, 
F . O. 46/600 . 
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grounds as a result of having rejected the British view 
on Madagascar . But the United States and European 
countries other than Franc e might , having regard 
to the British action respecting Madagascar , appeal to 
Britain to join them in protesting against Japan ' s 
proposed action in Korea , which would place Britain in 
a difficult position . On 14 July 1910 , Grey expla ined 
this to Takaaki Kato , the Japanese Minister in London , 
and expressed the hope that the Japanese government , 
whenever they annexed Korea , would , by stating that 
Japan would maintain for a long term of years the present 
tariff of Korea as guaranteed by treaties , prevent the 
British government from being placed in such a difficult 
position . 33 
The first Japanese reply came on 19 July . When 
annexation took place , Korea would become part of Japan 
and the treaties between Korea and other countries would be 
extinguished . But Japan had in view the economic 
inte rests of Powers who had treaties with Korea , and 
she desired to preserve their status quo in economic 
matters . Therefore , when the time came to annex Korea , 
Japan would , previous to annexation , make a declaration 
to the Powers concerned on three points: 1) that existing 
33 . Grey to MacDonald , 14 and 19 July 1910 , 
F.O . 371 / 877 . 
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tariffs between Korea and the Powers would continue in 
force for a considerable time . The import and export 
duties at Korean ports and the tonnage duties on 
shipping would be maintained at existing rates ' for 
the present '. The customs laws of Japan would be 
applied to Korea. Exports from Korea to Japan , imports 
from Japan to Korea , and Japanese shipping would be 
subject to the same rates in Korean ports for the present 
as applied to foreign goods and shipping . 2 ) that the 
coasting trade between Korean open ports would continue as 
also coasting trade between Korea and Japanese ports . 3) 
that all existing open ports of Korea would be left open 
with the exception of Masampo while a new open port would 
be made at Shinwiju . Japan also declared that all 
commercial , industrial and property rights , mining and 
land ownership , foreign settlements and perpetual leases 
in Korea would not immediately be disturbed by annexation 
but would form the subject of later discussion with the 
Powers , and , on the other hand , annexation would put an 
end to all treaties between Korea and foreign powers and 
to extra- territorial jurisdic t ion. 34 
34 Grey to MacDonald , 19 July 1910 , F . O. 371/877 ' 
MacDonald to Grey, 21 July 1910 , F . O. 371/877 . 
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In view of the fact that the Japanese had not given 
any definite period for the continuance of the present 
economic conditions in Korea , Grey observed that the 
term t for the present ' was very indefinite in its 
application to the maintenance o f existing economic 
conditions . The Japanese r eplied that it was difficult 
to fi x a definite period but they would be willing to 
give a guarantee that the period would be a considerable 
one, and not merely a period of one or two years , and 
that if approached by British government , they would fix 
specific terms of years only to Britain but not to the 
other Powers provided it was not too long . 
35 
suggested asking for ten years . 
MacDonald 
In his reply on 19 July , Komura , the Japanes e 
Foreign Secretary , also explained the necessity for the 
immediate annexation of Korea . He argued that the 
peace of the East and the ~ranquility of Korea were so 
important to Japan that she had had to establish a 
protectorate over Korea to improve the state of that 
country in 1905 . But tranquility was not yet 
established and the people of Korea looked upon things 
as being in a temporary condition and we re unsettl ed . 
35 . Grey to Macdonald , 19 July 1910 , F . O. 371/877 ; 
MacDonald to Grey , 21 July 1910 , F . O. 371/877 ; 
MacDonald to Grey , 22 July 1910 , F . O. 371/878 . 
Therefore they had to decide to introduce radical 
reforms to prevent future difficulties . 36 Britain 
did not oppose the Japanese intention of annexing 
Korea, she only worried about the treaty rights of 
the Powers in Korea . Sinc e it is quite natural 
that,in case of the absorption of one state by 
another , llil the treaties between the absorbed state and 
fore ign Powers come to an end , and all the rights and 
privileges enjoyed by those Powers cease and det e rmin e , 
the British even considered the Japanese intention to 
make a d e claration to the Powers that the existing 
treaty rights would continue for a considerable time 
aft e r the annexation was ' an act of grace ' . 37 
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When MacDonald merely asked Komura why the actual 
act of annexation had been decided upon in such a hurry, 
Komura replied that events in Korea had progressed much 
more rapidly than anticipated , and doubt and uncertainty 
prevailed In Korea , and that the Japanese government had 
to decide to put in force without further delay a policy 
which they had , as the world must be aware , intended from 
the first to carry out , as the only one possible und e r 
36 . Grey to MacDonald, 19 July 1910 , F . O. 371/877 . 
37 . Minutes by G. de Bernhardt , ibid. 
the circumstances. 38 
However, Bonar suggested to MacDonald that the 
proposed de claration of Japanese government would be 
inadequate. Upon Bonar ' s suggestions , MacDonald told 
Komura on 21 July that it was also important that British 
subjects in Korea should know what would be the fat e of 
the comme rcial, industrial and property rights which they 
had acquire d in Korea in the matter of mines , missions 
and land- ownership in general . Komura replied that no 
change would be made at the time of annexation but all 
these po ints would be subsequently discussed with the 
Powers concerned. MacDonald then mentioned th e advisa-
bility of making a special convention regarding these 
points prior to annexation. Komura said that the other 
nations would wish to make similar conventions and there 
would be no end to the matter , and as the annexation was 
imminent it was impossible that such a special convention 
could now be made . MacDonald did not insist. The 
British , as Campbell , the Assistant Under- Secretary of 
the Fore ign Office , said , ' could hardly see what more 
they could require of the Japanese ' . 39 Grey stated 
clearly in his telegram to MacDonald on 5 August that 
Britain acc epted the principle of the annexation of 
40 Korea by Japan . 
38. MacDonald to Grey , 22 July 1910 , F . O. 371/878 . 
39. Minute by Francis Campbell , in Bonar to Grey, 
24 July 1910 , F . O. 371/877 ; MacDonald to Grey , 
22 July 1910, F . O. 371/878. 
40 . Grey to MacDonald , 5 August 1910 , F . O. 371/877 . 
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Afte r consultation with the Board of Tr ade about the 
best means of protecting British commercial interests 
after annexation , on 3 August the British government 
proposed that the existing tariffs betwee n Korea and the 
Powers should continue in force for ten years , and that 
not only Shinwiju but some other port should also be 
opened t o foreign trade . 41 
Meanwhile , Japan moved quickly and positive ly for 
the annexation of Korea . The new Japanese Res ident -
General in Korea , Terauchi ; s greatest concern was the 
prevention of any serious uprising or other violent 
opposition to the annexation . On 24 June , before 
Te rauchi ' s departure for Korea , the Japanese forced an 
A.greement on Korea by which they obtained a complete 
transfer of police powers from the Korean government . 42 
Five days later, on 29 June , by the Imperial Ordinance No . 
196 , the Inspectorate- General of Police was to be established 
in Seoul . The Inspector- General of Police should be the 
Commander of the gendarmerie , under whose direction all 
the law enforcement agencies in Korea were unified . 43 
Thus , by the end of J une 1910 , as over ten thousand 
41 . Grey to Kato , 3 August 1910 , F . O. 371/877 . 
42 . To At in Ko rea : Tr eaties and Agre ements p . 61 . 
43 . Ibid ., pp . 61 - 63 . 
policemen and gendarmes were placed unde r the direct 
command of a major- general in the Japanese army, the 
whole of Korea came under strict control in preparation 
for the final step. 
On 8 July, the Japanese Cabinet completed a 
proposed Treaty of Annexation of Korea , and on 12 July, 
Prime Minister Katsura held a farewell reception In 
honour of the departing Terauchi . On 15 July 
Terauchi left Tokyo and arrived at Seoul on 23 July, 
amidst an impressive display of Japan ' s armed might. 
Upon his arrival at Seoul, Terauchi cleaned out all 
officials from the government who were not ardent 
supporters of annexation. A reign of terror descended 
upon Korea . All political discussion and assembly was 
banned. All newspapers that criticized the Residency-
General or carried any story on the annexation were 
suspended. Individuals suspected of being dangerous 
to the Japanese regime were arrested. All Ko rean 
organizations were placed under constant police 
surveillance. Streets in Seoul were patrolled by 
gendarmes and policemen . In fact , unproclaimed martial 
. 44 law prevalled. 
44. Midori Komatsu , Chosen Hei 0 no Rimen (Back round 
of the Japanese Annexatlon of Korea , Tokyo , 1920, 
pp. 543- 547 . 
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It took only a week after the formal presentation 
of the Japanese draft to conflude the Treaty of Annexation. 
The entire process of negotiation and del iberation in the 
Councils of both Governments had been conducted in absolute 
secrecy and with deliberate haste for f ear of violent 
reactions from the Koreans . The Korean- Japanes e Treaty 
was signed in the afternoon of 22 August 1910 between 
Wan- Yong Lee, the Ko rean Prime Minister , and Terauchi 
Masakata , the Japanese Resident - General. 45 Thus , the 
Yi dynasty of Korea , after five hundred and nineteen years 
of existence , came to an end . The Treaty contained eight 
Articles : the Japanese Emperor accepted the Korean 
Emperor ' s cession of all rights of sovereignty ; 
appropriate honour and maintenance were to be provided 
for members of the Korean Court and other Koreans who 
had given meritorious service ; and the entire government 
and administration was assumed by the government of 
Japan . The Treaty which was formally made public on 29 
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August 1910 was followed by a barrage of imperial edicts and 
official proclamations. The Treaty reads as follows : 
45 . Text in Enclosure in Kato to Grey , 23 August 
1910 , F . O. 371/878 ; B. D. Vol. VIII , No. 400 , 
pp . 498- 9 ; NGB. 43 , Pt . I , Nos . 576,579; 
~K~o_r~e~a~: __ ~T_r~e~a_t_l_· e __ s~a~n_d __ A~g~r~e~e~m~e~n~t~s , pp . 64 - 67 . 
Article I. His Majesty the Emperor of Korea 
makes complete and permanent cession to His Majesty 
the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty 
over the whole of Korea. 
Article II. His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan accepts the cession mentioned in the preceding 
Article and consents to the complete annexation of 
Korea to the Empire of Japan . 
Article III . His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan will accord to Their Majesties the Emperor and 
Ex- Emperor and His Imperial Highness t h e Crown Prince 
of Korea and their consorts and heirs with such titles ~ 
dignities and honours as are appropriate to their 
respective ranks and sufficient annual grants will be 
made for the maintenance of such titles , dignities 
and honours. 
Article IV . His Majesty the Emperor of Japan 
will also accord appropriate honour and treatment to 
the members of the Imperial House of Korea and their 
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heirs other than those mentioned in the preceding Article 
and funds necessary for the maintenance of such honour and 
treatment will be granted. 
Article V. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan 
will confer peerages and monetary grants upon those Koreans 
who , on account of meritorious services ~ are regarded as 
deserving such special recognition . 
Article VI . In consequence of the aforesaid 
annexation the Government of Japan assumes the entire 
government and administration of Korea and undertakes 
to afford full protection for the persons and prop e rty 
of Koreans obeying the laws there in force and to 
promote the welfare of all such Ko reans. 
Article VII. The Government of Japan will , 
so far as ci rcumstanc es permit , employ in the public 
services of Japan in Korea those Koreans who accept 
the new regime loyally and in good faith and who are 
duly qualified for such services . 
Article VIII . This treaty , having been 
approved by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His 
Majesty the Emperor of Korea , shall take the effect 
from the date of its promulgation . 
On 25 August , Kato informed Grey that the Treaty 
of Annexation had been concluded on 22 August between 
Korea and Japan. Kato also transmitted a copy of the 
translated text of the Treaty and the text of the 
Le claration of Japan . Japan declared to the foreign 
Powers that : 1) all treaties hitherto concluded by 
Korea with foreign Powers would cease to be operative , 
and Japan ' s existing treaties with them would apply to 
Korea ; 2) for e igne rs in Ko r ea were to enjoy the same 
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rights and immunities as the foreign residents in 
Japan and become subject to Japanese jurisdiction ; 
3) the existing rates of export and import duties and 
tonnage dues for Korea ' s foreign trade were to remain 
in force, applicable to both Japanese and foreign 
nationals , for a peri od of ten years ; 4) for eign 
vessels would be permitted to engage in coastal trade 
between the open ports of Ko r ea and between those ports 
and any open ports of Japan for a period of ten years ; 
5) the existing open ports of Korea would remain open 
except for Masampo , while Shinwiju would be newly 
46 
opened . The Japanese Declaration reads as follows 
Notwithstanding the earnest and laborious work 
of reform in the administration of Korea in which the 
Governments of Japan and Korea have been engaged for 
more than four years since the conclusion of the Agreement 
in 1905 , the existing System of Government in that country 
has not proved entirely equal to the duty of pr eserving 
public order and t ranquili ty ; and , in addition , the 
spirit of suspicion and misgiving dominates the wh ole 
peninsula. 
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In order to maintain peace and stability in Korea , 
to promote the prosperity and welfare of Koreans , and at 
46 . Ibid . 
the same time to ensure the safety and repose of foreign 
residents, it has been made abundantly clear that funda-
mental changes in the actual regime of Government are 
absolutely essential. The Governments of Japan and 
Korea, b e ing convinced of the urgent necessity of 
introducing reforms responsive to the requirements of 
the situation and of furnishing sufficient guarantee 
for the future , have , with the approval of His Majesty 
the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of 
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Korea, concluded through their respective plenipotentiaries 
a treaty providing for complete annexation of Korea to the 
Empire of Japan . By virtue of that important act which 
shall take effect on its promulgation on the 29th of 
August , 1910 , the Imperial Government of Japan undertakes 
the entire government and administration of Korea , and 
they hereby declare that the matters relating to 
foreigners and foreign trade in Korea shall be conducted 
in accordance with the following rules : 
1 . Treaties hitherto conclude d by Korea with 
foreign Powers ceasing to be operative , J apan ' s existing 
treaties will , so far as practicable , be applied to Korea . 
Foreigners resident in Korea will , so far as conditions 
permit, enjoy the same rights and immunities as in 
Japan proper , and the protection of their legally 
acquired rights subject in all cases to the jurisdiction 
of Japan. The Imperial Government of Japan is ready to 
consent that the jurisdiction in respect of the cases 
actually pending in any foreign consular court in Korea 
at the time the Treaty of Annexation takes effect shall 
remain in such court until final decision. 
2 . Independently of any conventional engagements 
formerly existing on the subject , the Imperial 
Government of Japan will for a period of ten years levy 
upon goods imported into Korea from foreign countries 
or exported from Korea to foreign countries and upon 
foreign vessels entering any of the open ports of Korea 
the same import or export duties and the same tonnage 
dues as under the existing schedules . The same import 
or export duties and tonnage dues as those to be levied 
upon the aforesaid goods and vessels will also for a 
period of ten years be applied in respect of goods 
imported into Korea from Japan or exported from Korea 
to Japan and Japanese vessels entering any of the open 
ports of Korea . 
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3 . The Imperial Government of Japan will also permit , 
for a period of ten years , vessels under flags of the 
Powers having treaties with Japan to engage in the coasting-
trade between the open ports of Korea and between those 
ports and any open port of Japan. 
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4 . The existing open ports of Korea , with the 
exemption of Masampo , will be continued as open ports 
and in addition, Shinwiju will be newly opened so that 
vessels foreign as well as Japanese , will there b e 
admitted and goods may be imported into and export e d 
from those ports. 
On the notification of the annexation , Grey 
told Kato that Britain had no political objection to the 
annexation of Korea by Japan , and that Britain was 
satisfied with the ten years term for the maintenance 
of the old tariff , which was in accordance with American 
precedent in the Philippines , and that Britain would 
r ese rve other questions , such as mining rights , perpetual 
1 d f f t d · . 47 eases , an so on , or u ure lSCUSSlon. 
The foreign Powers raised no problems in connection 
with the annexation. They only had shown concern lest 
the annexation might jeopardi ze the rights and interests 
of their nationals . Japan accommodated the wishes of 
these foreign Powers , except for the termination of 
47 . Grey to MacDonald , 25 August 1910 , F . O. 371/878 ; 
Grey to O' Beirne , 8 September 1910 , F . O. 371 / 878 . 
extraterritorial rights for foreigners in Korea . 
Later, in October, the Japanese Prime Minister , Katsura , 
expressed Japan ' s gratitude to Britain for the friendly 
and sympathetic manner in which annexation had been 
received by the British government . 48 
At this moment , with the Japanese annexation of 
Korea , there came to an end an era of British policy 
towards Korea which dated back to the early 1880 ' s of 
the last century . It is now possible to consider In 
the final short chapter which follows , what principles , 
if any , motivated the British policy towards Korea 
during the period of 1882- 1910. 
48. MacDonald to Grey , 10 Oct. 1910 , F . O. 371/878 . 
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CHAPTER 10 . CONCLUSION 
The first British relationship with Korea in 
the early 1880 ' s (there had been minor earlier contacts) 
occurred at the height of the British imperial expansion , 
but also at a time when she began to perceive and unde r -
stand the challenges and rivalries coming from the other 
Great Powers . Britain was no longer in an absolutely 
dominant position globally . 
Thus Britain ' s policy towards Korea has always to 
be analyzed within the framework of global imperial interests 
rather than in terms of a mere Anglo - Korean relationship . 
This manifested its el f in the Anglo - Chinese 
relationship . It was in the British int e rest to have 
China strong enough to maintain order and fulfill 
teaty obligations . Above all , it must serve as a 
bulwark against Russia , one Power which constantly 
challenged Britain thoughout the period . China ' s 
collapse could uncover the northeast frontier of India , 
to say nothing of the balance of power in the Far East 
and enormous losses to Britain ' s China trade . 
This also manifested itself in Britain ' s 
first approaching Korea only through the Chinese 
intermediary : this given the historic Sino- Korean 
relationship . (Britain never attempted to open a 
treaty relationship with Korea until after Korea was 
opened by the other Powers) . 
Even the British occupation of Port Hamilton 
during the first active phase of the British- Korean 
relationship was not the result of her direct interest 
in Korea but of her broad global consideration : in this 
case Britain ' s check on Russia in the Near East and 
Central Asia at that time . Moreover , throughout the 
incident , Britain again negotiated wi th Korea only 
through the Chinese mediatory , treating Korea as if 
she was a part of China . 
After her opening by the Powers , Korea became 
a bone of contention among the Powers of the Far Ea~t , 
because of her geographic location . The widening Sino-
Japanese rift over Korean affairs was furthe r complicated 
by the great Anglo - Russian discord . Britain had no 
large concern for Korea and always considered it only in 
relation to the balance of power in the Far East , all 
with the grand purpose of preserving her interests in 
the Far East aga i nst Russia . 
It was Britain ' s strategy to let one or other 
local Power balance the forces in the Far East - China 
and Japan . At first , the British chose to support and 
strengthen China ' s position in Korea and encouraged the 
Chinese claim of suzerainty over Korea , mainly for the 
purpose of thwarting Russia . However , China proved a 
feeble ally , as r evealed by the Sino - Japanese War . 
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Britain shifted its weight to Japan ' s side soon after 
the Japanese victory . 
The global situation had been complicated for 
Britain by the rise of other imperial Powers , for example , 
the Western European Powers and the United States and , 
above all, by the Russo - Japanese ambitions and rivalry 
in Ko r ea . 
Further, Britain ' s Far Eastern policy was also 
conditioned by both h er position ln Europe and her 
overall imperial interests both of which were much more 
important than the Korean peninsula . 
The thesis has endeavoured to trace out the 
evolution of British policy towards Korea through such 
major turning points as the Sino - Japanese and the Russo-
Japanese War . 
But , by the early part of the twentieth century , 
Britain ' s global need for the Anglo - Japanese Alliance 
became the dominant factor . After the S1no - Japanese 
War and the ' Triple Intervention ', the shift in the 
balance of forces in the Far East led Britain to seek a 
new ally , departing from her traditional policy of 
isolation . The Anglo - Japanese Alliance , among other 
things , acknowledged implicitly Japan ' s ' free hand ' in 
Korea and partly paved the way for the eventual Japanese 
annexation of Korea . 
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The renewal of the Anglo - Japanese Alliance 
at the end of the Russo - Japanese War manifested Britain ' s 
willingness , however reluctant , to sacrifice the 
independence of Korea and to some extent her relatively 
small economic interests in Korea in the interest of her 
broader, global , naval , strategic , political objectives . 
The final conclusion one reaches is that Korea , 
as such , was never more than a minor interest in British 
policy and that British policy towards Korea in the 
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period under consideration, including Korean domestic 
developments , can only be evaluated in the light of overall 
global British imperial objectives . 
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